Hardware processors for pairing-based cryptography by Ronan, Robert
Title Hardware processors for pairing-based cryptography
Author(s) Ronan, Robert
Publication date 2016
Original citation Ronan, R. 2016. Hardware processors for pairing-based cryptography.
PhD Thesis, University College Cork.
Type of publication Doctoral thesis
Rights © 2016, Robert Ronan.
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/
Embargo information No embargo required
Item downloaded
from
http://hdl.handle.net/10468/3291
Downloaded on 2018-08-23T17:59:06Z
Hardware Processors
for Pairing-Based Cryptography
Robert Ronan B.E.
September 13, 2016
A Thesis Submitted to the
National University of Ireland
in Fulfilment of the Requirements for
the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy
Supervisor: Dr. Colin Murphy
Head of School: Prof. Nabeel A. Riza
Department of Electrical and Electronic Engineering, School of Engineering,
National University of Ireland, Cork.
Abstract
Bilinear pairings can be used to construct cryptographic systems with very desirable prop-
erties. A pairing performs a mapping on members of groups on elliptic and genus 2
hyperelliptic curves to an extension of the finite field on which the curves are defined.
The finite fields must, however, be large to ensure adequate security. The complicated
group structure of the curves and the expensive field operations result in time consuming
computations that are an impediment to the practicality of pairing-based systems.
The Tate pairing can be computed efficiently using the ηT method. Hardware architectures
can be used to accelerate the required operations by exploiting the parallelism inherent to
the algorithmic and finite field calculations. The Tate pairing can be performed on elliptic
curves of characteristic 2 and 3 and on genus 2 hyperelliptic curves of characteristic 2.
Curve selection is dependent on several factors including desired computational speed, the
area constraints of the target device and the required security level.
In this thesis, custom hardware processors for the acceleration of the Tate pairing are
presented and implemented on an FPGA. The underlying hardware architectures are de-
signed with care to exploit available parallelism while ensuring resource efficiency. The
characteristic 2 elliptic curve processor contains novel units that return a pairing result in
a very low number of clock cycles. Despite the more complicated computational algorithm,
the speed of the genus 2 processor is comparable. Pairing computation on each of these
curves can be appealing in applications with various attributes. A flexible processor that
can perform pairing computation on elliptic curves of characteristic 2 and 3 has also been
designed. An integrated hardware/software design and verification environment has been
developed. This system automates the procedures required for robust processor creation
and enables the rapid provision of solutions for a wide range of cryptographic applications.
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Explanatory Note
The research work presented in this thesis was performed between the years 2003 and 2007
inclusive. Chapters 1-6 are written in the context of the state of the art of pairing-based
cryptography at that time. Chapter 7 reviews the advances and changes in the research
area between the years 2008 and 2015 inclusive.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation
The earliest cryptographic schemes were employed to ensure the secrecy of a message
in physical transit. Methods included substitution cyphers, in which each letter of the
message was replaced with a letter offset by a fixed number of positions in a repeating
alphabet. Julius Caesar famously employed this scheme to communicate with his generals
during his military campaigns. The secret key in this case was the number of letters
through which the message was shifted, but once this was known, decryption was trivial.
The importance of privacy has grown at a staggering rate and cryptographic systems have
become increasingly robust to meet the requirements of parties that wish to communicate.
The rotor machines of World War II are perhaps the most well known cryptographic
devices of the early 20th century. The rotors controlled a path through an electrical
system. Each letter of the plaintext resulted in a rotor movement, which meant that even
repeated letters within a message were encrypted to different letters of the ciphertext
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through the constantly changing pathways.
In the modern age, cryptography has moved from traditional government and military
applications to the realm of commerce and the general public. Meaningful communication
would be unacceptably constrained without protection of user information and a defined
probability of maintaining security. Currently, security relies on the difficulty of solving
certain mathematical problems, known as one-way functions. These functions should be
efficiently computable by verified users of the scheme. Reversal of the function by an
adversary should, however, be intractable (in practice) without some added information,
usually referred to as a key.
The constant advance of processing power means that existing cryptographic schemes are
ever more susceptible to attack. If a known attack on a scheme becomes realistic, the
difficulty of the mathematical problem must be increased. Unfortunately, this means that
computations required by users of the system also become more expensive. As communi-
cation volume grows the viability of modern systems is becoming increasingly reliant on
the efficient and fast computation of mathematical functions by users of the system.
Singh presents an interesting and engaging overview of the evolution of cryptography in
[4].
1.2 Thesis Aims
Bilinear pairings have been used to construct many protocols with very desirable prop-
erties. An overview of some some such schemes is provided in [5]. Their fast and effi-
cient computation is vital if pairing-based schemes are to be used in real-world scenarios.
Pairings are computed on algebraic curves, known as supersingular elliptic and genus 2
hyperelliptic curves. These curves are defined on finite fields. Pairing algorithms can
be expressed in terms of arithmetic operations on these finite fields and their extensions.
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The Tate pairing has traditionally been the most efficiently computable pairing. It can be
computed relatively quickly by performing an ηT pairing calculation followed by a suitable
exponentiation. In this thesis, this is referred to the ηT method for Tate pairing compu-
tation. However, even with the algorithmic operations available to date, Tate pairing
calculation remains a complex, expensive and time consuming operation.
Custom hardware processors can provide substantial accelerations in pairing computation
times when compared to implementations on general purpose serial processors. They
enable the exploitation of available parallelism in the required operations. Two types of
parallelism are possible in the case of pairings. Firstly, the underlying finite field arithmetic
operations can, in many cases, be performed in terms of parallel operations on a smaller
field. Secondly, hardware units can be designed so that the main computational stages
of the pairing algorithms can be performed in parallel. With careful scheduling, this can
result in a significant reduction in computation time.
A number of factors should be considered when devising a pairing-based scheme. The
system should be created with a desired computation speed and security level in mind.
The area constraints of the target device(s) should also be considered. Each of the curves
has a security multiplier that determines the field size required for a particular level of
security. Elliptic curves of characteristic 2 and 3 have security multipliers of 4 and 6
respectively. Characteristic 2 genus 2 hyperelliptic curves have a security multiplier of 12.
This means that, for a particular security level, the smallest field size can be used in the
genus 2 case. If the required security level increases, the genus 2 implementation will also
scale more efficiently due to the large security multiplier. Pairing computation on genus 2
curves is, however, more complicated than on elliptic curves. This added complexity should
be considered during the designation of a pairing-based system. A quantitative comparison
between the two elliptic cases is not straightforward. Some mathematical attributes of the
characteristic 3 Tate pairing, along with the higher values of the security multipliers, mean
that a smaller finite field size can be used in comparison to the characteristic 2 case. The
implementation of characteristic 3 systems is, however, more expensive than environments
that rely on characteristic 2 computations.
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The hardware implementation of the Tate pairing using the ηT method has not been
published to date. Furthermore, there have been no previous implementations of hardware
processors for any type of pairing on genus 2 hyperelliptic curves. In this work, the
feasibility of accelerators for the Tate pairing using the ηT method is examined in the
two elliptic cases and in the genus 2 case. Efficient hardware units that perform many
of the required operations in parallel are discussed. Pairing processors that use these
units to return a Tate pairing computation in a very low number of clock cycles are
presented. A processor that uses a programmable unit for finite field computation is
also discussed. This processor is flexible and can used in a wide range of environments,
from high speed systems that are relatively unconstrained in terms of area to small, low
power devices. The processors are implemented on reconfigurable devices known as Field
Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs). FPGAs contain a large number of lookup tables,
memory and programmable interconnect. They are relatively inexpensive and their ease
of reconfigurability means that they are an ideal target technology on which to implement
these processors. A Very High Speed Integrated Circuit (VHSIC) language is used to
describe the processors. Architectures are defined at the Register Transfer Level (RTL)
using VHSIC Hardware Description Language (VHDL). The processors are designed so
that the finite field size on which the curves are defined can be changed at will. This
means that the processors can be regenerated with ease if the security level of a system
must be changed.
Once an environment and target application have been chosen, curve and pairing selection
are not trivial as many interconnected factors must be considered. This problem has not
yet been well explored in the literature. A custom software design suite has been created
that automatically generates a wide range of hardware architectures according to user
specifications. This suite communicates with the FPGA and enables rapid prototyping and
benchmarking. It can be used to reduce the effort required to create low level instruction
sequences. Verification can also be performed automatically. This means that, once a
pairing-based protocol has been defined, a system designer can examine the suitability of
various processors with various area constraints, desired computation speed and security
levels in mind.
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1.3 Thesis Outline & Contributions
In this section, a thesis outline is provided and the contributions of this work are discussed.
Chapter 2 introduces the background necessary for an understanding of the subject matter
of this research. A brief description of private key and public key systems is provided. The
use of bilinear pairings in cryptography is discussed to provide context for this work. The
theory of finite fields is outlined. The mathematics of elliptic and genus 2 hyperelliptic
curves is presented. Computation of the group operation of these curves is explained.
Security considerations for curve-based systems are also discussed. Finally, some benefits
of the use of elliptic and hyperelliptic curves in cryptography are outlined.
Chapter 3 is concerned with the computation of the Tate and ηT pairings. The ηT pairing
is presented and Tate pairing computation, using the ηT method, discussed. Consider-
ations for the use of pairings in cryptography are outlined. The concepts underpinning
Identity-Based Encryption (IBE) are discussed and the Boneh-Franklin IBE scheme pre-
sented. The methodology used for the hardware implementation of the Tate pairing in this
work is discussed. A design system that has been created for the automatic generation,
implementation, benchmarking and verification of pairing processors is presented. This
can be used to generate processors according to various security, area and speed require-
ments. It can also be used to aid in curve and pairing selection on setup or modification
of a cryptographic scheme.
In Chapter 4, a dedicated processor for pairing computation on elliptic curves of character-
istic 2 is presented. The algorithms and operations required for Tate pairing computation
using the ηT method are discussed. The hardware modules that implement F2m arithmetic
are described. Techniques for the efficient compution of F24m arithmetic are discussed and
efficient extension field hardware architectures presented. Hardware units that perform
the various steps of Tate pairing computation are discussed. These units are designed in
a manner that enables calculations to be performed in parallel during the most expen-
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sive computational loop of the pairing algorithm. Finally, the top level processor that
utilises these architectures to return a fast Tate pairing result is presented. The efficient
scheduling of operations in the processor is also discussed. Results demonstrate that the
processor can return a pairing result in a low number of clock cycles. The subject matter
of this chapter was published in [6], [7] and [8].
The hardware implementation of the genus 2 hyperelliptic curve Tate pairing is discussed
in Chapter 5. A design strategy for the computation of the Tate pairing, using the ηT
method, in this case is outlined. The large extension degree means that care must be
taken to ensure that arithmetic units are not too large or complex. A tower of extensions
is used to reduce arithmetic operations on F212m to operations on F26m . These subfield
operations can be performed either serially or in parallel, depending on their complexity
and resource availability. In practice, dedicated units for each of the computational steps
of the algorithms cannot be used in the genus 2 case as the use of all available parallelism
would result in an extremely large area footprint. Instead, custom hardware units are
presented that share the most costly algorithmic operations. These units are designed to
minimise the impact of resource sharing on computation time while maximising efficiency.
The top level architecture of the pairing processor is presented. Results show that the
genus 2 processor can return a pairing in a similar time to the characteristic 2 elliptic curve
processor. Furthermore, it can return comparable results while utilising fewer resources.
The topics discussed and architectures described in this chapter were published in [9] and
[10].
A flexible processor for pairing computation on elliptic curves of both characteristic 2 and 3
is presented in Chapter 6. At this point in the thesis, characteristic 2 arithmetic has already
been detailed in previous chapters. Characteristic 3 arithmetic is discussed and hardware
modules that implement the required operations are presented. The processor described
in this chapter does not contain any extension field arithmetic units. Instead, several
subfield arithmetic modules operate in parallel. The most costly arithmetic operation is
multiplication. For this reason, the number of multipliers can be varied at will and the
design regenerated automatically using the platform that has been developed. This means
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that the pairing processor can be implemented on devices with extremely small area and
strict power constraints by limiting the number of multipliers. A design subsystem that
can be used to quickly generate the instruction sequences required to implement pairing
algorithms is also discussed. Results returned show that the flexible processor has a very
high level of efficiency. The topics covered in this chapter were published in [11], [12] and
[13].
In Chapter 7, a review of modern pairing-based cryptography is provided. Several pairings
with features that are attractive for the security requirements of contemporary schemes are
described. Currently known computational and side channel attacks are outlined, along
with countermeasures that can be used to render the attacks infeasible. The software
computation of pairings is discussed. This is an area that has received much attention
in recent years as some suggested systems rely on the efficient computation of pairings
on small devices such as microprocessors. The state of the art of pairing implementation
using dedicated hardware architectures is also discussed. Some interesting modern appli-
cations of pairings are described. Finally, some future work in the area of pairing-based
cryptography is suggested.
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Chapter 2
Background
2.1 Introduction
The concepts required for an understanding of this research are discussed in this chapter.
Private and public key cryptography are described in Section 2.2. An introduction to
cryptography based on curves and pairings is also provided. Cryptographically suitable
curves have coordinates that exist on finite fields. These fields are discussed in Section
2.3. The mathematical theory underpinning hyperelliptic curves is provided in Section
2.4. Some curves are not suitable for cryptographic purposes since they are vulnerable to
practical attacks. Two types of hyperelliptic curves, known as elliptic and genus 2 curves,
can be used securely and are discussed in Section 2.5. Security considerations for curve-
based schemes are outlined in Section 2.6. The merits of hyperelliptic curve cryptography
are also discussed. Finally, a hyperelliptic curve protocol is described in detail to provide
some context to the subject matter of this chapter.
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2.2 Cryptography
This section provides a brief introduction to cryptography. Some terminology is first
defined. The message to be sent is known as the plaintext. The disguised version of the
message, to be sent across an insecure channel, is known as the ciphertext. Encryption is
the means of converting the plaintext to ciphertext, and decryption is the procedure used
to convert it back again. The intended viewers of the plaintext are called the recipients.
Unintended viewers of the message while it is in transit are called eavesdroppers. A key is
a tool that can be used to encrypt or decrypt a message. A cryptosystem is the finite set of
possible plaintexts, possible ciphertexts, possible keys and algorithms for encryption and
decryption. An overview of modern cryptography, the algorithms used, and the practical
implementation of cryptographic systems is available in [14].
2.2.1 Private Key Cryptography
In private key cryptography, a single key is used for both encryption and decryption. The
sender encrypts a message using a key and sends the ciphertext to the recipient. The
recipient then decrypts the ciphertext using the same key. This is known as symmetric
key cryptography. In this case the same key must be made available to both the recipient
and the sender, but must remain hidden from eavesdroppers. An illustration of this type
of system is provided in Figure 2.1.
Eve
Messagem
Secret Key k
c=E (m)K
Ac
Bob
Secret Key k
m=D (c)K
Alice
Figure 2.1: Private Key Cryptographic System
Here, Alice uses the encryption algorithm E, along with the secret key k, to encrypt a
message m. This produces the ciphertext c, which is sent across the insecure channel.
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On receipt of c, Bob uses the decryption algorithm D and the secret key to retrieve the
original plaintext.
Private key schemes can be implemented using block ciphers and stream ciphers. Block
ciphers operate on a fixed length of plaintext and produce a ciphertext of the same fixed
size. The Advanced Encryption Standard uses block ciphers [15]. Stream ciphers encrypt
a small segment of the plaintext at a time using a pseudorandom stream of small keys.
These ciphers are suited to applications in which the size of the plaintext is not known in
advance. In practice, block ciphers are regularly used in conjunction with stream ciphers
in private key cryptographic schemes. A good introduction to ciphers is available in [16].
Private key schemes have the capacity for very high data throughput. Key distribution is,
however, a significant problem. Keys cannot be transferred over the insecure channel as, if
intercepted by an adversary, all communication will be compromised. In the recent past,
some keys were sent by physical means such as a private courier. It is clear that this is not
feasible in a modern society in which a large number of connections are established every
second. In systems with a large number of users, key management is also problematic as
a large number of unique keys is required.
2.2.2 Public Key Cryptography
Public key cryptography can help to solve the problems associated with key distribution,
management and authentication. In 1976 Diffie and Hellman proposed a system that
allows users to safely share a secret key over an insecure channel [17]. The shared key can
then be used in a high throughput private key scheme. This is the first published example
of a public key cryptographic scheme.
To aid in the understanding of public key cryptography, consider the case in which Alice
and Bob wish to generate a shared key for communication over an insecure channel. Alice
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and Bob are first each assigned a private key and a public key. Security does not depend on
the inaccessibility of the public keys and they can be made freely available. Alice and Bob
must keep their private keys secret. Let G be a cyclic group of order n with a generating
element g. Alice chooses a random integer 1 ≤ a < n. This is her private key. She then
computes her public key ga. Bob chooses a random integer 1 ≤ b < n. This is his private
key. He then computes his public key gb. After this, Alice retrieves Bob’s public key and
computes (gb)
a
. Bob computes (ga)b. Now both Alice and Bob have computed gab, which
is the value of the shared secret key. An eavesdropper has to solve the Diffie-Hellman
Problem (DHP) to obtain the shared secret key. This is the problem of computing the
value of gab given g, ga and gb. The intractability of this problem relies on the difficulty
of the Discrete Logarithm Problem in the group. In practice, the group order n must be
very large to ensure adequate security.
The scheme is, however, susceptible to a man in the middle attack. An eavesdropper can
tamper with or replace the public keys of Alice and Bob if she intercepts them before the
shared secret key has been generated. She can then pretend to be either party or simply
listen to the conversation even though the parties believe that their communication is
secure. To prevent this, Diffie and Hellman suggested the use of digital signatures. Alice
can sign the message using her own private key and encrypt it using Bob’s public key. Bob
can now be sure that the key was created by Alice and not altered in transit by decrypting
using her public key. A central Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) is usually required. A
PKI is used to generate, manage and store digital certificates. These certificates are tied
to keys so that users can be assured of their validity.
In 1978, Rivest, Shamir and Adleman devised RSA, the first usable public key encryption
scheme [18]. In RSA, public keys are used for encryption and private keys for decryption.
System security relies on the intractability of factoring the product of two large prime
numbers. In 1985, Elgamal proposed an encryption scheme that, instead, relies on the
intractability of the discrete logarithm problem in a finite field Fq, where q is the number of
elements in the field. Sub-exponential attacks can be used against the integer factorisation
problem and the DLP on a finite field. This means that very large key sizes must be used
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to ensure an adequate level of security.
In 1986, Miller [19] and Koblitz [20] suggested that elliptic curves can be used in public
key cryptographic schemes. Security is manifested in the intractability of the DLP in the
group of elliptic curve points with coordinates in Fq. This is a more difficult problem than
in the finite field case and smaller key sizes can, therefore, be used. The group operation
is, however, more complicated. In 1989, Koblitz showed that curves of any genus can be
used [21]. Genus 2 curves are invulnerable to some attacks on elliptic curves and even
smaller key sizes can be used. However, the group operation is more complex than in the
elliptic case.
An introduction to public key cryptography and its infrastructures is provided in [22]. A
comprehensive overview of elliptic curve cryptography is available in [23].
2.2.3 Cryptography Based on Pairings
In 2000, Joux devised a one round tripartite Diffie-Hellman key agreement scheme using
the bilinearity property of pairings [24]. This was the first example of the constructive use
of pairings (previous to this, they had been used for the purposes of cryptographic attack).
Identity-Based Encryption (IBE) schemes are the most well known application of pairings
in cryptography. The concept of IBE was first proposed by Shamir in 1984 [25]. In his
proposal, the generation of a shared secret key is not required before communication can
commence. The identities of users of the scheme can be utilised to send messages securely.
The creation of a fully usable IBE scheme remained an open problem for many years as a
secure implementation method could not be found. In 2001, however, Boneh and Franklin
used the bilinearity and other desirable properties of pairings to construct the first fully
functional IBE system [26]. Public keys are directly linked to the identities of the users of
an IBE scheme (email addresses or even real names can be used as keys). If Alice wishes
to send a message to Bob she encrypts the message using Bob’s identity and some other
system parameters that are available to all users. On receipt of the message Bob decrypts
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the message using his private key. The steps required to perform the Boneh-Franklin IBE
scheme are detailed in Subsection 3.4.2.
For comparative purposes, first consider a conventional public key scheme (which can be
implemented using, for example, RSA or curve-based cryptography). The PKI registers
users of the network. Users generate their own public keys from their private keys. All
public keys must be sent to the PKI to be validated before they can be used. Digital cer-
tificates are tied to validated keys by a Certification Authority (CA). A typical validation
and certification process is illustrated in Figure 2.2 (Network World [1]).
Figure 2.2: Conventional Public Key Validation and Certification Process (Source: Net-
work World [1])
In order to establish trust with Bob, Alice must follow a number of steps. She first requests
the public key of the CA, which is known as the root certificate. On receipt of this, she
generates a certificate request containing her identity information and her public key, signs
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it using the root certificate and sends it to the CA. The CA verifies Alice’s identity and
creates a digital certificate for Alice by binding her identity and public key. The CA then
signs this digital certificate using its own private key and issues the final certificate to Alice,
to be used as her identity certificate. Finally, Alice presents this to Bob, who follows the
digital signature verification process to establish trust in her public key. Once trust has
been established, secure information exchange can be initiated. As the number of users
grows, the key and certificate management system may become increasingly complex. The
resources required to store the keys and certificates can also be costly.
A basic example of an IBE system is illustrated in Figure 2.3 (Wikipedia [2]). All private
keys are generated from a shared master key by the Private Key Generator (PKG). Alice
and Bob first obtain their own private keys from the PKG. The security of this transfer
is paramount. To ensure secrecy, the key transfer can be performed off-line if desired.
To send a message to Bob, Alice generates a public key using Bob’s identity. She then
encrypts and signs the message using her own private key, the public key and parameters
that are available to all users of the system. On receipt of the message, Bob decrypts the
message using Alice’s public key, his own private key, and the publicly available parameters
of the system.
The elimination of the PKI can result in significant savings in terms of resources and
system complexity. Digital certificates are not required to establish public keys. This
removes the necessity for a central public key and management environment. To further
improve the security of an IBE system, the shared master key can be destroyed if no
more users are to be added. The designers of IBE schemes must, however, endeavour to
minimise the impact of the necessity for a secure private key transmission channel. Some
schemes require the generation and communication of private keys only at setup. Private
keys can also be transferred by physical means.
An example of a particularly useful application of IBE is in the area of Wireless Sensor
Networks (WSNs). WSN systems usually consist of a large number of sensor devices, which
communicate with each other to relay information to a central server. Before deployment,
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Figure 2.3: Identity-Based Encryption (Source: Wikipedia [2])
private keys can be transferred by physical means. Once deployed, low power consumption
is vital since the devices may be located in environments from which they are difficult
to retrieve. The devices are usually relatively inexpensive and the highest energy cost is
commonly that of communication. IBC can be used to reduce the number of transmissions
required to establish trust and initiate secure information exchange. An Identity-Based
Non-Interactive Key Distribution Scheme (ID-NIKDS), described by Sakai et al. in [27],
is very suitable for use in WSNs.
Canetti et al. [28] discuss how IBE can be used to construct a simple and efficient public
key encryption scheme that provides security against chosen-cyphertext attacks. Pairings
have also been used in the implementation of non identity-based cryptographic applica-
tions. Several signature schemes with very desirable properties have been proposed and
implemented using pairings. Other applications include threshold schemes, in which pri-
vate information can be distributed among several parties to reduce the impact of the
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failure of a single point in the system. A survey of such schemes is available in [5].
The advantages of ECC and IBE for wireless security are briefly outlined in [29]. A
concise introduction to pairing-based cryptography can be found in the Master’s thesis of
Maas [30]. A detailed treatment on the various aspects of identity-based cryptography is
available in [31].
2.3 Finite Field Theory
The work described in this thesis is based on computations on groups of hyperelliptic curve
elements. The curves are defined on finite fields. This subsection provides an overview of
the mathematics of these fields. A comprehensive resource for the theory of finite fields
is available in [32]. Wong provides an overview of finite fields and their applications to
cryptography in [33].
2.3.1 Groups and Rings
Before finite fields can be discussed, a brief introduction to groups and rings is necessary.
Some definitions are also provided.
Definition 2.3.1. (group) A group is an algebraic structure consisting of a set of ele-
ments together with a binary operation. Given a binary operator ‘+’ (this notation is for
convenience, the operator is not necessarily addition) then the following properties must
be satisfied for all a, b, c ∈ G:
• Closure: If d = a+ b, then d must also be a member of G.
• Associativity: (a+ b) + c = a+ (b+ c).
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• Identity: For each a there exists an element 0 ∈ G such that 0 + a = a+ 0 = a.
• Inverse: For each a ∈ G, there exists some element −a ∈ G such that a+ (−a) =
(−a) + a = 0
Definition 2.3.2. (abelian group) A group G is abelian if, for all a, b ∈ G, then a+b =
b+ a. An abelian group is also known as a commutative group.
Definition 2.3.3. (finite group) A group G is finite if it contains a finite number of
elements.
Definition 2.3.4. (group order) The order of a group G, denoted #G, is the number
of elements in that group.
Definition 2.3.5. (subgroup) A non empty subset G′ of G is a subgroup of G if G′ forms
a group under the same binary operation and inverse element as G.
Definition 2.3.6. (cyclic group, generator, scalar multiplication) A group G is
cyclic if, for all elements a ∈ G, each associated with some integer ka < #G, there exists
a single element g ∈ G such that [ka]a = g. The element g is known as the generator of
the group. The operation [k]a, for any integer k, is known as scalar multiplication and is
performed by adding a to itself k times. All cyclic groups are abelian.
Definition 2.3.7. (order of a group member, torsion group) Consider a group G
and a ∈ G. The order of a is the lowest value of n such that [n]a = 0. The subgroup of
elements with order n in G is known as an n-torsion group, denoted G[n].
Note that the order of a group generator is always equal to the group order.
Consider a group G with binary operator ‘+’ and a group H with binary operator ‘∗’.
These groups can be written as (G,+) and (H, ∗) respectively.
Definition 2.3.8. (group homomorphism) A group homomorphism from (G,+) to
(H, ∗) is a mapping function φ : G→ H such that for all elements a, b ∈ G.
φ(a+ b) = φ(a) ∗ φ(b) (2.1)
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There are various mapping functions.
• Injective function: There will never be more than one element of G mapped to
a single element of H. Note that there may be elements of H that do not have a
corresponding element in G after the mapping.
• Surjective function: Every element of H has one (or more) corresponding ele-
ment(s) in G after the mapping. An element of G may be mapped to more than one
element of H.
• Bijective function: Every element of G is paired exactly with one element of H
and every element of H is paired exactly with one element of G.
These mapping functions give rise to different types of group homomorphism.
1. Group Monomorphism: A homomorphism that is injective. Distinctness on G is
preserved through the mapping.
2. Group Epimorphism: A homomorphism that is surjective. The mapping of ele-
ments from G reaches every element in H.
3. Group Isomorphism: A homomorphism that is bijective. The groups G and H
are identical in operation and differ only in the notation of their elements.
4. Group Endomorphism: This is a homomorphism between G and itself, φ : G→
G.
5. Group Automorphism: This is an endomorphism that is bijective. It is also an
isomorphism. The set of all automorphisms of a group G forms a group known as
the automorphism group of G.
Definition 2.3.9. (ring) A ring R is a set of elements with two binary operators, usually
referred to as addition and multiplication, ‘+’ and ‘∗’. The ring must satisfy the following
properties for all a, b, c ∈ R:
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• Additive associativity: (a+ b) + c = a+ (b+ c)
• Additive commutativity: a+ b = b+ a
• Additive identity: For all a there exists an element 0 ∈ R such that 0+a = a+0 =
a.
• Additive Inverse: For every a, there exists some element −a ∈ R such that a +
(−a) = (−a) + a = 0
• Left and right distributivity: a∗(b+c) = a∗b+a∗c and (b+c)∗a = (b∗a)+(c∗a)
• Multiplicative associativity: (a ∗ b) ∗ c = a ∗ (b ∗ c)
Definition 2.3.10. (commutative ring) A ring R is commutative if its multiplicative
operation is commutative, i.e. a ∗ b = b ∗ a for all a, b ∈ R
An element a ∈ R is invertible if a ∗ a−1 = 1 where a−1 is some other element in R.
Definition 2.3.11. (subring) A ring R′ is a subring of R if R′ is a subset of R and is
a ring under the same addition and multiplication operations and identity elements.
2.3.2 Finite Fields
Definition 2.3.12. (field) A field F is a commutative ring in which all elements, exclud-
ing 0, have a multiplicative inverse.
Definition 2.3.13. (subfield, extension field) A field F ′ is a subfield of F if F ′ is a
subset of F and is a field with respect to the same binary operations and identity elements.
F is called an extension field with respect to F ′. The extension field may be written as
F/F ′ for clarity.
Definition 2.3.14. (finite field) A finite field is a field in which the number of elements
is finite. A finite field is written as Fq, where q is the field order (the number of elements
in the field).
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To satisfy its axioms, the order of a finite field will always have the form q = pm, where p
is a prime and m is a positive integer. The prime p is known as the characteristic of the
field and m is the dimension of the field. Fields with p = 2, 3 and m > 1 are considered
in this research since pairings, when computed on curves that are defined on these fields,
are very suitable for hardware implementation.
Polynomials can be used to represent elements of a finite field. Polynomial representation
has many advantageous features for the computation of finite field arithmetic. A generator
polynomial, denoted f(x), is used to construct the field. This polynomial is of degree m
and has, with the exclusion of constants, no roots in the field. It can be written as
f(x) = xm +
∑m−1
i=0 fix
i, where all fi ∈ Z and fi ∈ {1 − p, p − 1}. The relationship
f(x) = 0 ∈ Fq holds, and is useful for computation of field arithmetic. The generator
polynomial is also known as the irreducible polynomial.
In this work, irreducible polynomials with the lowest number of non-zero coefficients are
used to generate the field in use (in practice, trinomials and pentanomials are always
available). When there is a choice between irreducible polynomials with the same num-
ber of coefficients, the polynomial which has the lowest (m − 1)th coefficient is selected.
This ensures that the hardware resources required to perform finite field arithmetic are
minimised.
Given an element a ∈ Fq, q = pm, the polynomial representation of a in the variable x is
a(x) =
m−1∑
i=0
aix
i = a0 + a1x+ . . . + am−1xm−1 (2.2)
where all ai ∈ Fp and Fp is the ring of integers modulo p . Note that the degree of the
polynomial, denoted δ(a), has maximum value m− 1.
Addition of two elements a(x), b(x) ∈ Fq with degree δ(a) and δ(b), respectively, is per-
formed coefficient-wise as
a(x) + b(x) =
n∑
i=0
(ai + bi)x
i (2.3)
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where n = max(δ(a), δ(b)). The coefficients are members of Fp and addition is, therefore,
performed modulo p.
Multiplication of the polynomials a(x) and b(x) in a conventional manner may result in a
polynomial with degree larger than m − 1. This polynomial cannot be a member of Fq.
The generator f(x) is used to reduce the result in this case. Multiplication proceeds as
follows.
Consider the polynomials a(x), b(x) ∈ Fq with degrees δ(a) and δ(b), respectively. Con-
ventional polynomial multiplication returns
c′(x) =
δ(a)∑
i=0
δ(b)∑
j=0
(ai.bj)x
i+j . (2.4)
where ai, bj ∈ Fp.
The degree of c′(x) is δ(c′) = δ(a) + δ(b). If δ(c′) is larger than m− 1 then the polynomial
c′(x) cannot be a member of Fq and must be reduced modulo the irreducible polynomial
f(x). Two methods can be employed to perform this reduction:
1. c′(x) is divided by f(x) using regular polynomial division (with subtraction being
performed modulo p). If the remainder of this division, r(x), has δ(r) ≤ m− 1 then
reduction is complete. If this is not the case, then r(x) is repeatedly divided by f(x)
until δ(r) < m. The final value of the remainder r(x) is the multiplicative result and
is a member of Fq.
2. Since f(x) = 0 ∈ Fq, then xm =
∑m−1
i=0 fix
i. This relationship is used to remove the
terms of the composition polynomial that are of degree greater than m− 1.
As an example, consider the field F24 , generated by f = f(x) = x4 + x + 1. Let a =
a(x) = x3 + x2 + 1 represent the element (1101)2 and let b = b(x) = x
3 + 1 represent
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(1001)2. Multiplication of a and b begins with the composition stage, which produces the
polynomial c′ = x6 + x5 + x2 + 1. The first reduction method involves dividing c′ by f
until the degree of the remainder is less than 4. Two rounds are required: the first returns
r = x5 + x3 + 1, whilst the second returns r = x3 + x2 + x + 1. Since δ(r) ≤ m − 1
at this point, the value of a.b ∈ Fq is, therefore, given by r, which can also be written
as (1111)2. The second reduction method uses the relationship x
4 = x + 1. From this,
x5 = x.x4 = x(x+ 1) = x2 +x. Also, x6 = x.x5 = x(x2 +x) = x3 +x2. The reduced result
is then given by c = x3 + x2 + x2 + x+ x2 + 1 = x3 + x2 + x+ 1.
Notation is required to represent the construction of Fq using the irreducible polynomial
f(x). Let Fp[x] be the ring of all possible polynomials with coefficients in Fp. The field
Fq = Fpm is an m-dimensional extension of Fp. The field Fpm is generated by the degree
m polynomial f(x) ∈ Fp[x]. This is written as
Fq = Fpm ≡ Fp[x]/f(x) where f(x) =
m∑
i=0
fix
i for all fi ∈ Fp and fm 6= 0 (2.5)
Put simply, Fpm is the set of all possible polynomials with coefficients in Fp reduced modulo
f(x).
The field Fq can itself be extended. Let Fq[y] be the ring of all polynomials with coefficients
in Fq. If a k-dimensional extension of Fq is required, another polynomial g(y) that is
irreducible in Fqk is selected and used to generate Fqk . This is written as
Fqk = F(pm)k ≡ Fq[y]/g(y) where g(y) =
k∑
i=0
giy
i for all gi ∈ Fq and gk 6= 0 (2.6)
A series of extensions of the same field is known as a tower of extensions. It is possible
to perform arithmetic on an extension field in terms of arithmetic on one or several of
its subfields if towers are used. These subfield operations can be performed in parallel in
hardware in many cases.
A useful automorphism exists on finite fields and their extensions. This automorphism
can simplify the exponentiation of elements and can be used to reduce the complexity
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of finite field multiplication, as will be seen later in this thesis. Fermat’s little theorem
states that for any integer a and prime p then ap ≡ a mod p. On a prime field Fp this
means that ap = a for every element a of the field. The mapping of a to ap is called the
Frobenius automorphism of the field. It can be written as a mapping F : a → ap or as a
function F (a) = ap. The field is cyclic under this mapping and the Frobenius is said to
fix the field. It is clear that this function respects multiplication on Fp. Given r, s ∈ Fp
then F (rs) = (rs)p = rpsp under the associative rule. The Frobenius also respects the
addition rule. Given F (r + s) = (r + s)p it can be shown (using the binomial theorem)
that (r+ s)p = rp + sp on a prime field and the addition rule is, therefore, satisfied. These
properties also hold for all extensions of Fp.
Now, consider a prime power field Fq = Fpm . The order of Fq is q, so if the field is to be
cyclic then bq = b for all b ∈ Fq. The required mapping in this case is F : b → bq. Since
q = pm, the mapping can be written as F : b→ bpm . This can be achieved by performing
m iterations of b → bp. The Frobenius of Fq is known as the m-th order Frobenius and
fixes the field Fp inside Fq, i.e. Fq ≡ Fq/Fp.
Consider a k-dimensional extension of Fq. The field Fqk has order qk so a mapping F :
c → cqk is required. Since Fqk is an extension of Fq, this can be written as c → cqk . The
mapping on this field can, therefore, be performed using k iterations of the m-th order
Frobenius. This map fixes Fq inside Fqk , i.e. Fqk ≡ Fqk/Fq/Fp. The same properties hold
for all extensions of Fq. These Frobenius mappings, which are relatively easy to perform,
prove very useful for pairing computation, as will be seen in the next chapter.
Some further definitions concerning extension fields are required before hyperelliptic curves
can be introduced.
Definition 2.3.15. (algebraic element) If a field L is an extension of a field K then
an element a ∈ L is algebraic over K if a has a root in some non-zero polynomial with
coefficients in K, i.e. b(a) = 0 for some polynomial b(x) ∈ K.
Definition 2.3.16. (algebraic closure of a field) The algebraic closure of a field K,
denoted K¯, is a field in which every element has a root in a polynomial with coefficients
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in K.
For a finite field with q = pm, the algebraic closure of Fq is the union of all finite fields
with order qn, for all positive integers n.
F¯q =
∞⋃
n=1
Fqn (2.7)
2.4 The Mathematics of Hyperelliptic Curves
Hyperelliptic curves contain additive groups with properties that are advantageous to the
construction of cryptographic protocols. The mathematics of these groups is outlined in
this section. Note that discussion will remain general; the specific cases of elliptic and
genus 2 hyperelliptic curves will not be discussed until Section 2.5. A brief overview of the
mathematics of hyperelliptic curves is provided in [34]. A more comprehensive treatment
of elliptic and hyperelliptic curves and their group arithmetic is available in [35].
2.4.1 Curve Definition
Definition 2.4.1. (hyperelliptic curve) A hyperelliptic curve C on a field K is defined
by
C : y2 + h(x)y = f(x) (2.8)
where (x, y) are members of the algebraic closure K¯, h(x) ∈ K[x] is a polynomial of degree
less than or equal to an integer g and f(x) ∈ K[x] is a monic polynomial of degree 2g+ 1.
The value of g is known as the genus of the curve.
For cryptographic use, the curve should have no singular points. This means that there
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should be no point on C that satisfies both partial derivatives
2y + h(x) = 0 (2.9)
h′(x)y − f ′(x) = 0 (2.10)
where h′(x) = δh(x)δx and f
′(x) = δf(x)δx .
A point P on C is represented by an (x, y) pair, where x and y are elements of the algebraic
closure K¯. The set of points, together with a special point at infinity∞, is denoted C(K¯).
For convenience, C(K¯) is written as C.
The opposite of a point P ∈ C with (x, y) ∈ K¯ is given by
−P = (−x,−y − h(x)) (2.11)
Note that if P =∞ then −P =∞.
2.4.2 Divisors
The computations relevant to this research are performed on divisors.
Definition 2.4.2. (divisor) A divisor D is a finite formal sum of points on C such that
D =
∑
P∈C
mpP (2.12)
where mp is an integer and only a finite number of mp are non-zero.
The notation mp is used to describe the number of instances a particular point P exists
in the divisor construction.
Definition 2.4.3. (degree of a divisor) Given a divisor D =
∑
P∈C mpP , the degree
of D is the sum of all values of mP
deg(D) =
∑
mP (2.13)
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Definition 2.4.4. (support of a divisor) The support of a divisor is the set of all points
at which mp 6= 0.
Definition 2.4.5. (degenerate divisor) A divisor with a single point in its support is
known as a degenerate divisor.
The set of all divisors on C, denoted D, forms an abelian group under an addition law,
which is defined as follows: Given two divisors D1 =
∑
P∈C mPP and D2 =
∑
P∈C nPP
then
D1 +D2 =
∑
P∈C
(mP + nP )P (2.14)
The identity element of D is
∑
0P = 0 and the additive inverse of a divisor D =∑
P∈C mpP is −D =
∑
P∈C(−mP )P .
Definition 2.4.6. (greatest common divisor (gcd)) The greatest common divisor of
D1 =
∑
mP
P and D2 =
∑
nP
P is given by
gcd(D1, D2) =
∑
min(mP , nP )P −
∑
min(mP , nP )∞ (2.15)
Note that gcd(D1, D2) will be a divisor of degree 0.
2.4.3 Polynomial and Rational Functions
Definition 2.4.7. (coordinate ring, polynomial function) Given a hyperelliptic curve
C and an algebraic closure K¯, the coordinate ring of C over K¯ is the set of all polynomials
in K¯ reduced modulo C. It is a quotient ring defined as
K¯[C] = K¯[x, y]/(y2 + h(x)y − f(x)) (2.16)
An element of K¯[C] is called a polynomial function of C.
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Definition 2.4.8. (rational function) Given polynomial functions G,H ∈ K¯[C] and
H 6= 0 a rational function R is given by
R = G/H (2.17)
The field of rational functions on C is written as K¯(C).
The somewhat subtle difference between the notation used for rings and field should be
noted. If R is a ring then R[x] denotes the set of polynomials in x with coefficients from
R. If L is a field then L(x) denotes the set of polynomials in x with coefficients from L.
Definition 2.4.9. (uniformising parameter, intersection multiplicity) Let P be a
point on C. Let d be an integer and U, S ∈ K¯(C) such that U(P ) = 0 and S(P ) 6= 0,∞.
Each polynomial G ∈ K¯[C] satisfies the relationship G = UdS at P . The function U is
known as the uniformising parameter of G. The integer d is known as the intersection
multiplicity of G at P and does not depend on the choice of U .
Definition 2.4.10. (order of a polynomial function) Consider a polynomial function
G ∈ K¯[C]. The order of G at a point P is equal to the intersection multiplicity d of G at
P and is given by
ordP (G) = d (2.18)
Definition 2.4.11. (divisor of a polynomial function) The divisor of a polynomial
function G ∈ K¯[C] is given by
div(G) =
∑
P∈C
[ordP (G)]P (2.19)
Definition 2.4.12. (divisor and order of a rational function) Let R = G/H, where
R ∈ K¯(C) and G,H ∈ K¯[C]. The divisor of R is defined as
div(R) =
∑
P∈C
[ordP (R)]P (2.20)
and also satisfies
div(R) = div(G)− div(H) (2.21)
The order of the divisor of a rational function is, therefore, always equal to 0.
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A divisor of a rational function is usually known as a principal divisor, defined formally
as follows.
Definition 2.4.13. (principal divisor) A divisor D is a principal divisor if it is a divisor
of some rational function R ∈ K¯(C). All principal divisors are, therefore, of degree 0. The
set of all principal divisors is written as P.
The set of degree zero divisors is written as D0. The set P forms an important subgroup
of D0.
2.4.4 The Jacobian
The group on which the hyperelliptic curve discrete logarithm problem is constructed is
known as the Jacobian of the curve.
Definition 2.4.14. (Jacobian) The Jacobian of a hyperelliptic curve C is the quotient
group of the degree zero divisors modulo the principal divisors, so that
JC = D
0/P (2.22)
The elements of the Jacobian are defined according to an equivalence relation between
degree zero divisors, denoted ∼.
Definition 2.4.15. (equivalent divisors) Consider two divisors D1, D2 ∈ D0 on a
hyperelliptic curve. D1 and D2 are known as equivalent divisors if D1 −D2 is a principal
divisor, i.e.
D1 ∼ D2 if D1 −D2 ∈ P (2.23)
The Jacobian group is partitioned into subsets such that each subset contains divisors
that are related to each other under the equivalence relation. These subsets are known as
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equivalence classes. All of the equivalence classes are cosets with respect to each other.
The Jacobian is an equivalence class group under this partition. The equivalence classes
can be represented using divisors with particular properties.
Definition 2.4.16. (semi-reduced divisor) A semi-reduced divisor is a degree 0 divisor
of form
D =
∑
miP −
∑
mi∞ (2.24)
with the following properties:
1. All mi ≥ 0 and all of the points must be finite.
2. If mi 6= 0 at a point P and P 6= −P then the divisor can contain either P or −P
but not both.
3. If a point P = −P then mi ≤ 1 at that point.
Every divisor in D0 has an equivalent semi-reduced divisor.
Definition 2.4.17. (reduced divisor) A reduced divisor is a semi-reduced divisor that
also satisfies the property
∑
mi ≤ g, where g is the genus of the curve.
Using the Riemann-Roch theorem [36], it can be shown that every equivalence class of the
Jacobian contains exactly one reduced divisor that is unique to that class. Each class can,
therefore, be represented by its own reduced divisor. The Jacobian forms an abelian group
under the addition of these reduced divisors. This additive operation is very important in
the context of curve-based cryptography.
Mumford [37] proposed a method for writing each reduced divisor in terms of two related
polynomials. This representation is convenient for addition on the Jacobian.
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2.4.5 Mumford Notation
From this point forward, discussion will be restricted to curves on finite fields since main-
taining generality would result in additional complexity whilst providing no benefit. The
hyperelliptic curve C : y2 +h(x)y = f(x) of genus g is now defined on a finite field Fq and
has points P = (x, y) with x, y ∈ F¯q. Note that if a hyperelliptic curve is defined over Fq
then it is also defined on all extensions of Fq.
Mumford provides a way to represent reduced divisors as follows.
Definition 2.4.18. (Mumford notation) All reduced divisors D =
∑
mi
Pi −
∑
mi
∞
on a hyperelliptic curve C : y2 + h(x)y = f(x) can be represented by two polynomials u(x)
and v(x) such that
u(x) =
∏
i
(x− xi)mi (2.25)
v(xi) = yi (2.26)
where Pi = (xi, yi). These polynomials must satisfy the following properties:
1. u is monic
2. deg(v) < deg(u) ≤ g
3. u divides v2 + vh− f
A divisor is written as D = [u, v] when using Mumford notation.
Up until now the coordinates of the points have been defined on F¯q. However, F¯q may be
a very large field in comparison to Fq. Fortunately, an automorphism can be used so that
the coordinates can be defined on Fq.
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Definition 2.4.19. (Fq-rational divisor) Consider a divisor D =
∑
mP
P where D ∈
D0. D is said to be defined over Fq if, for all automorphisms σ of F¯q over Fq, then
Dσ =
∑
mP
P σ =
∑
mP
(σ(x), σ(y)) where Dσ = D. D is known as an Fq-rational divisor.
On fields with suitable automorphisms, points with coordinates (x, y) ∈ Fq can be used to
construct reduced divisors on the Jacobian. The Mumford polynomials are considerably
smaller as a result.
An algorithm that uses Mumford notation to perform divisor addition on the Jacobian
was proposed by Cantor in 1989 [36].
2.4.6 Cantor’s Algorithm
Cantor’s algorithm is used to add two reduced divisors on the Jacobian. Elements of the
Jacobian form an abelian group under this operation. The algorithm is performed in two
steps, respectively known as composition and reduction. Given the reduced divisors D1
and D2, a semi-reduced divisor D
′ is first calculated such that D′ ∼ D1+D2. The divisor
D′ is then reduced to return D3 = D1 +D2, where D3 is a reduced divisor.
Given a hyperelliptic curve y2 + h(x)y = f(x), the algorithm begins with the composition
step, which is described by Algorithm 1. For convenience, f(x) and h(x) are written as f
and h. Note that steps 1 and 2 correspond to d1 ← gcd(u1, u2) and d← gcd(d1, v1+v2+h)
respectively.
The reduction step is then used to reduce the result and return D3 = D1 +D2. This step
is described by Algorithm 2.
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Algorithm 1 Composition step of Cantor’s algorithm
Input: Reduced divisors D1 = [u1, v1] and D2 = [u2, v2]
Output: Semi-reduced divisor D′ = [u′, v′] such that D′ ∼ D1 +D2
1: d1 ← e1u1 + e2u2
2: d← c1d1 + c2(v1 + v2 + h)
3: s1 ← c1e1, s2 ← c1e2, s3 ← c2
4: u′ ← (u1u2)/(d2)
5: v′ ← ((s1u1v2 + s2u2v1 + s3(v1v2 + f))/d) mod u′
Return: [u′, v′]
Algorithm 2 Reduction step of Cantor’s algorithm
Input: Semi-reduced divisor D′ = [u′, v′]
Output: Reduced divisor D3 = [u3, v3]
1: u3 ← (f − v′h− v′2)/u′
2: v3 ← (−h− v′) mod u3
3: if deg(u3) > g then
4: u′ ← u3, v′ ← v3
5: Go to step 1
6: end if
7: Make u3 monic by dividing it by its leading coefficient
Return: [u3, v3]
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2.5 Elliptic and Genus 2 Hyperelliptic Curves
There is an attack, first described in [38], that can be used to compromise the security of
some systems that use hyperelliptic curves. The time required by this attack decreases as
the genus of the curve is increased. At the time of this research, attacks of this nature were
considered very costly on curves of genus 1 and 2. These curves are used exclusively in
this research for this reason. A more detailed overview of attacks on hyperelliptic curves
is available in Section 2.6. Curves of genus 1 are more commonly known as elliptic curves.
This section discusses these curves and their group operation. The use of elliptic and genus
2 hyperelliptic curves in cryptography are discussed in [39] and [40]. An introduction to
the group operation on elliptic and hyperelliptic curves is provided by Sadanandan in [41].
2.5.1 Elliptic Curves
Definition 2.5.1. (elliptic curve) An elliptic curve on a finite field Fq = Fpm is the set
of points P = (x, y) with x, y ∈ Fq, together with a point at infinity ∞, that satisfy the
equation:
E(Fq) : y2 + a1xy + a3y = x3 + a2x2 + a4x+ a6 (2.27)
where all ai ∈ Fq.
Definition 2.5.2. (opposite of a point) The opposite of a point P = (x, y) is −P =
(x,−y).
Recall from Definition 2.4.17 that members of the Jacobian on a hyperelliptic curve C are
reduced divisors of the form D =
∑
miP −
∑
mi∞, where
∑
mi ≤ g. Since g = 1 for
elliptic curves, reduced divisors only have one point in their support, i.e. D = P − ∞.
Every member of the Jacobian can, therefore, be represented by a distinct point on E(Fq).
Members of E(Fq) form a finite abelian group under the addition of these points. The
identity element of this group is ∞, which exists at (1, 0). This group is isomorphic to
33
the Jacobian, which means that it can be used for cryptographic purposes. There exists a
method for adding points on elliptic curves that is more efficient than Cantor’s algorithm.
When used for cryptographic purposes, elliptic curve points are members of E(Fq). The
addition process can, however, be viewed more clearly when the elliptic curve is defined
over the field of real numbers R, as illustrated in Figure 2.4 (G. C. Kessler [3])
Figure 2.4: Elliptic Curve Addition over R (Source: G. C. Kessler [3])
Consider the addition R = P+Q, where P,Q,R ∈ E(R) and P 6= Q. A function describing
a straight line between P and Q is first defined. The line intercepts the curve at a third
point, −R, the value of which can be retrieved by solving for the line function and curve
equation. A vertical line function is then defined that describes a vertical line through
−R. This line intercepts the curve at another point, which is R. This is the final result
R = P +Q. Doubling is performed in a similar manner. The value of S = P + P , where
P, S ∈ E(R) is computed by first defining a function describing a tangent to the curve at
P . This tangent intercepts the curve at a point −S. A vertical line function is defined at
−S. The line function intercepts the curve at S, which is equal to P +P . The addition of
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a point to multiples of itself is known as point scalar multiplication. Doubling of a point
is written as [2]P , while point tripling is written as [3]P , and so forth.
When an elliptic curves is defined on Fq, all arithmetic required by the addition and
doubling operations can be performed on Fq. More details on the elliptic curve group
operation are available in [39].
The security level of systems that employ elliptic and hyperelliptic curves is directly related
to the order of the group in question. This order lies within the Hasse-Weil bound [40].
Definition 2.5.3. (elliptic curve group order, trace of Frobenius) Consider an
elliptic curve E defined on a finite field Fq. The order of E(Fq) is given by
#E(Fq) = q + 1− t (2.28)
where t is known as the trace of the Frobenius of the curve and |t| ≤ 2√q.
For groups large enough to be of cryptographic interest, the value of |t| is much smaller
than q so #E(Fq) ≈ q.
Subsets of points of the same order are known as sets of torsion points.
Definition 2.5.4. (set of n-torsion points on an elliptic curve) The set of n-torsion
points on an elliptic curve E is the set of points on the curve for which [n]P =∞, where
n is some positive integer. This set is written as E[n].
Supersingular curves are useful in the context of pairing-based cryptography as pairings
can be computed very efficiently on them.
Definition 2.5.5. (supersingular elliptic curve, ordinary elliptic curve) An ellip-
tic curve E(Fq), where q = pm, is supersingular if there are no points of order p on the
curve, i.e. if E[p] is empty. If this is not the case the curve is known as ordinary. The
trace of Frobenius of a supersingular elliptic curve is always divisible by p.
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2.5.2 Genus 2 Hyperelliptic Curves
As seen in the previous section, a hyperelliptic curve of genus g is described by C :
y2 + h(x)y − f(x) = 0, where h(x) is of degree less than or equal to g and f(x) is monic
and of degree 2g+ 1. This means that in the genus 2 case the degree of h(x) is either 1 or
2 and the degree of f(x) is 5.
Members of the Jacobian on a genus 2 curve are represented by divisors of form D =∑
miP−
∑
mi∞. Using Mumford notation, the divisors can be represented by polynomial
pairs [u, v] where u is monic, deg(v) < deg(u) ≤ 2 and u|(v2 + vh − f) (from Definition
2.4.18). Cantor’s algorithm can be used to perform addition on the Jacobian, as before.
There is, however, a more efficient way to perform the group operation.
Consider the Mumford polynomial pairs [u1, v1] and [u2, v2] corresponding to, respectively,
the reduced divisors D1 and D2 on the Jacobian. Addition can be performed efficiently by
exploiting the relationships between the polynomials. Explicit addition formulae for the
cases where {deg(u1) = 0}, {deg(u1) = 1, deg(u2) = 1}, {deg(u1) = 1, deg(u2) = 2} and
{deg(u1) = 2, deg(u2) = 2} can be derived. Note that the degrees of the v polynomials
are fixed by their relationships to the u polynomials. Harley provides explicit formulae
for odd characteristic genus 2 curves in [42]. Some performance results are published in
[43]. In [44], Lange derives formulae for even characteristic curves. The most common
case, in which {deg(u1) = 2, deg(u2) = 2} requires two inversions, three squarings and
24 multiplications on Fq. This performance is much better than the average number of
operations required by Cantor’s algorithm. Addition formulae do not have to be employed
exclusively. A good compromise is to use the explicit addition formulae for the most
common cases and to employ Cantor’s algorithm otherwise.
In [45], Lange further refines formulae for characteristic 2 and 3 curves using affine, projec-
tive and weighted projective coordinates. Points are represented by (x, y) pairs in an affine
coordinate system. The explicit formulae require multiplications, squarings, additions and
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one inversion. Finite field inversion can be costly in comparison to other field operations.
A projective coordinate system employs (x, y, z) triples. While inversion is not required,
more multiplications must be performed. The extra coordinate also increases the complex-
ity of the group arithmetic. Lange introduces a weighted projective system that provides
a comparably efficient way to perform doubling on the Jacobian. An affine coordinate
system is, however, used in this research. The introduction of a third coordinate is not
justified since inversions can be performed relatively quickly using a dedicated hardware
component.
The Hasse-Weil bound in the genus 2 case states that the order of the Jacobian is restricted
to
(
√
q − 1)4 ≤ #J ≤ (√q + 1)4 (2.29)
In practice, this means that #J ≈ q2. Recall that on elliptic curves the Jacobian is of
order q. This means that if a field size of order q is used in the elliptic case then genus 2
curves can be defined on a field of order
√
q, while maintaining the same level of security.
This reduction in the underlying field size results in faster field arithmetic and reduced
storage requirement. The benefit that this provides may, however, be offset by the cost of
a more complicated Jacobian addition in the genus 2 case.
The set of n-torsion divisors on a genus 2 curve can be defined in the same manner as in
the elliptic case.
Definition 2.5.6. (set of n-torsion divisors on genus 2 curves) The set of n-torsion
divisors on the Jacobian, J , of a genus 2 hyperelliptic curve is the set of degree 0 divisors
on J for which [n]D = 0, where n is some positive integer. The set is written as J [n].
Pairings can be calculated very efficiently on certain supersingular genus 2 hyperelliptic
curves.
Definition 2.5.7. (supersingular genus 2 curve) A supersingular genus 2 hyperelliptic
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curve has no divisors of order p, where p is the characteristic of the finite field on which
the curve is defined.
2.6 Hyperelliptic Curves in Cryptography
The cryptographic use of hyperelliptic curves is discussed in this section. Known attacks
on curve-based schemes that use group addition are described. The properties of fields and
curves that should be avoided to prevent the success of these attacks are outlined. The
rationale for the cryptographic use of hyperelliptic curves is also discussed. Finally, the
Elgamal Encryption system [46], when implemented using an elliptic curve, is described
in detail to provide some context to the topics discussed in this chapter. An overview
of curve-based cryptography is available in [39]. An introduction to the security issues
relating to curve-based cryptography is provided by Scholten and Vercauteren in [47].
The Computational Diffie-Hellman Problem (CDH) can be used to construct many schemes
based on finite fields, elliptic curves and hyperelliptic curves.
Definition 2.6.1. (Computational Diffie-Hellman Problem) Consider a group G of
order n with generator g. Let a, b be positive integers smaller than n and ga, gb ∈ G. The
Computational Diffie-Hellman Problem is: given g, ga, gb, find the element h ∈ G such
that h = gab.
The difficulty of the CDH is reliant on the difficulty of the Discrete Logarithm Problem in
the group in question.
Definition 2.6.2. (Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP)) Consider a group G of
order n with generator g. Let h = ga, where h ∈ G and a is a positive integer smaller
than n. The Discrete Logarithm Problem is the problem of finding the value of a, given g
and h.
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The CDH can be solved if the DLP is solved in the group. It is shown in [48] that the
CDH and the DLP have the same complexity in a group of prime order. They also have
the same complexity in the relevant groups on elliptic and hyperelliptic curves. Attacks on
the CDH come in the form of attacks on the DLP of the group in question. An overview
of the CDH and its intractability is available in [39].
Attacks on the DLP become more difficult as the group order is increased. To provide
adequate security for modern cryptographic applications the size of a finite field must be in
the order of several thousand bits when the DLP is built on the field alone. Computations
on fields of this size are too costly and too slow to be of benefit in the majority of systems.
Attacks on the DLP of groups on elliptic and hyperelliptic curves are, however, more
difficult. This means that a smaller underlying finite field size can be used to provide the
required security level.
2.6.1 Security Considerations
Some good overviews of the subject matter of this subsection can be found in [40], [47],
[30] and [49].
The following terms are used to define the time requirement of an attack on the DLP or
its curve-based extensions:
• Polynomial: The required time is polynomial in the number of digits in the group
order.
• Exponential: The required time is exponential in the number of digits in the group
order.
• Sub-exponential: There is no agreed definition of sub-exponential time. In general
terms, a problem with sub-exponential properties is still considered intractable but
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not as difficult as a problem requiring exponential time.
The Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP)
Consider a group with an order of n bits that has members g and h such that h = ga. The
most basic attack on the DLP is known as a brute force attack. This involves guessing
values of a until a solution to the problem is found. This attack requires a running time
of O(n) and is, therefore, exponential in nature.
There is a family of generic algorithms that can be used to attack the DLP when imple-
mented on any group. This includes groups defined on curves. One such attack uses the
baby-step giant-step algorithm [50], usually in combination with a lookup table, to perform
a modified brute force attack. Pollard’s rho algorithm [51] returns a result in similar time,
but with a smaller memory requirement. In [52], Shoup proves that all generic attacks
on groups of prime order require a running time of O(
√
n). It should be noted that even
if the order of the group is not prime, the Pohlig-Helman algorithm [53] can be used to
reduce the running time to O(
√
p), where p is the number of digits in the largest prime
factor of the group order. This means that generic attacks are exponential in the number
of digits in the prime order, or in the number of digits in the largest prime factor of the
order. The DLP should therefore be constructed on a group with large prime order or on
a group with an order that has a large prime factor.
The DLP, when implemented on the multiplicative groups of finite fields, is susceptible
to the Index Calculus Algorithm [54]. This algorithm exploits relationships between small
prime members of the field and returns a result in probabilistic sub-exponential time. The
order of the group should be sufficiently large to render this attack infeasible. The brute
force, generic and index calculus attacks mean that multiplicative finite field must be of
very large order.
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The Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem (ECDLP)
The ECDLP was independently suggested for cryptographic use by Miller [19] and Koblitz
[20] in 1985.
Definition 2.6.3. (Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem(ECDLP)) Con-
sider an elliptic curve E(Fq) containing a point P of order l. Let < P > be the cyclic
subgroup of points generated by P . Let Q = [a]P , where 1 ≤ a < l and Q ∈< P >. The
elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem is the problem of finding the value of a given P
and Q.
The point Q = [a]P is the result of the addition of P to itself a times. This is known as
point scalar multiplication.
The index calculus attack cannot be applied to elliptic curves. This means that a much
smaller field size can be used to provide the same security as systems based on the DLP
alone. There are, however, certain curves that should be avoided since their properties
introduce a susceptibility to other attacks.
Anomalous elliptic curves have a trace of Frobenius that is equal to 1. An anomalous
curve E(Fq), where q = pm, has exactly pm points. In [55], it is shown that, in this case,
the ECDLP can be reduced to the DLP in an additive group on Fp. The DLP in this
group is trivial and can be solved in linear time. All anomalous elliptic curves should be
avoided.
Menezes et al. [56] describe an attack, known as the MOV reduction, that reduces the
ECDLP to the DLP on some extension of the underlying finite field on which the elliptic
curve is defined. The dimension of this extension is known as the embedding degree of the
curve (see Definition 2.6.5 for the definition of embedding degree in the general hyperel-
liptic case, which holds here). The index calculus attack can then be used on the DLP
of the extension field and, if its order is insufficient, a successful attack may be feasible.
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An insignificant subset of elliptic curves have an embedding degree that is small enough
to introduce vulnerability to a MOV reduction. Since it is necessary to randomly select a
curve only during the construction of a system or at the beginning of a particular session,
the MOV reduction is, in general, not a troublesome problem.
Supersingular elliptic curves are vulnerable to MOV reduction since they have a maximum
embedding degree of 6. These curves should not be used in DLP systems unless this
vulnerability is considered. Supersingular curves do, however, have properties that allow
for efficient pairing computation on them. Many novel pairing-based schemes have been
devised that use supersingular curves in combination with other difficult problems. The
calculation of pairings on supersingular curves, and their use in cryptographic schemes, is
discussed in the next chapter.
The Hyperelliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem (HCDLP)
The HCDLP was generalised to groups on hyperelliptic curves by Koblitz in 1989 [21].
Definition 2.6.4. (Hyperelliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem (HCDLP))
Consider a hyperelliptic curve C(Fq) with Jacobian J and D1 ∈ J . Let D2 be a member
of < D1 >, where < D1 > is the cyclic subgroup of divisors in J generated by D1. The
Hyperelliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem is, given D1 and D2, finding the positive
integer a < (#J) such that D2 = [a]D1.
An Index Calculus attack on hyperelliptic curves, faster than Pollard’s rho algorithm when
the genus of the curve is larger than 2, is described by Gaudry et al. in [57]. Curves with
genus larger than 2 should, therefore, be avoided.
The Pohlig-Hellman algorithm can be used to reduce the DLP on the Jacobian to the
DLP on a group with order equal to the largest prime divisor of #J . This means that
#J should be prime, or the largest prime divisor of the group order should be sufficiently
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large, to avoid vulnerability to this attack.
If the largest prime divisor, r, of #J is equal to the characteristic of Fq then the curve is
anomalous and the DLP is trivial in the additive group of Fq, as in the elliptic case.
The MOV reduction was generalised from elliptic curves to hyperelliptic curves of arbitrary
genus by Frey and Ru¨ck in [58]. In this case, the Tate pairing is used to perform a reduction
from the HCDLP to the DLP on a k-dimensional extension of the finite field, where k is
the embedding degree of the hyperelliptic curve.
Definition 2.6.5. (embedding degree) Consider a hyperelliptic curve C with a divisor
group of order r on J . The embedding degree of C is the smallest value of k such that
r | (qk − 1).
If the embedding degree is sufficiently small an Index Calculus attack on the DLP in
the multiplicative group F∗
qk
may be possible. Fortunately, very few genus 2 curves have
a value of k that is small enough to be problematic. As in the elliptic case, however,
supersingular hyperelliptic curves have low embedding degree. Genus 2 curves defined on
fields of characteristic 2, for example, have a maximum embedding degree of 12. These
curves are, however, again useful in the implementation of pairing-based cryptography, as
will be seen in the next chapter.
2.6.2 The Benefits of Hyperelliptic Curve Cryptography
The benefits of the cryptographic use of elliptic and genus 2 hyperelliptic curves are
discussed in this subsection. In public-key schemes based on the DLP (and the ECDLP
and the HCDLP) the keys are members of the finite field upon which the problem is
constructed. This means that the keys are the same size as the order of the finite field
in use. The difficulty of the DLP on the multiplicative group of a finite field has the
same complexity as the problem of integer factorisation, which is used by conventional
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public-key schemes such as RSA. This means that, for example, a conventional public-key
scheme with 1024-bit keys corresponds to a DLP scheme with a finite field size with a
1024-bit order.
It was shown in Section 2.5 that, on elliptic curves, the group operation is performed
on the group of points in E(Fq), where #E(Fq) ≈ q. The Index Calculus attack is not
problematic in the elliptic case. This means that a smaller field size can be used to provide
the same level of security as conventional public-key schemes. In the genus 2 case, the
Hasse-Weil bound states that the Jacobian group, on which the HCDLP is constructed,
has order #J ≈ q2. The larger group order means that the curve can be defined on an
even smaller finite field than in the elliptic case if the genus 2 curve is carefully chosen.
In [49], the times required by successful attacks on the DLP, the ECDLP and the HCDLP
are calculated and used to compare the field sizes required for various levels of security.
These are compared with each other and also with the key sizes required by conventional
public-key schemes (such as RSA) in Table 2.1.
Table 2.1: Comparison of key sizes (in bits) required by conventional public-key schemes
and public-key schemes using the DLP, the ECDLP and the HCDLP
Conventional DLP ECDLP HCDLP
1024 1024 174 87
2048 2048 234 117
4096 4096 313 157
8192 8192 417 209
It can be seen that elliptic and genus 2 implementations can provide a large reduction
in key size when compared to conventional schemes, resulting in a reduced bandwidth
requirement. Arithmetic on the smaller fields is less expensive. Furthermore, if an increase
in security level is necessary, the key sizes required by curve-based solutions grow at a
smaller rate than systems based on RSA or the DLP on the multiplicative groups of finite
fields. The genus 2 case holds an added advantage over the elliptic case in this respect.
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As the security level is increased, the key length of a genus 2 implementation increases at
a smaller rate than in the elliptic case.
The advantages of the smaller finite field sizes of the ECDLP and HCDLP are, however,
offset by the more complicated group operations of the elliptic and hyperelliptic curves.
A hardware implementation can provide a very favourable solution to this problem since
many of the group operations can be performed in parallel, if carefully scheduled. The
extension field computations can also be implemented in terms of sub-field operations,
which can be performed in parallel in hardware. This can result in a large reduction in
computation time.
2.6.3 Protocol Example: The Elgamal Encryption Scheme
Many cryptographic systems based on the DLP can be implemented using elliptic and hy-
perelliptic curves. Several of these schemes are discussed in [39]. The Elgamal Encryption
System [46] is an asymmetric public-key encryption scheme. Security is dependent on the
intractability of the CDH in the group on which it is constructed. It was adapted for
implementation on elliptic curves by Koblitz in 1987 [20]. In the following example, the
Elgamal encryption system is implemented on an elliptic curve. It can also be implemented
on the Jacobian of genus 2 hyperelliptic curves.
The following steps must be followed if Alice wishes to securely send a message, denoted
m, to Bob using the Elgamal Encryption System.
Setup
• A suitable elliptic curve, E, defined on a finite field, Fq, is selected. A point P =
(xp, yp), of order n, is chosen as the generator of a cyclic subgroup < P >. The
security of the cryptosystem does not depend on these parameters and they can be
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made available to all users.
• Bob chooses a random positive integer kb, where 1 ≤ kb < n. This is his private key
and is not shared. He then calculates and publishes Q = [kb]P . The point Q is his
public key and is available to Alice.
Encryption
• Alice first selects a random positive integer ka, 1 ≤ ka < n.
• She calculates R = [ka]P and S = [ka]Q, where S = (xs, ys).
• Alice then calculates t = xs.m mod q, where m is the message to be sent.
• Alice sends the ciphertext tuple (R, t) to Bob.
Decryption
• Bob calculates U = [kb]R, where U has coordinates (xu, yu).
• Bob retrieves the message by calculating m = t/xu mod q.
The Elgamal cryptosystem is viable since the calculations required of Alice and Bob are
relatively easy to perform. An eavesdropper would, however, have to solve the ECDLP to
decrypt the message. The ECDLP in this group should sufficiently difficult so that such
an attack is infeasible.
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2.7 Conclusions
The mathematics underpinning curve-based cryptography have been introduced in this
chapter. The theory that is required for an understanding of the subject matter of this
thesis is summarised here for clarity. The computation of arithmetic on finite fields is
particularly important as all operations required for pairing-based cryptography are per-
formed on members of abelian groups on these fields. The group on which the hyperelliptic
curve discrete logarithm problem is based is known as the Jacobian. The set of divisors,
which are finite formal sums of points on the curve, form an abelian group under the ad-
dition law of the Jacobian. These divisors can be represented by a set of two polynomials
using Mumford Notation. Divisors on the Jacobian of elliptic curves have only one point
in their support, which means that the abelian additive group on the Jacobian consists of
points. This significantly reduces the complexity of the group operation. The Jacobian
of genus 2 hyperelliptic curves contains divisors with at most two points in their support,
complicating the group operation. Addition can be performed using Cantor’s algorithm,
explicit formulae, or a combination of the two.
Attacks on the security of schemes that employ these curves have been outlined and the
removal of vulnerabilities through appropriate field and curve selection discussed. It has
been shown that curve-based implementations of cryptographic schemes require smaller
key sizes, when compared to other similar public-key systems. The use of hyperelliptic
curves can also offer several advantages if a cryptographic scheme must be implemented
in a constrained environment, i.e. quicker computation of finite field arithmetic and a
reduced memory requirement. FPGAs are suitable for such an implementation since, if
a change in the security level of the scheme is required, a simple reprogramming can be
performed.
The next chapter introduces the theory of mathematical pairings on hyperelliptic curves
and the rest of this thesis is concerned with their efficient computation. This chapter has
provided a foundation for that work. It must be noted, however, that the hardware to
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be discussed in later chapters can easily be adjusted to implement the more conventional
curve-based schemes that have been described up to this point.
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Chapter 3
The Tate and ηT Pairings
3.1 Introduction
In 1994, bilinear pairings were introduced to cryptography in the form of attacks on the
security of certain curves. The MOV reduction [56] employed the Weil pairing whilst the
Frey-Ruck (FR) attack [58] used the Tate pairing to reduce the DLP on an elliptic or
genus 2 hyperelliptic curve to the DLP on an extension of the finite field on which the
curve is defined. Supersingular curves are particularly vulnerable to these attacks and
their use was avoided for a time. Supersingular curves are, however, suited to schemes
that use pairings in a constructive manner since pairings can be computed very efficiently
on them. The Tate pairing is usually used in cryptographic applications as it can be
computed faster than the Weil pairing (the Weil computation requires two applications of
an algorithm that can itself be used once to compute the Tate pairing).
As discussed in Subsection 2.2.3, the first constructive use of pairings was described by
Joux in 2000 [24]. A one round tripartite key agreement scheme, devised using the bilin-
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earity of pairings, is described. In 2001, Boneh and Franklin [26] devised an IBE scheme
that was made possible by pairings. Since then the research area has garnered much at-
tention and many optimisations for pairing computation have been suggested, the most
important of which are briefly outlined here.
As will be seen in this chapter, pairings are computed by performing finite field operations
within an iterative loop. This is followed by an exponentiation to ensure that a unique
result is returned. The loop is constructed using Miller’s algorithm [19], [59]. In 2002,
Barreto et al. [60] provided efficient algorithms for pairing computation on characteristic
3 elliptic curves. Prior to this, pairings were performed on members of extensions of the
finite fields on which the relevant curves were defined. They show that if one of the pairing
inputs is restricted to the base field, then many computations required during the Miller
loop can be avoided. Galbraith et al. made similar observations in [61]. They also provide
efficient computation methods for arithmetic on characteristic 2 and 3 extension fields.
In 2003, Duursma and Lee [62] described several optimisations for a subset of hyperelliptic
curves with points on Fpm , where p > 2. In 2007, Barreto et al. [63] generalised these op-
timisations to a large number of characteristic 2 and 3 elliptic curves and to characteristic
genus 2 hyperelliptic curves. They define a notation for the use of these optimisations and
show that a bilinear pairing can be computed using a Miller’s loop with half as many iter-
ations as previously required. This method does not return a Tate pairing but has all the
properties required for use in pairing-based cryptosystems. The pairing is known as the
truncated pairing, denoted ηT . It is closely related to the Tate pairing and a conversion
can be performed by exponentiating the ηT result. Tate pairing computation using the
ηT method returned the fastest software result at the time of this research, and the rest
of this thesis discusses its implementation.
It should be noted that this research does not consider pairings on curves that are de-
fined over fields of large prime characteristic. A review of the optimisations to pairing
computation on these curves is, however, provided in Section 7.1.
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The Tate pairing is defined and some relevant properties outlined in Section 3.2. Com-
putation using Miller’s Algorithm is described. Further optimisations to Tate pairing
computation are also discussed. The ηT pairing is introduced in Section 3.3. A discussion
on the use of pairings in cryptography is provided in Section 3.4. The Boneh-Franklin
identity-based encryption scheme [26] is outlined to provide context to the subject matter
of this chapter. The methodology for the hardware implementation of the Tate pairing in
this work is described in Section 3.5. An automated design environment has been created
to facilitate the rapid design and verification of hardware pairing processors and will also
be discussed.
The ηT is an optimisation of methods previously used for Tate pairing calculation. The
properties of certain groups and curves are exploited to return a very fast computation.
Although the pairings are closely related, the use of some optimisations means that the
results returned by the ηT are not the same as those returned by the Tate pairing. An
exponentiation of the ηT result to a Tate pairing value can, however, be performed. A
system that has been created to aid in the design and verification of the processors is also
presented.
The Master’s thesis of Maas [30] and the Ph.D. thesis of Lynn [64] provide good overviews
of pairing-based cryptography. El Mrabet analyses efficient computation methods for
pairing-based cryptography in [65].
The mathematical foundations of the Tate and ηT pairings are discussed in this chapter.
Cryptography based on pairings is also discussed. The steps required to perform the
Boneh Franklin identity-based encryption scheme [26] are described. The methodology
and equipment that have been used for the hardware implementation of the Tate pairing
is described.
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3.2 The Tate Pairing
3.2.1 Definition
Let C be a hyperelliptic curve on Fq and let JC(Fq) be the Jacobian of C. Let n be a large
prime such that n | #JC(Fq). The property gcd(n, q) = 1 must hold to avoid the attack
described by Ru¨ck in [66]. Also, n2 must not divide #JC(Fq) so that the Pohlig-Hellman
attack [53] cannot be used. Let k be the smallest integer that satisfies n | qk − 1 (this is
the embedding degree of the curve, as discussed in Section 2.6).
Consider a group containing the n-th multiples of all divisors in JC(Fqk). This group is
written as nJC(Fqk) = {[n]D | D ∈ JC(Fqk)}. The quotient group JC(Fqk)/nJC(Fqk)
forms an equivalence class under an equivalence relation. Members D and D′ are related
under the equivalence D ∼ D′ if (D − D′) ∈ nJC(Fqk). Let JC(Fqk)[n] be the n-torsion
group of divisors in JC(Fqk). Consider a divisor D1 ∈ JC(Fqk)[n]. There exists a function
fn,D1 such that div(fn,D1) = [n]D1. Let D2 ∈ JC(Fqk)/nJC(Fqk).
Definition 3.2.1. (Tate pairing) The Tate pairing is defined as
〈D1, D2〉n = fn,D1(D2) (3.1)
and is a mapping
〈., .〉n : JC(Fqk)[n]× JC(Fqk)/nJC(Fqk)→ F∗qk/(F∗qk)n (3.2)
where F∗
qk
is an abelian multiplicative group and F∗
qk
/(F∗
qk
)n is an equivalence class group.
Consider group members a and b, where a, b ∈ F∗
qk
. The element a is equivalent to b only
if a/b ∈ (F∗
qk
)n. This means that a ∼ b if a = bcn for some element c ∈ F ∗
qk
.
Note that the divisors D1 and D2 must be linearly independent so that the pairing result
is non-trivial, i.e. D1 and D2 must have no common points.
52
The result of the pairing does not depend on the choice of D2 since the only impact of
its value is in the definition of the representation for the equivalence class. For simplicity,
this means that D2 can be a member of JC(Fqk). With this information, the Tate pairing
is now a mapping
〈., .〉n : JC(Fqk)[n]× JC(Fqk)→ F∗qk/(F∗qk)n (3.3)
The Tate pairing does not return a unique value, which is required for cryptographic
purposes. Members of the quotient group F∗
qk
/(F∗
qk
)n are defined up to a multiple of
the n-th power of c ∈ F∗
qk
. Since a unique result is required, the n-th powers must be
eliminated. The relationship cq
k−1 = 1 holds due to the cyclical nature of the multiplicative
group. The multiples can, therefore, be removed by exponentiating the pairing result to
the power (qk − 1)/n. The output of this exponentiation is a unique element of F∗
qk
of
order n. The calculation of the Tate pairing followed by this exponentiation, known as
the final exponentiation, is known as the reduced Tate pairing.
Definition 3.2.2. (reduced Tate pairing) The reduced Tate pairing is defined by
e(D1, D2) = 〈D1, D2〉n(q
k−1)/n = fn,D1(D2)
(qk−1)/n (3.4)
where the unique values returned by the pairing are members of µn = {µn = 1 | µ ∈ F∗qk},
which is the group of n-th roots of unity of F∗
qk
.
The reduced Tate pairing satisfies the following useful properties:
• Bilinearity: For any integers s, t
e([s]D1, [t]D2) = e([t]D1, [s]D2) = e(D1, D2)
st (3.5)
• Non-degeneracy: For each divisor D1 ∈ JC(Fqk)[n], where D1 6= 0, there exists a
divisor D2 ∈ JC(Fqk) such that e(D1, D2) 6= 1.
• Compatibility: Let N = sn for any integer s. Then
e(D1, D2) = 〈D1, D2〉n(q
k−1)/n = 〈D1, D2〉N (q
k−1)/N (3.6)
53
3.2.2 Computation Using Miller’s Algorithm
In the literature, the Tate pairing was first computed using Miller’s algorithm [59, 67].
This algorithm does not return a reduced pairing value and must be followed by a final
exponentiation in cryptographic applications that use it.
Consider the divisors D3 ∈ JC(Fqk) and D4 ∈ JC(Fqk). Let D′5 be the non-reduced
divisor returned by adding D3 and D4 using the Jacobian group law (or point addition in
the elliptic case) and let D5 be the final reduced divisor. If addition is performed using
Cantor’s algorithm, for example, then D′5 is the output of the composition stage and D5
is the output of the reduction stage. A function gD3,D4 always exists such that
div(gD3,D4) = div(cD3,D4)− div(dD3,D4) = D′5 −D5
where c and d are rational functions on the curve.
From Equations (3.1) and (3.3) the Tate pairing is calculated according to 〈D1, D2〉n =
fn,D1(D2), where D1 ∈ JC(Fqk)[n], D2 ∈ JC(Fqk) and fn,D1 is a function such that
div(fn,D1) = [n]D1. For pairing computation it is not necessary to define the function
fn,D1 . The only result that is of importance is the evaluation of fn,D1 at D2. This can be
calculated by defining a series of simpler, intermediate functions arising from the addition
of D1 to multiples of itself and accumulating the evaluations of these functions at D2. The
following relationship is used to define the intermediate functions and forms the basis for
Miller’s algorithm
fi+j,D1 = fi,D1 .fj,D1 .g[i]D1,[j]D1 (3.7)
where g is a function that equals c/d and c and d are the rational functions arising from
the addition process. Note that div(g) = div(c)− div(d) = div(c/d).
Miller’s algorithm takes the form of an iterative loop. A binary double-and-add method can
be used to add multiples of D1 to itself on each iteration. The c and d functions related to
these additions are then defined and evaluated at D2. The accumulating function f ∈ Fqk
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is updated according to Equation (3.7). This process is described by Algorithm 3 in the
general hyperelliptic case.
Algorithm 3 Tate pairing computation using Miller’s algorithm
Input: D1 ∈ JC(Fqk)[n], D2 ∈ JC(Fqk)
Output: 〈D1, D2〉n
1: Initialise: f ← 1, D ← D1
2: Let n =
∑s
i=0 ni2
i, where s is the number of bits in n, ni ∈ {0, 1} and ns = 1.
3: for (i← s− 1, i ≥ 0, i← i− 1) do
4: D ← [2]D and define gD,D during the doubling
5: f ← f2.gD,D(D2)
6: if ni = 1 then
7: D ← D +D1 and define gD,D1 during the addition
8: f ← f.gD,D1(D2)
9: end if
10: end for
Return: f
In the elliptic case addition is performed on the group of points on E(Fqk). Consider the
addition of P and Q, where P,Q ∈ E(Fqk). The intermediate function gP,Q is related to
the lines used in the addition process. The function cP,Q describes the straight line through
P and Q and dP,Q describes the vertical line through P + Q. In the genus 2 case, either
Cantor’s algorithm or explicit formulae can be used to perform the required Jacobian
addition. The rational functions are defined in terms of intermediate divisors, which are
represented by Mumford polynomials. The functions are evaluated at points in the elliptic
case. They are evaluated at divisors in the general genus 2 case. They can, however, be
evaluated at points in certain circumstances (as discussed in the next subsection). These
evaluations can also be incorporated into the addition process to reduce computation time
[68], [69].
Miller’s algorithm can be computationally expensive when working with large groups.
Many additions and doublings are necessary. The multiplication of the accumulating Fqk
element by (c/d) on each iteration requires multiplication and inversion on Fqk , which are
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expensive operations. An implementation using the algorithm described in this subsection
may not be suited to many applications as a sufficiently fast pairing computation may
not be possible. There are, however, several methods that can be used to reduce pairing
computation time.
3.2.3 Optimisations to Tate Pairing Computation
This section describes various optimisations for Tate pairing computation that are relevant
to this research. A more detailed overview of many of the optimisations is available in
[68].
The first input to the pairing can be defined on JC(Fq)[n] rather than JC(Fqk)[n], without
a loss in security [70]. However, if the second input D2 ∈ JC(Fqk) is also a member
of JC(Fq) then the non-degeneracy property of the Tate pairing will not be satisfied. To
ensure that this does not happen a non-Fq-rational endomorphism can be used to generate
the second input. This endomorphism, also known as a distortion map, ψ, exists on all
supersingular curves [71] and proves very beneficial for pairing computation. Using this
function a divisor on JC(Fq) can be mapped to another on JC(Fqk) such that the resultant
divisor cannot be a member of the original field. A pairing that uses a distortion map is
described as modified.
Definition 3.2.3. (modified Tate pairing) Let D1 ∈ JC(Fq)[n] and D2 ∈ JC(Fq). The
modified Tate pairing is given by
〈D1, ψ(D2)〉n = fn,D1(ψ(D2)) (3.8)
The modified pairing, followed by a final exponentiation, is known as the reduced modified
Tate pairing.
Definition 3.2.4. (reduced modified Tate pairing) Let D1 ∈ JC(Fq)[n] and D2 ∈
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JC(Fq). The reduced modified Tate pairing is given by
eˆ(D1, D2) = 〈D1, ψ(D2)〉(qk−1)/nn = fn,D1(ψ(D2))(q
k−1)/n (3.9)
In 2002, Barreto et al. [60] and Galbraith et al. [61] described several optimisations for
Tate pairing computation in the elliptic case. Many of these improvements are based on
similar observations and are discussed in this section.
A division on Fqk is required on every iteration of the loop in Miller’s algorithm. Each
division consists of an extension field inversion followed by a multiplication. Extension
field inversions require many expensive operations and should be avoided when possible.
The divisions can, however, be replaced by multiplications on each loop iteration. The
accumulating function f is first written as a quotient of two functions, f = f1/f2. The new
functions can be independently updated on each iteration of the loop and each accumulated
in the same manner as in Algorithm 3. The function f can then be computed on loop exit
by dividing the final value of f1 by the final value of f2.
Consider a reduced modified Tate pairing 〈P,ψ(Q)〉(qk−1)/nn where P ∈ E(Fq)[n] and Q ∈
E(Fq). If a distortion map is available such that the x-coordinate of ψ(Q) is defined
on a sub-field of Fqk , then the operations required to compute the denominators of the
intermediate functions of Miller’s algorithm are not required. The reason for this is that
they are eliminated by the final exponentiation. This means that the vertical line functions
do not need to be evaluated on each loop iteration.
There is a very efficient point tripling operation on curves of characteristic 3. Tripling can
be performed in O(m) steps, whereas a doubling requires O(m2) steps in characteristic
3. The accumulating function can be calculated using a triple and add algorithm to take
advantage of this.
The Hamming weight of n has a direct effect on the number of required operations. If n can
be chosen so that it has low Hamming weight then the number of required point additions
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can be significantly reduced. Note that in this work, standard methods are used to return
sparse Hamming weights. Investigations into possible mathematical optimisations for the
reduction of Hamming weight are beyond the scope of this research.
In 2003, Duursma and Lee [62] published a paper that describes several improvements to
Tate pairing calculation. These new optimisations can be applied to hyperelliptic curves
of form C(Fq) : y2 = xp − x + d, where q = pm and d = ±1. The conditions p ≥ 3,
p ≡ 3 mod 4 and gcd(m, 2p) = 1 must be met. These types of curves have embedding
degree k = 2p. This relationship enables some of the optimisations. Many of the methods
described in the paper hold for p > 3, but the authors concentrate much of their effort on
the characteristic 3 case. Their observations result in a very efficient pairing computation
on these curves. The hardware implementations described in this thesis apply to only
characteristic 2 and 3 curves (partly for this reason) and so higher characteristic cases will
not be considered here. Duursma and Lee show that the Tate pairing can be implemented
on groups of degenerate divisors on genus 2 curves. This means that the pairing can be
computed using point arithmetic, which results in a significant reduction in complexity.
They also suggest that pairing calculation can be performed efficiently if the order pmp+1
is used. This new order has a Hamming weight of 2 in base p, which reduces the number of
operations required within the iterative loop. It is also demonstrated that point addition
is not required on each iteration. Instead, multiplication by the field characteristic p can
be used to construct the pairing. A very efficient function for the multiplication of a point
by p is provided. Frobenius actions can also be employed within the loop, which results
in further savings since these operations are relatively trivial. One would expect that the
larger order would increase the size of the loop from m to mp iterations. The authors
show that this is not the case: a computation using m iterations is possible. The final
exponentiation is also easier to calculate since (qk−1)/n = (p2mp−1)/(pmp+ 1) = pmp−1.
This is performed using Frobenius actions and a division.
The techniques described in this section result in an efficient Tate pairing computation
on a restricted set of curves. These methods can be generalised and further improved, as
seen in the next section.
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3.3 The ηT Pairing
Barreto et al. [63] generalise the techniques of Duursma and Lee to characteristic 2 elliptic
and genus 2 hyperelliptic curves and to a larger number of characteristic 3 elliptic curves.
They define a generalised notation that can be used to describe pairing computation for
each of the cases. They also show that further computational improvements are possible
and express the optimised computations using the same notation. The techniques of
Barreto et al. provide a very efficient means for pairing calculation. The methods do,
however, return a different value to that returned by a more traditional computation of
the Tate pairing. The pairing that is calculated using the new approach is called the
truncated eta pairing, denoted ηT . It is bilinear and non-degenerate and can be used to
form the basis for cryptographic applications in the same manner as the Tate pairing. The
ηT pairing is closely related to the Tate pairing. An ηT result can be converted to a Tate
result using an exponentiation.
Let C be a supersingular elliptic or hyperelliptic curve on Fq, q = pm, with an even
embedding degree k > 1. The curve should be chosen so that it contains a distortion map
ψ that enables the denominator elimination technique. LetN be the order used to compute
the Tate pairing. The value of N can be the order of the Jacobian, a multiple of the order
of the Jacobian, or the order of a prime subgroup of the Jacobian. Let D1, D2 ∈ JC(Fq)
be divisors of order dividing N and let fN,D1 be a function such that div(fN,D1) = [N ]D1.
The modified Tate pairing in this case is given by 〈D1, ψ(D2)〉N = fN,D(ψ(D2)). The ηT
pairing is defined as follows:
Definition 3.3.1. (ηT pairing) For some T ∈ Z the ηT pairing is given by
ηT (D1, D2) = fT,D1(ψ(D2)) (3.10)
The value of T can be chosen so that T < N , i.e. [T ]D1 does not have to be equivalent
to zero. This means that a pairing computation can be achieved using a smaller number
of iterations than would normally be required. A very small set of values of T will return
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a non-degenerate, bilinear pairing. However, a well defined method for the selection of T
can be used. Multiplication of a finite field element by a power of p can be achieved using
an automorphism on the curve. The ηT pairing is constructed so that this automorphism
can be used to reduce computation time.
Barreto et al. provide a theorem that introduces several variables to define a fixed rela-
tionship between the ηT and Tate pairings.
Theorem 3.3.1. Let N ∈ N be the order used to compute the Tate pairing. Let M =
(qk − 1)/N . Let each of T ∈ Z, a ∈ N and L ∈ Z be co-prime to N and let c ∈ Z. The ηT
pairing is related to the Tate pairing by(
〈D1, ψ(D2)〉MN
)L
=
(
ηT (D1, D2)
M
)aTa−1
(3.11)
where:
1. [T ]D1 ≡ γ(D1), where γ is some automorphism of C that is defined over Fq.
2. γ and ψ satisfy the condition
γψq(D2) = ψ(D2) (3.12)
3. T a + 1 = LN
4. T = q + cN
The following general equations are useful for the computation of the ηT pairing.
fT,D1(ψ(D2))
TM = fT,TD1(ψ(D2))
M (3.13)
and
div(fTa,D1) = div(f
Ta−1
T,D .f
Ta−2
T,TD . . . f
T
T,Ta−2D.fT,Ta−1D) (3.14)
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The computation and hardware implementation of the Tate pairing using the ηT method
in the characteristic 2 elliptic, the characteristic 2 genus 2 hyperelliptic and in the char-
acteristic 3 elliptic cases are discussed in detail in Chapters 4, 5 and 6 respectively. The
specific relationships between the Tate pairing and the ηT pairing in each of these cases
will be described then.
3.4 Pairings in Cryptography
3.4.1 Security
The pairing-based cryptographic schemes that are relevant to this work rely on the Bilinear
Diffie-Hellman problem (BDH).
Definition 3.4.1. (Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Problem (BDH)) Consider the groups
G1 and G2 of prime order n. Let P be a generator of G1. Let e : G1 × G1 → G2 be
a bilinear, non-degenerate map. Let a, b, c ∈ Z. Given (P, aP, bP, cP ), the BDH is the
problem of finding the value of e(P, P )abc.
Systems that rely on the BDH are only as secure as the CDH (previously discussed in
Section 2.6) in the groups used by the pairing. In the schemes relevant to this work G1
is a group on an elliptic or a genus 2 hyperelliptic curve. This means that security is
reliant on either the ECDLP or the HCDLP in this group. The second group, G2, is the
multiplicative finite field F∗
qk
. The DLP in G2 should be sufficiently difficult to protect
against feasible attacks. All of the attacks on the DLP, the ECDLP and the HCDLP that
were described in Subsection 2.6.1 can be used. This means that, for current security
requirements, qk should have an order of approximately 1024 bits and q should be large
enough so that attacks on the ECDLP or the HCDLP are infeasible in practice.
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3.4.2 Protocol Example: The Boneh-Franklin IBE Scheme
The concept of identity-based encryption and the advantages it provides over conventional
public key schemes has been discussed in Subection 2.2.3. Having introduced the opera-
tions necessary for pairing computation, an example implementation of a Boneh-Franklin
IBE scheme [26] is detailed here in order to illustrate a practical application of pairings in
cryptography. Boneh and Franklin discuss two schemes called BasicIdent and FullIdent.
FullIdent is the more complicated of the two but, unlike BasicIdent, protects against cho-
sen ciphertext attacks. The BasicIdent scheme, when implemented using the ηT pairing,
is discussed here. The Tate pairing can be used in the same manner. An elliptic curve
is used to describe the scheme but a genus 2 curve could be used just as easily. In the
following example, a user Alice wishes to send a message M to Bob. The scheme consists
of four steps.
1. Setup
• Choose an elliptic curve E(Fq) with embedding degree k along with a point P
that generates a cyclic group 〈P 〉 of order N .
• Let eˆ be a bilinear, non-degenerate, reduced modified pairing that maps two
elements A,B ∈ 〈P 〉 to an element of F∗
qk
such that
eˆ(A,B) = ηT (A,B)
(qk−1)/N (3.15)
• Select a secret master key s ∈ Z, where s < N . Compute Ppub = [s]P .
• Choose a cryptographic hash function H1 to map a binary string of arbitrary
bit length to an element of 〈P 〉. Choose another hash function H2 that maps
an element of F∗
qk
to a binary string of length t, where t is the maximum bit
length of the message to be sent.
• The system parameters are (q,N, t, 〈P 〉,F∗
qk
, eˆ, P, Ppub, H1, H2) and are available
to all users.
2. Extract
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• Let ID be Bob’s identifier. The PKG computes QID = H1(ID), where QID ∈
〈P 〉.
• The PKG computes Bpriv = [s]QID using its master key. This is Bob’s private
key and is transferred to him over a secure channel.
3. Encrypt
• Alice calculates QID = H1(ID).
• She then computes g1 = eˆ(QID, Ppub).
• A random positive integer r < N is generated.
• The message M is incorporated into the ciphertext, C. The ciphertext is com-
puted according to
C = (U, V ) = ([r]P,M ⊕H2(gr1))
4. Decrypt
• Bob computes g2 = eˆ(U,Bpriv) on receipt of the ciphertext C = (U, V ).
• The message M can now be retrieved according to
M = V ⊕H2(g2)
The bilinearity of the pairing enables Bob to retrieve the message. Bob computes V ⊕
H2(g2) = M ⊕ H2(gr1) ⊕ H2(g2). This means that M is returned if gr1 and g2 are equal.
This is easily demonstrated:
gr1 = eˆ(QID, Ppub)
r
= eˆ(QID, [s]P )
r
= eˆ([s]QID, [r]P )
= eˆ(Bpriv, U)
= g2
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In order to compromise the system an eavesdropper would have to recover the value of s
from Ppub = [s]P or the value of g1 from g
r
1. The former requires a solution to the ECDLP
while the latter requires a solution to the DLP in F∗
qk
.
3.5 Methodology and Design System
A justification for the methodology of this work is provided in this section. The equip-
ment used during the research is also described. The design cycle is discussed. A software
system for the efficient generation and analysis of the pairing processors is also presented.
This system reduces the design time required during the architectural definition, imple-
mentation and verification stages.
3.5.1 Justification
The use of dedicated hardware architectures for pairing computation provides several
benefits. Many of the extension field arithmetic operations can be implemented using
subfield units that operate in parallel. Pairing algorithms can also be expressed in terms
of distinct computational stages. Custom hardware units can be designed for the fast
implementation of these stages. The algorithms can be sequenced so that these units have
the ability to operate in parallel.
The goal of this work is to create custom hardware processors that return a Tate pairing
result as quickly as possible while also ensuring that resources are used efficiently. Pro-
cessors are designed in the characteristic 2 and 3 elliptic cases and in the characteristic 2
genus 2 hyperelliptic curve case. The efficient generation of these hardware processors is
vital. It is also important that the implementation platform be inexpensive so that various
architectural solutions can be explored at will. Timing results must also be available as
quickly as possible after each design stage so that modifications can be made, if necessary,
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and the updated architectures quickly re-instantiated. A robust verification procedure is
also necessary to ensure the reliability of the processors.
3.5.2 Equipment
The hardware architectures of this work are implemented on a Field Programmable Gate
Array (FPGA). These devices are relatively inexpensive. Their major advantage is the
ease with which they can be reconfigured. The FPGA used for this work is a Xilinx Virtex-
II Pro FPGA (xc2vp100-6ff1696) [72]. The high level architectural details of this family
of FPGAs is described in [72]. The Virtex-II Pro consists of an array of Configurable
Logic Blocks (CLBs), dedicated Block RAM (BRAM) and programmable interconnect
for routing. Each CLB contains four modules, known as slices. Each slice contains two
4-input function generators, tri-state buffers, carry and arithmetic logic gates and two
multiplexers. The function generators can be configured as two 4-input Lookup Tables
(LUTs), RAM or registers. A switch matrix is used to connect the CLBs with the routing
system of the FPGA. The area metric for a hardware architecture on an FPGA is the
number of slices it uses. The Virtex-II has a capacity of 44,096 slices. The product of the
area required by an implementation and the cycles required for computation is used as an
indication of its efficiency. This is measured in cycles.s. A desired hardware architecture
is described using VHDL, defined at the RTL level. The Xilinx ISE tool (version 8.1) is
then used on a PC to synthesise the VHDL. ISE also determines how the design should
be placed and routed, and creates a bit file that can be used to program the FPGA.
An interface is required between the host PC and the FPGA. The FPGA is mounted
on an Alpha Data PCI Mezzanine Card (ADM-XRC-2 PMC) [73]. This card handles
input/output for the FPGA and provides a user programmable clock and high local bus
speeds. The Alpha Data card is connected to a Celoxica RC2000 PMI-PCI carrier card
[74]. The PC is connected to the RC2000 with a standard PCI connector, which, in turn,
communicates with the Alpha Data card containing the FPGA. A C code Application
Programming Interface (API) is provided by the vendors and handles communication
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between the PC and the FPGA.
A typical design and implementation flow for Xilinx FPGAs using ISE can be summarised
as follows. This flow is discussed in more detail in [75].
1. Design Specification: Architectures that describe the operations to be performed
are designed. These are composed of interconnected units, which should each per-
form a specific, well-defined function.
2. VHDL Definition: Each unit is defined by writing VHDL at the RTL level. All
storage, logic and control systems must be described. Test benches are also defined.
3. Synthesis: The Xilinx ISE tool checks syntax and also analyses the hierarchy of
the design. If the hierarchy is not optimum, new interconnections are created that
provide the same functionality. A netlist, formally describing the usage of specific
components within the CLBs and slices is created. A file can also be added by
the designer at this point that provides timing, implementation and hierarchical
constraints if desired.
4. Implementation: Implementation involves the following steps: translation (merges
the synthesis netlist and constraints into one design file), map (fits design into avail-
able resources on the target device), place and route (places and routes design on
the device, selecting the most desirable interconnect structure) and program file
generation (the creation of a bitstream file).
5. Bitstream Download and FPGA Configuration: The generated bitstream
is downloaded onto the FPGA and it is configured according to the description
provided.
Verification can be performed at various steps during the process. Behavioural verification
can be performed after Step 2. The Modelsim XE analysis tool [76] can be used to rapidly
test for functionality. This step provides an indication of any errors in the RTL code.
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It does not, however, take into account any errors that may be introduced by timing
delays. Post-synthesis and post-mapping simulation can also be useful, although for the
architectures used in this research, they can be relatively time consuming due to the large
areas required. A possible solution is to perform initial verification iterations using small
field sizes.
Post synthesis, mapping and on-FPGA failure may be caused by several issues. These
include incorrect binding, which may be caused by errors introduced by the attempted
optimisations of the synthesis step. This can be solved by modifying the original hierarchy
and interconnectivity of the design, changing the scheduling of operations, or changing the
constraints. Fan-out, caused by loading the output of logical gates with too many inputs
to other digital logic, can also be problematic and may require architectural and constraint
design changes. The ISE tool itself may introduce failure while endeavouring to map the
architecture to the smallest possible number of slices. This type of failure is common
in a target device that that is approaching full occupancy. The Xilinx tools struggle
to efficiently implement the desired architecture and the propagation of signals through
the device may cause issues. A possible solution is to loosen area constraints, to add
constraints that ensure the problem units are mapped so that they are placed near to each
other on the target device, or to reduce the frequency used to clock the device.
3.5.3 Automated Design and Verification Environment
This work necessitates the creation of processors computing three different Tate pairings.
Many iterations of the design cycle are required during the exploration and implementation
stages. The results of each of the iterations must be verified and the processors bench-
marked. Defining hardware architectures at the RTL level can be very time consuming.
There is a significant probability of error as the work is very involved. The implementation
stages usually require a lot of user intervention as various tools must be used. Verification
may require significant effort due to the numerous issues that may cause failure. A software
design program for the pairing processors of this work has been created for these reasons.
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The program is denoted design sys for convenience. The software is written in C++ and
includes Shell scripts that provides a significant level of automation. The object-oriented
nature of this programming language is used extensively so that a designer can use various
features of the system independently or in combination with each other. The final outcome
is a highly automated design and verification environment, which significantly reduces the
time and effort required to prototype a large range of architectures.
The design system contains a class for the software computation of the Tate pairing in
each of the three cases. This is called soft sub sys and contains base classes that define
the required curve, extension fields and the subfield operations. Pairing algorithms are
written in terms of operations that call functions within these classes. The Multiprecision
Integer and Rational Arithmetic C Library (MIRACL) is used to perform some of the
curve and field arithmetic [77].
A class, called vhdl sub sys, has been created to aid in the generation of low level RTL
descriptions of the hardware architectures. Arrays, conditional statements and iterative
loops are used to reduce the repetitive nature of RTL level design. Variables are used to
define field sizes, irreducible polynomials and other properties. This means that VHDL
can easily be regenerated if changes in field and curve definition are required. As will be
seen in later chapters, the architectural parameters of the arithmetic units can also be
manipulated using variables.
The system contains an analysis sub sys in which architectural efficiency can be ex-
plored. The number of hardware clock cycles required for the implementation of oper-
ations through the desired hardware units can be computed in software. Control schemes
and operation sequencing can also be investigated. The redundancy of hardware units can
also be explored and designs altered if they are deemed to be inefficient.
The imp sub sys class is used to oversee the vendor tools, communicate with the FPGA
and to handle verification and benchmarking. The Xilinx synthesis and Modelsim testing
programs are invoked from here. Constraints are provided, mapping tools are called,
68
and a bit file is retrieved on completion. The communication API library is incorporated.
This class requests test vectors from soft sub sys and sends them to the FPGA. Results are
retrieved from the processor and compared to those returned by the software computation.
More than one processor can be implemented and tested without user intervention by using
arrays that describe the desired hardware architectural parameters. The corresponding
set of processors are then implemented, verified and benchmarked by the system and
metrics automatically stored for later analysis. This capability is particularly useful for
prototyping.
Finally, the system contains a flexible subclass, called flex sub sys, that provides some extra
functionality for the design and implementation of the flexible Tate pairing processors.
These processors are discussed in Chapter 6 and the flex sub sys class is described in
Subsection 6.4.4.
An example of an automated flow, used to design and verify a Tate pairing processor, is
illustrated in Figure 3.1. It is assumed that the software that performs the pairing algo-
rithm to be implemented has already been written and included in the soft sub sys. The
hierarchy of the system, its connectivity at a high level of abstraction, and the schedul-
ing of operations are defined by a designer using the vhdl sub sys. A file describing the
implementation constraints to be used by the Xilinx tools can also be created. Variables
defining mathematical parameters such as the curve, field size and irreducible polynomial
are defined. Architectural parameters of the finite field arithmetic modules (such as mul-
tiplier digit sizes) are also set here. Test benches can also be written with ease. Variables
defining whether verification is to be performed at various stages of the implementation
process are also set by the user.
The analysis sub sys can be used at this point to explore various architectural and schedul-
ing options. The estimated times required to perform arithmetic operations in hardware
can be investigated. The redundancy of hardware units can be computed to ensure that
area resources are being used efficiently.
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Figure 3.1: Automation of the design cycle using design sys
Once all parameters have been chosen and the architectural connectivity and the schedul-
ing of operations have been defined, VHDL describing the desired hardware processor is
automatically generated by the vhdl sub sys. At this point, the flow enters the imple-
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mentation subsystem imp sub sys. Extensive use is made of Shell scripting in order to
automate tool usage, verification, benchmarking and data storage.
Behavioural verification is first performed. If failure occurs, control is handed back to the
user of the system so that its cause can be investigated. Otherwise, synthesis commences.
Post-synthesis verification is optional, as it can be time-consuming. User access is again
provided if failure occurs. Once the post-synthesis netlist has been generated, the mapping
and place & route steps are performed. On completion, a bitstream is returned by the
Xilinx ISE tool. This file is transferred through the PCI card and programs the FPGA.
On-FPGA verification can be time consuming as, if failure occurs, the full implementation
process must be repeated. To mitigate this, a system user can access the imp sub sys to
change the I/O ports of the FPGA with ease so that intermediate values can be read.
The soft sub sys can be used to provide its corresponding values so that comparisons
can quickly be made and debugging performed efficiently. Verification of newly created
processors is performed by computing 10,000 pairings on the processor using randomly
generated input points. The results returned are compared to the results of software
computations on the same points. Protection against the computation of a result at
infinity does not need to be provided as this is not possible in these pairing-based systems.
It has been noted since the research was performed that, due to the complexity of the
processors created during this work, the successful computation of one pairing is usually
sufficient proof of correct operation as full coverage is provided by the propagation of bits
through the hardware.
Once a design and verification cycle has been completed successfully, the environment
can be used to perform automated implementation and verification of various versions of
the hardware pairing processors. Variables describing the mathematical and architectural
parameters of the processors are stored in arrays within the imp sub sys. The design flow
iterates until all desired hardware processors have been created, verified and benchmarked.
The data outputs of each iteration can also be stored, if desired.
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This environment reduces the difficulties associated with the creation of hardware archi-
tectures that must implement complex operations. It enables a high level of control over
processor generation and verification while significantly reducing the effort required. A
designer is able to spend the majority of available time on hardware specification and
analysis without distraction. The rest of the process is aided by the software system: it
generates the VHDL files, enables rapid analysis, calls the synthesis and programming
tools, initiates hardware computation and handles verification and benchmarking. Similar
design environments were later described in [78], [79] and [80].
This system is an important contribution of this work. Hundreds of thousands of lines of
C++ and Shell code were written to design it. It was carefully developed to be easy to
use, robust, scalable and to significantly reduce the effort required for FPGA design and
verification. The design and verification environment enabled the author of this thesis to
rapidly generate hardware processors for pairing-based cryptography. The environment,
the hardware processors it produced and the results returned were described by the author
of this thesis in [11], [12] and [13].
3.6 Conclusions
The Tate pairing and its efficient computation have been introduced in this chapter. The
ηT pairing has also been discussed in detail. This pairing is closely related to the Tate
pairing but can be computed more quickly in many cases. The ηT pairing is bilinear
and non-degenerate and can be used in the same manner as the Tate in pairing-based
applications. A conversion between pairing results is enabled by an exponentiation. The
computation of the ηT pairing on characteristic 2 and 3 supersingular elliptic curves and
on characteristic 2 genus 2 supersingular curves is particularly efficient. These curves have
embedding degrees of 4, 6 and 12, respectively.
Security is reliant on both the DLP in the abelian additive group on the curve and on
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the DLP in the multiplicative extension field F∗
qk
. This means that curves with larger
embedding degree can provide the necessary level of security using a finite field Fq of
smaller order, when compared to curves with smaller embedding degree. Note that the
order of Fq must still be large enough so that attacks on the additive group on the curve
(i.e. on the ECDLP or HCDLP) are infeasible. The hyperelliptic case offers the highest
embedding degree but the benefit of the smaller underlying finite field size is offset by
a more complex pairing computation. Similarly, the characteristic 3 elliptic curve case
appears to be more attractive than the characteristic 2 case. Implementation of arithmetic
in characteristic 3 is, however, more complicated than in characteristic 2 in both software
and hardware.
This work investigates the hardware implementation of the Tate pairing in all three cases.
The computation of the ηT pairing forms the basis for these implementations. The creation
of dedicated architectures for pairing computation offers many benefits. The complexity
of the required finite and extension field arithmetic and the difficulty of efficient operation
scheduling does, however, present significant design challenges. At the time of this work,
it was not clear if the ηT methods offered a worthwhile advantage over other algorithms
in terms of the hardware computation of the Tate pairing.
A robust design environment, created to reduce the effort required to create and verify
pairing processors and to automate the design cycle, has been discussed in this chapter.
The advantages of its use will be apparent throughout the thesis.
A dedicated hardware architecture for characteristic 2 elliptic curve Tate pairing compu-
tation is presented in Chapter 4. The design of a custom architecture for characteristic
2 genus 2 pairing computation is described in detail in Chapter 5. A flexible processor,
which can implement the Tate pairing on both characteristic 2 and 3 elliptic curves, is
presented in Chapter 6.
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Chapter 4
A Hardware Processor for Tate
Pairing Computation on a
Characteristic 2 Elliptic Curve
4.1 Introduction
The efficient computation of the characteristic 2 Tate pairing using the ηT method in
hardware is discussed in this chapter. Hardware systems enable parallel computation.
In this chapter it is shown that, through slight modification of the pairing algorithms,
many of the required operations can be performed at the same time. Some of the required
extension field arithmetic can also be implemented in terms of parallel F2m operations.
Much of the arithmetic on F2m can, in turn, be performed in terms of operations on F2,
all of which can be performed at the same time. A characteristic 2 elliptic curve pairing
processor that takes advantage of this parallelism and other properties of the Tate pairing
is discussed in this chapter.
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The equations and algorithms required for Tate pairing computation using the ηT methods
are provided in Section 4.2. The hardware implementation of arithmetic on F2m and F24m is
discussed in Sections 4.3 and 4.4, respectively. Dedicated hardware architectures, designed
for the parallel computation of various pairing computation stages, are described in Section
4.5. Finally, the elliptic curve characteristic 2 Tate pairing processor is presented in Section
4.6 and the properties of several implementations are discussed.
4.2 The Characteristic 2 Elliptic Curve ηT and Tate Pairings
The characteristic 2 elliptic curve ηT pairing and its exponentiation to the Tate pairing
is discussed in this section. The Duursma and Lee techniques [62] are first expressed in
terms of the ηT notation presented by Barreto et al. [63]. Computation of the Tate pairing
using an ηT pairing of reduced order, as discussed by Barreto et al., is then discussed in
detail. More detail on much of the subject matter of this section is provided by Barreto
et al. in [63].
Let E(Fq) : y2 + y = x3 + x + b be an elliptic curve defined on Fq = F2m , where b = 0
or 1 and m is odd. This curve has embedding degree k = 4. The order of the curve
is given by #E(F2m) = 2m + 1 + (−1)b2(m+1)/2 if m ≡ (1, 7) mod 8 or #E(F2m) =
2m + 1− (−1)b2(m+1)/2 if m ≡ (3, 5) mod 8.
The basis {1, δ, , δ} is used to represent members of F24m , where δ,  ∈ F24m such that
δ2 = δ + 1 and 2 =  + δ. A distortion map providing denominator elimination is given
by ψ(x, y) = (x+ δ2, y + δx+ ).
Given a point P = (x, y) and a function φ(x, y) = (x+ 1, y+x) then it can be shown that
[2i]P = φi(xp
(2i), yp
(2i)) (4.1)
This means that the expression [q]P = φm(P ) can be used.
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Barreto et al. use Theorem 3.3.1 to relate the Duursma and Lee techniques to computation
of the Tate pairing using the ηT method. In this case, T = q = 2
m and N = 22m + 1.
This means that c = 0. The equation T a + 1 = LN must be satisfied, and this is
achieved by setting a = 2 and L = 1. The value of M is given by M = (qk − 1)/N =
(24m − 1)/(22m + 1) = 22m − 1. The relationship between the ηT pairing and the Tate
pairing is given by (
ηT (P,Q)
M
)2q
= 〈P,ψ(Q)〉MN (4.2)
Barreto et al. show that the value of T can again be reduced. Using N = #E(F2m) = 2m+
1±2(m+1)/2 then [N ]P =∞ for a point P on E(F2m). The automorphism γ(P ) = [q]P can
be rewritten as γ(P ) = [q−N ]P = [∓2(m+1)/2− 1]P . This means that T = ∓2(m+1)/2− 1
can be used. From Theorem 3.3.1 the expression c = −1 must hold. Setting a = 2 yields
L = 2. The exponent is given by M = (24m − 1)/(2m + 1± 2(m+1)/2) = (2m ∓ 2(m+1)/2 +
1)(22m − 1). The relationship between the pairings in the characteristic 2 elliptic case is
now given by (
ηT (P,Q)
M
)T
= 〈P,ψ(Q)〉MN (4.3)
4.2.1 Computation of the ηT Pairing
The ηT pairing is returned according to ηT (P,Q) = fT,P (ψ(Q)), where fT,P is the Miller
function. This function is evaluated and accumulated using the fast point doubling op-
erations available on the curve. From the value of T it is clear that computation re-
quires (m + 1)/2 point doublings and a point addition. A point is doubled according to
straight line and vertical line functions. As discussed previously, the vertical line function
is not required for pairing calculation due to denominator elimination. Consider a point
A = (xA, yA). The straight line function governing the calculation of [2]A is
gA(x, y) = (x
2
A + 1)(xA + x) + (yA + y) (4.4)
Equations (3.13) and (3.14) can be used to show that the Miller function can be evaluated
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at ψ(Q) according to
fT,P (ψ(Q)) =
(
(m−1)/2∏
i=0
(
g[2i]P (ψ(Q))
)2(m−1)/2−i)
.l(ψ(Q) (4.5)
where l(ψ(Q)) is the line function arising from the final addition. Exponentiating to
2(m−1)/2−i on each iteration requires (m−1)/2 F24m squarings. These operations are, how-
ever, not necessary if the Miller function is accumulated differently. Let P ′ = [2(m−1)/2]P .
The value of P ′ can be calculated trivially according to P ′ = φ(m−1)/2(
√
xP ,
√
yP ), where
φ(x, y) = (x+ 1, y + x). The Miller function is now constructed using a point halving op-
eration, which has the same complexity as doubling. Let j = 2(m−1)/2− i. The evaluation
of the Miller function at ψ(Q) is now given by
fT,P (ψ(Q)) = l(ψ(Q)).
(
(m−1)/2∏
j=0
g[2−j ]P ′(ψ(Q))
2j
)
(4.6)
The definitions of the functions of Equation (4.6) are dependent on the value of b describing
the elliptic curve and on the value of m mod 8. The results presented at the end of this
chapter are returned by a hardware implementation on a field with m = 313, which means
that m mod 8 ≡ 1. The irreducible trinomial defining F2313 is x313 +x79 + 1. The middle
coefficient of the trinomial is the smallest of those that can be used to generate a field
of this size. This provides the best performance as the choice minimises the number of
F2 operations required to perform F2m arithmetic. In this work, members of F24m are
represented by degree 3 polynomials generated by the irreducible polynomial x4 + x+ 1.
These fields and irreducible polynomials are the same as those used by Barreto et al. in [63].
It should be noted, however, that the design environment supports the implementation of
processors on any finite field generated by an irreducible polynomial.
The functions required for pairing computation can now be defined. Let t = xP . The line
function describing the final addition is given by
l(ψ(Q)) =
(
t.
(
xP + xQ + 1
)
+ yP + yQ + b
)
+(
t+ xQ + 1
)
x+
(
t+ xQ
)
x2 +
(
0
)
x3
(4.7)
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Now let t = x
(−j)
P + 1 (the brackets around the exponent are used for clarity). The
intermediate functions are computed according to
g[2−j ]P ′(ψ(Q))
2j =
(
t.
(
x
(−1−j)
P + x
(j)
Q + 1
)
+ y
(−1−j)
P + y
(j)
Q
)
+(
t+ x
(j)
Q + 1
)
x+
(
t+ x
(j)
Q
)
x2 +
(
0
)
x3
(4.8)
The operations required for ηT pairing computation using Equations (4.6), (4.7) and (4.8)
are presented in Algorithm 4. The most computationally expensive operations are required
on Steps 2, 6, 8 and 10. Steps 2 and 6 require an F2m multiplication each, while Steps 8
and 10 require expensive F24m multiplications
Algorithm 4 Computation of ηT (P,Q) on E(F2m) : y2 + y = x3 + x+ b, m mod 8 ≡ 1
Input: P = (xP , yP ), Q = (xQ, yQ), where P,Q ∈ E(F2m)
Output: f = ηT (P,Q), where f ∈ F24m
1: Initialise: t← xP , mill← 1
2: f ← t.(xP + xQ + 1) + yP + yQ + b+ (t+ xQ + 1)x+ (t+ xQ)x2
3: mill← 1
4: for (i← 0, i < (m+ 1)/2, i← i+ 1) do
5: t← xP + 1, xP ← √xp, yP ← √yP
6: u← t.(xP + xQ + 1) + yP + yQ + (t+ xQ + 1)x+ (t+ xQ)x2
7: xQ ← x2Q, yQ ← y2Q
8: mill← mill.u
9: end for
10: f ← mill.f
Return: f
Some of the computations required within the for loop can be performed in parallel if pairs
of iterations are combined and some additional polynomials are introduced. This takes
advantage of the sparse nature of the polynomials and is known as unrolling the loop.
The operations required to calculate the ηT pairing using this technique are detailed in
Algorithm 5. Note that i is incremented by 2 on each iteration of the new loop. Steps 2, 5,
8 and 14 require an F2m multiplication each. The polynomials u0 and u1 can be calculated
in parallel in hardware. A custom multiplication routine, smul, is used to multiply u0 by u1
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on Step 10. This routine is constructed with a hardware implementation in mind. Many
of the F2m operations that are required during loop iteration can also be performed in
parallel if they are scheduled carefully. Steps 11, 15 and 16 require an F24m multiplication
each. The hardware architectures that have been created to efficiently implement the
operations required by Algorithm 5 are described later in this chapter.
Algorithm 5 Unrolled computation of ηT (P,Q) on E(F2m) : y2 + y = x3 + x + b, m
mod 8 ≡ 1
Input: P = (xP , yP ), Q = (xQ, yQ), where P,Q ∈ E(F2m)
Output: f = ηT (P,Q), where f ∈ F24m
1: Initialise: t← xP , mill← 1
2: f ← t.(xP + xQ + 1) + yP + yQ + b+ (t+ xQ + 1)x+ (t+ xQ)x2
3: for (i← 0, i < (m− 1)/2, i← i+ 2) do
4: t← xP + 1, xP ← √xP , yP ← √yP
5: u0 ← t.(xP + xQ + 1) + yP + yQ + (t+ xQ + 1)x
6: xQ ← xQ2, yQ ← yQ2
7: t← xP + 1, xP ← √xP , yP ← √yP
8: u1 ← t.(xP + xQ + 1) + yP + yQ + (t+ xQ + 1)x
9: xQ ← xQ2, yQ ← yQ2
10: u← smul(u0, u1)
11: mill← mill.u
12: end for
13: t← xP + 1, xP ← √xP , yP ← √yP
14: u← t.(xP + xQ + 1) + yP + yQ + (t+ xQ + 1)x+ (t+ xQ)x2
15: mill← mill.u
16: f ← mill.f
Return: f
4.2.2 Exponentiation to the Tate Pairing
The extension field element f = ηT (P,Q) returned by Algorithm 5 must be exponentiated
to M = (2m − 2(m+1)/2 + 1)(22m − 1) to provide a unique and useful pairing value. Com-
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putation of the ηT pairing followed by this exponentiation can be used to form the basis
for pairing-based cryptographic applications. In this work, however, ηT (P,Q)
M is further
exponentiated to T = 2(m+1)/2 ± 1 so that a Tate pairing value is returned. This means
that the results returned by the processor can be directly compared to other Tate pairing
implementations in the literature. The value of T is 2(m+1)/2+1 in the m mod 8 ≡ 1 case.
The operations required for the exponentiation of ηT (P,Q) to ηT (P,Q)
MT = 〈P,ψ(Q)〉MN
are provided in Algorithm 6. The most expensive operations are the F24m multiplications
of Lines 6, 8, 10, 11 and 13 and the F24m inversion of Line 12. Squaring and exponentiation
to q are also required, but these operations are trivial in comparison (recall q = 2m).
Algorithm 6 Exponentiation of ηT (P,Q) to ηT (P,Q)
MT = 〈P,ψ(Q)〉MN , m mod 8 ≡ 1
Input: f = ηT (P,Q), where f ∈ F24m
Output: c = ηT (P,Q)
MT = 〈P,ψ(Q)〉MN , where c ∈ F24m
1: Initialise: u← f , v ← f , w ← f
2: for (i← 0, i < (m+ 1)/2, i← i+ 1) do
3: u← u.u
4: end for
5: u← uq, v ← vq
6: w ← u.v
7: v ← vq
8: w ← w.v
9: u← u2q, v ← vq
10: c← u.v
11: c← c.f
12: w ← w−1
13: c← c.w
Return: c
The computation of ηT (P,Q) and the exponentiation to MT require many operations on
F2m and F24m . Addition, multiplication, squaring and inversion are required on both fields.
Exponentiation of F24m elements to q is also necessary. The hardware modules used to
implement F2m field operations are described in the next section. The architectures that
perform operations on F24m are then described in Section 4.4.
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4.3 Hardware Implementation of Arithmetic on F2m
The finite field F2m is an m-degree extension of F2. The field F2 has elements 0 and 1 and
all arithmetic is performed modulo 2. The additive and multiplicative operations of F2
are shown in Table 4.1. An element of F2 requires one hardware bit for storage. Addition
is performed using a logical XOR gate. Multiplication is performed using an AND gate.
Note that addition and subtraction yield the same result on F2.
Table 4.1: Addition and Multiplication on F2
a b a+b a.b
0 0 0 0
0 1 1 0
1 0 1 0
1 1 0 1
Members of F2m are represented by polynomials with a maximum degree of (m− 1) with
coefficients in F2. An element a ∈ F2m is given by
a(x) =
m−1∑
i=0
aix
i = a0 + a1x+ . . . am−1xm−1 (4.9)
where all ai ∈ F2. Each member of F2m requires m hardware bits for storage. For
simplicity, a polynomial representation should be assumed from this point and a(x) will
be written as a. As previously discussed in Subsection 2.3.2, the field F2m is generated
by an irreducible polynomial, f , of degree m. Irreducible polynomials are of form f =∑m
i=0 fix
i, where fm = f0 = 1 and all fi ∈ F2. Low weight irreducible polynomials reduce
the complexity of the field arithmetic. Trinomials are used in this work. The efficient
computation of F2m addition, multiplication, squaring and inversion is vital for pairing-
based systems. This section discusses the hardware architectures used to implement these
arithmetic operations.
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4.3.1 F2m Addition
Given a, b, c ∈ F2m , addition of a and b is performed bitwise according to
c = a+ b =
m−1∑
i=0
(ai + bi)x
i (4.10)
All of the F2 coefficient additions can be performed in parallel. A total of m XOR gates
are used to perform addition on F2m and a result is returned in one clock cycle.
4.3.2 F2m Multiplication
An introduction to multiplication on Fpm was provided in Subsection 2.3.2. A multiplica-
tion c = a.b, where a, b, c ∈ F2m , is performed in two stages: composition and reduction.
Given a =
∑m−1
i=0 aix
i and b =
∑m−1
j=0 bjx
j a polynomial z is first computed according to
z =
m−1∑
i=0
m−1∑
j=0
ai.bjx
i+j (4.11)
where z is of degree 2m− 2. This new polynomial is then reduced modulo the irreducible
polynomial f in the second step.
c = z mod f (4.12)
There are several ways to perform F2m multiplication in hardware. Reduction is usually
performed in hardware using the relationship f =
∑m
i=0 fix
i = xm +
∑m−1
i=0 fix
i. An
example of reduction using this method was provided in Subsection 2.3.2. This technique
is implemented using a network of XOR and AND gates. In this work, the VHDL
that describes the reduction networks is automatically generated in software according to
desired field size and irreducible polynomial.
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One general technique forms the basis for reduction and is described first. Consider the
field F2m generated by the irreducible polynomial f =
∑m
i=0 fix
i = xm+
∑m−1
i=0 fix
i. Since
x is a root of the irreducible polynomial then f = 0 ∈ F2m . This means that
xm =
m−1∑
i=0
fix
i (4.13)
This relationship can be used to recursively reduce a composition polynomial by replacing
the terms of higher degree with terms of degree smaller than m. As an example, consider
the field F24 , generated by an irreducible polynomial f = x4+x+1. The relationship x4 =
x+ 1 holds on this field. Let the polynomial a = x3 +x2 + 1 represent the element (1101)2
and let b = x3 + 1 represent (1001)2. The composition stage produces the polynomial
z = x6 + x5 + x2 + 1. This can be reduced by noting that x5 = x.x4 = x(x+ 1) = x2 + x.
Also, x6 = x.x5 = x(x2+x) = x3+x2. Now, z = x3+x2+x2+x+x2+1 = x3+x2+x+1.
Various strategies have been suggested for the efficient hardware implementation of field
multiplication. In bit-serial architectures [81, 82] multiplication is performed according to
c = a.b = (
m−1∑
i=0
aix
i).(
m−1∑
j=0
bjx
j) =
m−1∑
j=0
((bj .ax
j) mod f) (4.14)
This method requires an iterative implementation. In hardware, one bit of the b polynomial
is multiplied by a left-shifted version of the a polynomial on each iteration. The resultant
polynomial is reduced modulo f and accumulated with the results of previous iterations.
The main advantage of an implementation of this type is a relatively small area footprint.
A result is returned after m clock cycles. This cycle cost is, however, too high for the
applications relevant to this research as the field sizes are large.
In bit-parallel architectures [83, 84, 85], parallel multiplications of the a polynomial by
each bit of b are performed. These architectures return a result in one clock cycle. The
area required, however, is prohibitively large for the relevant field sizes.
Digit-serial architectures were proposed by Song and Parhi in [86]. These multipliers offer
a balance between resource usage and the number of clock cycles required to return a
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result. Computations are performed in parallel on D bits of one of the input polynomials.
D is known as the digit size and 1 ≤ D ≤ m. A result is returned in n = (m/D+ θ) clock
cycles, where θ is a small number of cycles required for combinatorial logic and storage.
As D increases, so too does the area required by the architecture. Digit-serial multipliers
are used in this research as they can be used to satisfy different application requirements
by varying the digit size.
Consider the multiplication c = a.b, where a, b, c ∈ F2m . The process begins by separating
b into bit strings of length D. There are n such strings, where n is the value given by
rounding m/D upward to the nearest integer. Let b =
∑m−1
i=0 bix
i. The polynomial is first
rewritten as
b =
n−1∑
j=0
b˜jx
jD = b˜0 + b˜1x
D + b˜2x
2D + . . . b˜n−1x(n−1)D (4.15)
where all b˜j are digits such that
b˜j =
D−1∑
l=0
bjD+lx
l (4.16)
and all bj ∈ F2.
Multiplication of a by b using the digit-serial method is performed by multiplying the a
polynomial by the digits of b, accumulating the results and reducing modulo f :
c = a.b =
(
a.(
n−1∑
j=0
b˜jx
jD)
)
mod f (4.17)
=
( n−1∑
j=0
a.b˜jx
jD
)
mod f (4.18)
A multiplication a.b˜j is known as a digit-word multiplication (the polynomial a of length
m is known as a word). These multiplications can be performed in one clock cycle in
hardware by multiplying a digit of b by each bit of a simultaneously. These multiplications
are reduced modulo f before accumulation to minimise operational complexity and storage
requirements. Digit-word multiplication can be performed efficiently using matrix-vector
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methods. Consider the multiplication of a =
∑m−1
i=0 aix
i by a digit of b. A composition
polynomial is first computed:
z =
m−1∑
i=0
D−1∑
l=0
ai.bjD+lx
i+l (4.19)
The polynomial z has degree m + D − 2 and its coefficients are members of F2. Let z
be a vector of length m + D − 1 containing the value of the coefficients of z, i.e. zT =
[z0, z1, z2, . . . zm+D−2]. The polynomial a can also be represented by a vector, a, of length
m. An (m+D−1)×m product matrix B can be generated that represents the F2 operations
that are required during the composition stage. The z vector is returned by the matrix-
vector multiplication of B by a. All of the operations are on F2. The product matrix
is used to generate a network of AND and XOR gates that implement the composition
stage in hardware.
The result returned by the composition stage must be reduced modulo f if its degree is
greater than m − 1. This reduction can also be performed using matrix-vector methods.
Let z =
∑u−1
s=0 zsx
s, where u > m − 1 and let z be a vector of length u containing the
coefficients of z. A reduction matrix R, of size m× u, can be created that represents the
F2 additions required for reduction. A network of XOR gates that returns the reduced
value of the digit-word product is generated using this matrix. More information on the
construction and use of these matrices is provided in [86].
The F2m multiplication of a by b can be implemented in hardware according to Equation
(4.18). The degree of the accumulating polynomial increases by D after each digit-word
multiplication. A straightforward implementation would require a relatively large area to
store and reduce the resulting bit strings. If the results of the digit-word composition stages
are, however, shifted left by D bits after computation and immediately reduced modulo
f , then the degree of the accumulating polynomial will not exceed m− 1. Another matrix
can be used to generate the network of XOR gates required to reduce the polynomials of
(m+2D−1) bits returned by digit-word composition and shifting. The equation governing
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F2m multiplication using this method is
c = a.b =
( n−1∑
j=0
(
xjD(a× b˜j)
)
mod f
)
mod f (4.20)
where a × b˜j represents the composition stage of a digit word multiplication a.b˜j . The
operations required for the hardware implementation of Equation (4.20) are presented as
Algorithm 7.
Algorithm 7 F2m Digit-Serial Multiplication
Input: a, b ∈ F2m , where a =
∑m−1
i=0 aix
i, b =
∑n−1
j=0 b˜jx
jD and b˜j =
∑D−1
l=0 bjD+lx
l
Output: c = a.b, where c ∈ F2m
1: Initialise: z(0) ← 0, b(0) ← b
2: for (i← 1, i ≤ n− 1, i← i+ 1) do
3: z(i) ← xD(z(i−1) + b˜(i−1)d−1 × a) mod f
4: b(i) ← xDb(i−1)
5: end for
6: c← (z(d−1) + b˜d−1 × a) mod f
Return: c
The hardware architecture used for digit serial multiplication is illustrated in Figure 4.1.
The polynomial a is stored in an m-bit register and b is stored in an m-bit shift register
with a D-bit output. On each iteration, the a polynomial is sent to the multiplication
block with a digit of b and a composition string of size (m + D − 1) bits is calculated.
The worst case propagation delay for this block is 1 AND gate and [log2D − 1] XOR
gates. The lower m bits of the digit-word composition result are then added to the
m-bit accumulation polynomial computed during the previous iteration. The result is
shifted to the left by D bits and enters the reduction block. This unit consists of a
network of XOR gates that is constructed according to the reduction matrix. The worst
case propagation delay of this block is dependent on the field size and the irreducible
polynomial. A low weight irreducible polynomial reduces the complexity and propagation
delay of this network significantly. The output of the reduction block is stored in an m-bit
register. The result c = a.b is available at the output of this register on completion of
the for loop. A Finite State Machine (FSM) provides all of the signals that are required
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to handle the operations. The digit-serial multiplication architecture produces a result in
n = m/D + 2 clock cycles.
Figure 4.1: F2m Digit-Serial Multiplier Architecture
The VHDL for the multiplication architecture is generated in the design environment using
C++ code. Variables are used to represent the field size, irreducible polynomial and digit
size. Multipliers can be created automatically on the input of these parameters. This
means that pairing processors, each containing multipliers with different digit sizes, can
be generated with ease. This enables detailed analysis of the capabilities and resource
requirements of various architectural solutions to pairing computation.
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4.3.3 F2m Squaring
Squaring of an element a ∈ F2m can be achieved using the digit-serial multiplication archi-
tecture. This operation can, however, be performed much more efficiently by employing
the techniques described by Wu in [87]. The use of their methods means that squaring
can be implemented with a purely combinatorial unit.
Consider a =
∑m−1
i=0 aix
i with all ai ∈ F2. Since 0.0 = 0 and 1.1 = 1 on F2m , then
(ai)
2 = ai. This means that a composition polynomial z can be calculated according to
z = (
m−1∑
i=0
aix
i)2 =
m−1∑
i=0
a2ix
2i =
m−1∑
i=0
aix
2i (4.21)
This is performed in hardware by placing a zero between each bit of a, which results in
a bit string of length 2m − 1. This string, which represents the composition polynomial,
is reduced modulo the irreducible polynomial using a network of XOR gates defined by
a reduction matrix. A low weight irreducible polynomial also reduces the complexity of
this network. The VHDL for the squaring unit is generated in software according to the
desired field size and irreducible polynomial. Since squaring requires combinatorial logic
alone a result is returned in one clock cycle.
4.3.4 F2m Inversion
Inversion is typically more expensive than all other operations on F2m . Fermat’s Little
Theorem can be used to perform inversion. An element c = b−1, where b, c ∈ F2m , can be
computed using the relationship b = b2m for all b ∈ F2m . This means that b−1 = b2m−2.
This exponentiation can be performed using a series of squaring and multiplications. A
hardware architecture that uses a generalised version of the Itoh-Tsujii inversion method
[88] is presented in [89]. The computation time required is, however, in the order of m
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multiplications, which means that it is sometimes unsuitable for the relatively large field
sizes used in pairing-based applications.
Inversion can also be performed using the Extended Euclidean Algorithm (EEA). This
is the most efficient method to perform hardware inversion [90]. The EEA is used to
compute the Greatest Common Divisor (GCD) of 2 polynomials a, b ∈ F2m . The EEA
also returns a pair of polynomials w, u ∈ F2m such that GCD(a, b) = wa + ub. The
irreducible polynomial f generating the field is not divisible by any polynomial in F2m ,
which means that
GCD(f, b) = wf + ub = 1 (4.22)
Also, since f = 0 ∈ F2m , then ub = 1 and therefore b−1 = u. This forms the basis
for the EEA-based inversion algorithm of [91], presented in more detail in [90]. The
calculation of the inverse of an element b ∈ F2m using the EEA is described by Algorithm 8.
Operations are performed on the polynomial pairs (r, s) and (u, v), where r, s, u, v ∈ F2m .
On initialisation, (r, s) is set to (b, f) and (u, v) to (1, 0). The for loop is iterated 2m
times. An integer δ is used to track the differences between the degrees of r and s. The
relationships between the polynomial pairs remains the same throughout the loop. By
accumulating the (u, v) polynomials in this manner, the inverse of b is given by the value
of the u polynomial after 2m iterations.
In hardware, the (u, v) polynomial pair can be updated in parallel to (r, s) since they are
computed independently of each other. The inverter described in [90] uses this parallelism
to perform F2m inversion and is used in this work. The architecture contains hardware
units that are known as bit-slices. Each bit-slice is dedicated to updating a specific bit of
a polynomial pair. A chain of RS slices, with each slice containing the same combinatorial
logic, returns the final (r, s) polynomial pair in 2m clock cycles. A chain of UV slices is
also used to return the final value of (u, v) in 2m cycles. An architecture containing a
chain of (m+ 1) RS slices and a parallel chain of m UV slices performs an F2m inversion
in 2m clock cycles.
It would be interesting to investigate whether the area cost of the inverter is justified by
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Algorithm 8 F2m Inversion
Input: b =
∑m−1
i=0 bix
i ∈ F2m
Output: c = b−1, where u ∈ F2m
1: Initialise: r(0) ← b, s(0) ← f, u(0) ← 1, v(0) ← 0, δ(0) ← 0
2: for (i← 1, i ≤ 2m, i← i+ 1) do
3: if r
(i−1)
m = 0 then
4: r(i) ← x(r(i−1))
5: s(i) ← s(i−1)
6: u(i) ← x(u(i−1)) mod f
7: v(i) ← v(i−1)
8: δ(i) ← δ(i−1) + 1
9: else
10: if δ(i−1) = 0 then
11: r(i) ← x(s(i−1) + s(i−1)m r(i−1))
12: s(i) ← r(i−1)
13: u(i) ← x(v(i−1) + s(i−1)m u(i−1)) mod f
14: v(i) ← u(i−1)
15: δ(i) ← δ(i−1) + 1
16: else
17: r(i) ← r(i−1)
18: s(i) ← x(s(i−1) − s(i−1)m r(i−1))
19: u(i) ← (u(i−1))/x mod f
20: v(i) ← v(i−1) + s(i−1)m u(i−1)
21: δ(i) ← δ(i−1) − 1
22: end if
23: end if
24: end for
25: c← u
Return: c
90
the reduction in clock cycles required to perform the pairing. The inverter is utilised only
during the exponentiation. Fermat’s Little Theorem can be used to define how many times
the field member to be inverted should be iteratively squared and multiplied with itself to
return a result. The dedicated inversion architecture is also desirable in other curve-based
cryptographic systems.
4.4 Hardware Implementation of Arithmetic on F24m
Extension field addition, multiplication, squaring, inversion and exponentiation to q are re-
quired to perform Tate pairing computation according to Algorithms 5 and 6. This section
describes the hardware architectures that have been used to implement these operations.
An element a ∈ F24m is represented by a degree 3 polynomial of form
a = a0 + a1x+ a2x
2 + a3x
3 (4.23)
where all ai ∈ F2m . The F24m field is generated by the degree 4 irreducible polynomial
p = x4 + x+ 1.
4.4.1 F24m Addition
The addition operation is performed bitwise on each coefficient of the polynomials. Let
a, b, c ∈ F24m . Then
c = a+ b =
3∑
i=0
aix
i +
3∑
i=0
bix
i = (a0 + b0) + (a1 + b1)x+ (a2 + b2)x
2 + (a3 + b3)x
3 (4.24)
Addition on F24m is relatively trivial and can be computed in one clock cycle using a total
of 4m XOR gates.
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4.4.2 F24m Multiplication
Multiplication on F24m is required on each iteration of the for loop of Algorithm 5. Multi-
plication on the extension field is, however, relatively expensive and efforts must be made
to ensure that it is performed as efficiently as possible.
Consider a, b, c ∈ F24m . The extension field multiplication c = a.b can be performed by
multiplying each coefficient of a by each coefficient of b and reducing the resulting com-
position polynomial. This method requires 16 F2m multiplications and nine F2m additions
during the composition stage alone. Karatsuba multiplication [92] can instead be used to
reduce the number of F2m multiplications at the expense of more trivial F2m additions.
Nine F2m multiplications are first performed:
mul0 =a0.b0
mul1 =a1.b1
mul2 =a2.b2
mul3 =a3.b3
mul4 =(a0 + a1).(b0 + b1)
mul5 =(a0 + a2).(b0 + b2)
mul6 =(a1 + a3).(b1 + b3)
mul7 =(a2 + a3).(b2 + b3)
mul8 =(a0 + a1 + a2 + a3).(b0 + b1 + b2 + b3)
Seven partial products are now calculated using these results. This stage requires no
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further F2m multiplications:
γ0 =mul0
γ1 =mul0 +mul1 +mul4
γ2 =mul0 +mul1 +mul2 +mul5
γ3 =mul0 +mul1 +mul2 +mul3 +mul4 +mul5 +mul6 +mul7 +mul8
γ4 =mul1 +mul2 +mul3 +mul6
γ5 =mul2 +mul3 +mul7
γ6 =mul3
These partial products are reduced modulo the irreducible polynomial p = x4 + x + 1.
This can be performed using the matrix reduction techniques described in the previous
section. The irreducible polynomial is, however, fixed in this case. This means that the
following additions can be used to reduce the partial products and return the final result:
c0 =mul0 +mul1 +mul2 +mul3 +mul6
c1 =mul0 +mul4 +mul6 +mul7
c2 =mul0 +mul1 +mul5 +mul7
c3 =mul0 +mul1 +mul2 +mul4 +mul5 +mul6 +mul7 +mul8
A dedicated hardware architecture for extension field multiplication using the Karatsuba
method has been created for this work and is illustrated in Figure 4.2. The unit takes
as input the m-bit coefficients of the input operands. All nine F2m multiplications are
performed in parallel in hardware. The digit-serial architectures described in Subsection
4.3.2 are used to perform F2m multiplication. The F24m additions are nested, when possible,
and a network of 22 adders is used. This architecture returns an F24m multiplication result
in (m/D + 2) clock cycles.
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Figure 4.2: Architecture for F24m Karatsuba multiplication
4.4.3 F24m Squaring
Consider a =
∑3
i=0 aix
i and c =
∑3
i=0 cix
i, where a, c ∈ F24m . The computation c = a2
begins with the composition of an intermediate polynomial z:
z =
3∑
i=0
ai
2x2i = a0
2 + a1
2x2 + a2
2x4 + a3
2x6 (4.25)
This polynomial must now be reduced. The irreducible polynomial has value p = 0 ∈ F24m ,
which means that x4 = x+ 1, x5 = x2 + x and x6 = x3 + x2. Substituting into Equation
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(4.25) gives:
c =(a0
2 + a1
2x2 + a2
2x4 + a3
2x6) mod p (4.26)
=a0
2 + a1
2x2 + a2
2(x+ 1) + a3
2(x3 + x2) (4.27)
=(a0
2 + a2
2) + a2
2x+ (a1
2 + a3
2)x2 + a3
2x3 (4.28)
Squaring on F24m requires four F2m squaring units and two F2m adders. The architecture
that has been designed for the computation of squaring on the extension field is displayed
in Figure 4.3.
a
0
a
1
a
2
a
3
Sq Sq Sq Sq
c
0
ac
1
ac
2
ac
3
Figure 4.3: Architecture for Squaring on F24m
4.4.4 Exponentiation to q
Consider a ∈ F24m where a =
∑k−1
i=0 aix
i and all ai ∈ F2m . Exponentiation of a to q = 2m
can be implemented with m extension field squaring operations. As a is squared, however,
a pattern emerges that can be used to considerably reduce the number of required field
operations. It can be easily shown that a2
5
is equal to a2
1
, a2
6
is equal to a2
2
and a2
7
is
equal to a2
3
. This sequence continues every four steps. This means that a2
m
is dependent
on the value of m mod 4. The relationships a2
0
= a for m mod 4 = 0, a2
1
= a2 for m
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mod 4 = 1, a2
2
= a2 for m mod 4 = 2 and a2
3
= a3 for m mod 4 = 3 hold. Recall also
that a2
m
i = ai for all ai ∈ F2m . The value of c = aq, where c =
∑k−1
i=0 cix
i is returned
according to Table 4.2.
Table 4.2: Calculation of c = aq, where a, c ∈ F24m for different values of m mod 4
Output m mod 4
0 1 2 3
c0 a0 a0 + a2 a0 + a1 + a2 + a3 a0 + a1
c1 a1 a2 a1 + a3 a2 + a3
c2 a2 a1 + a3 a2 + a3 a1
c3 a3 a3 a3 a3
Exponentiation to q can, therefore, be implemented in hardware using XOR gates and a
result returned in one clock cycle.
4.4.5 F24m Inversion
The final exponentiation, described by Algorithm 6, requires a multiplicative inversion
on F24m . Inversion is the most complex field operation. This subsection describes the
algorithmic and hardware optimisations that can be employed to implement extension
field inversion.
Inversion on any extension field Fnk , where n and k are positive integers, can be performed
using a variant of the EEA. An efficient method for extension field inversion based on the
EEA was presented by Lim and Hwang in [93], in which several Fn inversions are replaced
by less costly Fn multiplications. The field operations required to perform Fnk inversion
are presented in Algorithm 9. The algorithm takes as input a ∈ Fnk and the irreducible
polynomial p generating Fnk and returns b ∈ Fnk such that b = a−1. In order to clarify
the notation, consider line 9. The term gdeg(g).pdeg(p)−1 denotes the Fn multiplication of
the uppermost coefficient of g by the second to uppermost coefficient of p.
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Algorithm 9 Fnk Inversion
Input: a =
∑k−1
i=0 aix
i ∈ Fnk , where ai ∈ Fn, and irreducible polynomial p generating Fnk
Output: b =
∑k−1
i=0 bix
i = a−1 ∈ Fnk , where bi ∈ Fn
1: Initialise: b← 0, c← 1, g ← a
2: while deg(p) 6= 0 do
3: if deg(p) < deg(g) then
4: Swap p with g and b with c
5: end if
6: j ← deg(p)− deg(g)
7: α← gdeg(g)2
8: β ← pdeg(p).gdeg(g)
9: γ ← gdeg(g).pdeg(p)−1 − pdeg(p).gdeg(g)−1
10: p← α.p− (β.xj + γ.xj−1).g
11: b← α.b− (β.xj + γ.xj−1).c
12: if deg(p)=deg(g) then
13: p← gdeg(p).p− pdeg(p).g
14: b← gdeg(p).b− pdeg(p).c
15: end if
16: end while
17: p0 ← p0−1
18: b← p0.b
Return: b
The main calculation cost of Algorithm 9 lies in the operations required within the while
loop that begins on Line 2. On each iteration, the variables α, β and γ must be computed
and the values of p and b updated, requiring several Fn field operations, the most costly
of which are the multiplications. If the degree of p is equal to the degree of g at the end
of an iteration, further operations are required. On completion of the loop, p0 ∈ Fn is
inverted and multiplied by b ∈ Fnk . The while loop can be implemented in hardware using
a finite state machine, with the degree of p and the degree of g acting as control lines. The
control scheme would also have to provide a means for implementation of the required if
statements and swap operations.
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An efficient technique that is also more amenable to hardware implementation can be
developed by fixing the extension field in question. The sparse nature of an irreducible
polynomial can result in a dramatic reduction in the number of required operations. The
conditional statements of Algorithm 9 can also be removed and a sequence of field opera-
tions explicitly stated. This simplifies the corresponding hardware control scheme signifi-
cantly.
Table 4.3: Computational steps for F24m Inversion
Var. Init. Step 1 Step 2 Step 3
α - g3
2 p2
2 p1
2
β - g3 g3.p2 g2.p1
γ - g2 g2.p2 + g3.p1 g1.p1 + g2.p0
p4 1 0 0 0
p3 0 0 0 0
p2 0 β.g1 + g2
2 0 0
p1 1 α+ β.g0 + γ.g1 α.g1 + β.p0 + γ.p1 0
p0 1 α+ γ.g0 α.g0 + γ.p0 α.g0 + γ.p0
b3 0 0 0 β.b2
b2 0 0 β.p1 β.b1 + γ.b2
b1 0 β β.p0 + γ.b1 α.c1 + β.b0 + γ.b1
b0 0 γ α+ γ.b0 α.c0 + γ.b0
g3 a3 a3 0 -
g2 a2 a2 p2 -
g1 a1 a1 p1 -
g0 a0 a0 p0 -
c1 0 0 b1 -
c0 1 1 b0 -
In the case of F24m , the while loop is replaced by a sequence of operations that can
be grouped into three computational steps. Table 4.3 demonstrates the F2m operations
required during each step. The p, b, g and c polynomials are initialised before the first
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step. Note that the degree 2 and 3 coefficients of c are omitted since they are not operands
of any operation and, therefore, do not need to be updated. On each step, the values of α,
β and γ are first calculated. The p, b, g and c polynomials are then updated. On the first
computational step, the variables β and γ are initialised and γ is calculated with an F2m
squaring operation. Subsequently, p is calculated, requiring four multiplications and four
additions on F2m . The b polynomial is updated with a simple reassignment. The g and
c polynomials remain unchanged. Note that the degree of p is reduced by 2 during this
step, due to the sparse nature of the irreducible polynomial defining the field. On step
2, the α, β and γ variables are calculated, this time requiring three multiplications, one
squaring and one addition on F2m . The p polynomial is updated, which requires five F2m
multiplications and three additions, and b is updated with four F2m multiplications and
two additions. After this g and c are allocated the values of p and b at the end of Step 1,
respectively. On the third step the α, β and γ variables are updated, requiring three F2m
multiplications, one addition and one squaring. The p polynomial is updated with two
multiplications and one addition on F2m and b is updated with eight multiplications and
four additions. No further steps are necessary as the degree of p has reached 0. The three
steps of Table 4.3 require a total of 29 multiplications, four squarings and 16 additions on
F2m . These operations satisfy the calculations required by the while loop of Algorithm 9.
After this sequence, p0 ∈ F2m is inverted and multiplied by b ∈ F24m . The latter operation
requires four F2m multiplications.
The most costly operations are the multiplications. All other operations can be performed
combinatorially in hardware. A hardware implementation provides an opportunity to
perform many of the 33 F2m multiplications in parallel. The quantity of multipliers re-
turning the most efficient computation was determined through analysis of clock cycle and
area data. It was found that three multipliers, operating in parallel, provide an excellent
solution for the computation of the multiplications.
The scheduling of the 33 multiplicative operations through three multipliers is shown in
Table 4.4 (the data in the table itself points towards increasing redundancy within the
multipliers as the number of units grows). The stage at which the F2m inversion begins is
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Table 4.4: Scheduling of F2m multiplications through three multipliers for F24m inversion
Stage Mult 0 Mult 1 Mult 2 Inv
1 β.g1 β.g0 - -
2 γ.g1 γ.g0 - -
3 g3.p2 g2.p2 g3.p1 -
4 α.g1 β.p0 γ.p1 -
5 γ.g0 γ.p0 β.b1 -
6 β.p0 γ.b1 γ.b0 -
7 p1.g1 g2.p0 - -
8 α.g0 γ.p0 g2.p1 -
9 β.b2 β.b1 γ.b2 inv(p
−1
0 )
10 α.c1 β.b0 γ.b1
11 α.c0 γ.b0 - ret(p
−1
0 )
12 p−10 .b0 p
−1
0 .b1 p
−1
0 .b2 -
13 p−10 .b3 - - -
also noted. Extension field inversion is completed in a total of 13 stages. Stages 1-8 and
12-13 require n = m/D clock cycles each, where D is the digit size of the F2m multipliers.
The F2m inversion of p0 begins at Stage 9. This operation can be performed in parallel
with the multiplications of Stages 9-11. Stage 12 cannot, however, begin until the value of
p−10 is returned by the inverter, which returns a result after 2m clock cycles. This means
that Stages 9-11 require the larger of 3n or 2m clock cycles. All other field operations are
combinatorial. An F2m inverter using three multipliers, therefore, returns a result in 13n
clock cycles if 3n > 2m or in 10n + 2m clock cycles otherwise. The redundancy of the
multipliers is very low. The first multiplier is in use 100% of the time, while the second
and third multipliers are in use 92% and 62% of the time, respectively. All other options
are considerably less efficient.
The techniques discussed in this subsection form the basis of a co-authored publication
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that appeared in [7]. The paper describes the FPGA implementation of the F24m inverter.
The architecture consists of an Arithmetic Logic Unit (ALU), dedicated RAM and an
uncomplicated control system. The ALU contains an F2m inverter, two adders, a squar-
ing unit and three multipliers. The control system sequences the arithmetic operations,
accesses the RAM and sends the m-bit buses representing the F2m elements to the requi-
site logic units. The system also controls the logic units and stores their outputs in the
correct place in memory, when available. The inverter was prototyped on the extension
field F24m , where m = 283, and then used to optimise a Tate pairing processor that was
previously described by Keller et al. in [94]. The inverter leads to a dramatic reduction in
pairing computation time. The minimum Tate pairing computation time, without the use
of the inverter, is 2ms assuming that there are no area constraints and a clock frequency
of 40MHz. The minimum computation time required with the inclusion of the extension
field inverter is 0.69ms if the same parameters are used. The author of this thesis provided
the VHDL and the files necessary to implement the inversion architecture. Help was also
provided during the integration of the architecture with the Tate pairing processor.
Since extension field inversion is only required once during the computation of the Tate
pairing (using the ηT method) the inclusion of three multipliers dedicated to inversion alone
would not be prudent. Fortunately, other multipliers within the processor architecture can
be accessed if care is taken with the routing of buses and the design of top level control
systems. As will be seen in the next section, three parallel F2m multipliers are used to
implement the special multiplication known as smul in Algorithm 5. These multipliers
are not in use during exponentiation. The inverter is placed within an exponentiation unit
that has access to these multipliers. This unit will be discussed in the next section and
the hardware implementation of extension field inversion further clarified.
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4.5 Dedicated Hardware Units for Pairing Computation
Computation of the ηT pairing followed by exponentiation to the Tate pairing, is performed
according to Algorithms 5 and 6, respectively. The most expensive component of these
algorithms is the for loop of the ηT computation. This loop iterates (m+ 1)/4 times and
it is, therefore, paramount that its field operations be performed as efficiently as possible.
The for loop of Algorithm 5 can be described by four computation stages:
1. The calculation of t and the roots and squares of xP , yP , xQ, yQ as calculated on
Steps 4, 6, 7 and 9 of the algorithm, respectively.
2. The calculation of u0 and u1 according to Steps 5 and 8.
3. The computation of u0.u1 on Step 10. This multiplication is performed using a spe-
cial function, called smul, that takes advantage of the structure of the polynomials.
4. The F24m multiplication mill.u on Step 11.
Dedicated hardware units have been designed to ensure a fast computation of these four
stages. An exponentiation unit has also been created for the implementation of the com-
putations required by Algorithm 6. It should also be noted that Steps 14-16 of Algorithm
5 require computations on F2m and F24m , but these operations need only be performed
once and can be implemented by reusing other units. The custom hardware units that
have been created for the characteristic 2 elliptic curve Tate pairing processor described
in this chapter are as follows:
• Precomputation Unit: Many F2m squaring and rooting operations are required
during the for loop. The inclusion of dedicated units for all of these operations
would be wasteful and the control scheme necessary to supply the correct values to
other hardware blocks, when required, would not be trivial. This unit computes
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all required squares and roots before iteration of the for loop. The desired F2m
precomputation values are supplied to the other units, as required.
• Unit for the parallel calculation of u0 and u1: The use of the unrolled for loop
means that u0 and u1 can be calculated at the same time. This unit performs this
parallel calculation efficiently.
• Unit for the calculation of smul(u0, u1): The custom multiplication routine
smul is implemented in this unit and the value of u = smul(u0, u1) returned.
• F24m Multiplication Unit: Themill variable must be updated by means of an F24m
multiplication by u on each iteration. Extension field multiplication is an expensive
operation. A dedicated unit is included in the pairing processor that utilises the
Karatsuba multiplication method. This unit was discussed in Subsection 4.4.2.
• Exponentiation Unit: This unit performs the exponentiation from the ηT to the
Tate pairing according to Algorithm 6.
The most efficient interconnection of these units was carefully studied during the design
phase of the Tate pairing processor. A scheme was created to handle control signals and
data buses and to sequence the required operations. The functional units are considered
individually in this section. Their hierarchy and connectivity at the top level of the
processor will be described in Section 4.6.
4.5.1 Precomputation Unit
Squares of the values of xQ, yQ ∈ F2m must be computed on Lines 6 and 9 of Algorithm
5. Square roots of xP , yP ∈ F2m are required by lines 4, 7 and 13. As seen in Subsection
4.3.3, squaring is relatively trivial in hardware. Square rooting is, however, more costly.
Fortunately, the latter operation is not required if precomputation methods are employed.
In this processor, the values of x2
i
P and y
2i
P , for all 0 < i < m, are computed and stored
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in an indexed memory array before the for loop begins. Since the F2m field is cyclic, the
roots required on each iteration of the loop can be obtained by accessing the squares from
memory in reverse order. The values of x2
i
Q and y
2i
Q are also precomputed before the loop.
As mentioned previously, the u0 and u1 polynomials of Lines 5 and 8 of Algorithm 5 can
be computed in parallel in hardware. This requires some rearranging of the operations
performed on Lines 4-9 and the introduction of some extra variables. As an example,
consider the second iteration of the loop. The operations and variables of Lines 4-9 can
be related to the original pairing input points as follows:
t0 ←x
1
4
P + 1, xP0 ← xP
1
8 , yP0 ← yP
1
8 , xQ0 ← x4Q, yQ0 ← y4Q
t1 ←xP 18 + 1, xP1 ← xP
1
16 , yP1 ← yP
1
16 , xQ1 ← xQ8, yQ1 ← yQ8
u0 ←(t0.(xP0 + xQ0 + 1) + yP0 + yQ0) + (t0 + xQ0 + 1)x
u1 ←(t1.(xP1 + xQ1 + 1) + yP1 + yQ1) + (t1 + xQ1 + 1)x
The values of xP0 , xP1 , yP0 , yP1 , xQ0 , xQ1 , yQ0 , yQ1 are the powers of the pairing input co-
ordinates that are required on each iteration of the loop. A modular architecture has
been created for precomputation that supplies all of the values that are required during
a parallel computation of u0 and u1. The xP precomputation module is illustrated in
Figure 4.4. This module contains m × m bit dual port block RAM along with an F2m
squaring unit and an m-bit multiplexer. The multiplexer is used at the input of the RAM
to allow storage of either the initial value of xP or the result at the output of the squaring
unit. A control system at the top level of the pairing processor employs a counter to write
the squares to memory. The RAM address connections are controlled by the ind0 and
ind0− 1 buses, the latter of which represents the integer value of ind0 minus the integer
one. The calculation and storage of these squares requires (m + 2) clock cycles. Once
precomputation is complete the for loop can begin. Using appropriate indices, all of the
powers of xP that are required for the parallel computation of u0 and u1 can be supplied
simultaneously on each iteration of the loop.
The top level precomputation unit contains modules for each of the input coordinates and
is illustrated in Figure 4.5. It receives as input the m-bit values of xP , yP , xQ and yQ.
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Figure 4.4: Precomputation module for xP
It is controlled by a pair of index buses and a 1-bit signal. The first index (ind0) is used
to access the RAM within the xP and yP modules and the other (ind1) to access the
RAM within the xQ and yQ modules. The 1-bit signal cont inp mux is used to handle
the multiplexers within each of the precomputation modules. The three control signals
are used to handle both precomputation and the supply of powers of coordinates during
loop iteration. The unit has two 4m-bit output buses. The Dout0 bus supplies the powers
required for the computation of u0, whilst Dout1 supplies the powers for the computation
of u1. This architecture means that all powers are calculated in parallel and are available
after a total of (m+ 2) clock cycles.
4.5.2 Unit for the Computation of u0 and u1
On completion of the precomputation stage, the for loop begins and u0 and u1 must be
computed. On inspection of Algorithm 4, it can be seen that the u polynomial has a
special form before loop unrolling. It can be written as u = c0 + c1x + (c1 + 1)x
2, where
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Figure 4.5: Precomputation unit for the characteristic 2 elliptic curve Tate pairing pro-
cessor
all ci ∈ F2m . After the loop has been unrolled u0 and u1 are of the same structure. Let
u0 = a0 + a1x + (a1 + 1)x
2 and u1 = b0 + b1x + (b1 + 1)x
2, where all ai, bi ∈ F2m . The
coefficients of x2 in u0 and u1 do not need to be computed since they can be trivially
retrieved from a1 and b1 when smul(u0, u1) must be performed. This results in a saving
of 2m-bits of storage and reduces the output bus sizes of the u0 and u1 computation unit
by a total of 2m bits. This is reflected in Lines 5 and 8 of Algorithm 5, in which the x2
coefficients of u0 and u1 are not computed.
The hardware unit that was designed for the parallel computation of u0 and u1 is illus-
trated in Figure 4.6. The required powers of the input coordinates are supplied by the
precomputation unit on a pair of 4m-bit input buses. Two separate but similar branches
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compute u0 and u1 simultaneously. Each branch contains one F2m multiplier and four F2m
adders. An extra m-bit register is required in the upper branch since t0 is dependent on
the value of xP1 from the previous iteration. The operations required to compute u0 and
u1 are very similar to those required to compute the f and u polynomials of Algorithm
5 (Lines 2 and 14). This means that this unit can also be used to calculate f and u.
These polynomials are computed in the upper branch. Some extra 1-bit adders and 1-bit
multiplexers are required since the least significant bits of these polynomials differ to those
of u0. The Dout0 output bus supplies either the lower 2m bits of the u0 polynomial or the
3m-bit f and u polynomials that must be computed outside of the loop. The lower 2m bits
of u1 are produced on Dout1. The hardware unit contains a total of two F2m multipliers,
eight F2m adders, an m-bit register, seven 1-bit adders and two 1-bit multiplexers. The
u0 and u1 polynomials are computed in a total of (m/D+ 2) clock cycles, where m is the
field size and D is the digit size of the multipliers.
Figure 4.6: Unit for the computation of u0 and u1
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4.5.3 Unit for the Computation of smul(u0, u1)
Once computed, the u0 and u1 polynomials must be multiplied together. This can be
performed using degree 2 Karatsuba multiplication, which would require six F2m multi-
plications and a number of additions. A specialised multiplication routine can, however,
be defined that requires fewer multiplications. This routine, called smul(u0, u1), takes
advantage of the special form of u0 and u1.
Consider u0 = a0 + a1x+ (a1 + 1)x
2 and u1 = b0 + b1x+ (b1 + 1)x
2, where all ai, bi ∈ F2m .
The multiplication u0.u1 proceeds in the usual fashion. A composition polynomial is first
computed:
z = (a0 + a1x+ (a1 + 1)x
2).(b0 + b1x+ (b1 + 1)x
2)
= a0.b0 + a0.b1x+ a0.(b1 + 1)x
2
+ a1.b0x+ a1.b1x
2 + a1.(b1 + 1)x
3
+ b0.(a1 + 1)x
2 + b1.(a1 + 1)x
3 + (a1 + 1).(b1 + 1)x
4
= a0.b0 + (a0.b1 + a1.b0)x+ (a0.b1 + a0 + a1.b1 + a1.b0 + b0)x
2
+ (a1 + b1)x
3 + (a1.b1 + a1 + b1 + 1)x
4
The z polynomial is now reduced modulo x4 + x+ 1, the irreducible polynomial defining
the extension field. The reduced result is given by:
u0.u1 = (a0.b0 + a1.b1 + a1 + b1 + 1) + (a0.b1 + a1.b0 + a1.b1 + a1 + b1 + 1)x
+ (a0.b1 + a0 + a1.b1 + a1.b0 + b0)x
2 + (a1 + b1)x
3
The smul routine can now be constructed. Let mul0 = (a0.b0), mul1 = (a1.b1) and
mul2 = (a0 + a1).(b0 + b1) = a0.b0 + a0.b1 + a1.b0 + a1.b1. Substituting into the previous
equation and cancelling terms when possible gives the F2m operations required to compute
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u0.u1 = smul(u0, u1):
u0.u1 = (mul0 +mul1 + a1 + b1 + 1)
+ (mul0 +mul2 + a1 + b1 + 1)x
+ (mul0 +mul2 + a0 + b0)x
2
+ (a1 + b1)x
3
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Figure 4.7: Unit for the computation of smul(u0, u1)
The hardware architecture that has been designed for the computation of smul(u0, u1) is
presented in Figure 4.7. The 2m-bit inputs DIn0 and DIn1 are supplied by the (u0, u1)
computation unit and contain the values of a0, a1 and b0, b1 respectively. The F2m mul-
tiplications mul0, mul1 and mul2 are performed in parallel. The unit contains a total of
three F2m multipliers, nine F2m adders and a 1-bit adder. The 4m-bit output bus DOut0
contains the value of smul(u0, u1) after computation. A result is returned in (m/D + 2)
clock cycles, where m is the field size and D is the digit size of the multipliers.
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4.5.4 Exponentiation Unit
The ηT result of Algorithm 5 is followed by an exponentiation to a unique Tate pairing
value. The relationship between the pairings on characteristic 2 elliptic curves was already
defined in Section 4.2 and is given by
ηT (P,Q)
MT = 〈P,ψ(Q)〉MN (4.29)
where M = (22m− 1)(2m− 2(m+1)/2 + 1) and T = 2(m+1)/2− 1 in the m mod 8 ≡ 1 case.
Exponentiation to MT is performed according to Algorithm 6. A total of (m+ 1)/2 F24m
squarings, five F24m multiplications, six F24m exponentiations to q = 2m and one F24m
inversion is required. Most of the extension field operations require operands that are not
available until the previous algorithmic step has completed. This means that the algorithm
provides little scope for parallelism. The design of an exponentiation unit containing
large dedicated arithmetic modules would not be resource efficient as far fewer operations
are required in comparison to the ηT computation. Fortunately, the exponentiation is
computed after iteration of the for loop of Algorithm 5. This means that the hardware
units that have been created for the implementation of that loop can be reused. The F24m
multiplications can be performed by sending the input operands to the extension field
multiplication architecture described in Subsection 4.4.2. As seen in Subsection 4.4.5,
the most efficient implementation of extension field inversion arises from the use of three
parallel F2m multipliers. The smul unit contains three multipliers that operate in parallel
and are used to perform the F2m multiplications required for F24m inversion.
The hardware unit that has been designed for the implementation of exponentiation is
presented in Figure 4.8. The unit has two input data buses. The first is Din0, a 3m-bit
bus that is connected to the outputs of the three F2m multipliers of the smul unit. The
second, Din1, is 4m-bits in length and is connected to the output of the F24m multiplication
unit. Arithmetic modules for extension field squaring and powering to q are included and
require only combinatorial logic. These modules are combinatorial in nature and are
inexpensive in terms of area. The unit also contains an F24m inversion module. This
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module does not perform every operation that is required for extension field inversion. It
contains an F2m adder, an F2m squaring unit and an F2m inverter. It also handles Dout2,
the 6m-bit output bus that is used to send operands to the external smul multipliers.
Figure 4.8: Characteristic 2 Elliptic Curve Exponentiation Unit
The extension field variables of Algorithm 6 are stored in dual port 4m-bit RAM. The
first input port is directly connected to the output of the external F24m multiplier. The
arithmetic modules receive their inputs from the second 4m-bit RAM output. The outputs
of the arithmetic modules are each connected to a tri-state buffer. A control signal is
used to select the 4m-bit result to be stored in RAM. The RAM output ports are also
connected to the DOut0 and DOut1 outputs. These 4m-bit buses are sent to the inputs of
the external F24m multiplier. A control system takes as input clk, rst and en exp signals
from the top level processor. This system contains a finite state machine that outputs the
signals that are required to enable reads and writes from and to the RAM and to control
the logic units.
Exponentiation begins when the en exp control signal is set. The ηT pairing result is
located at the output of the F24m multiplier at this time and is immediately stored in
RAM. The (m+1)/2 F24m squarings, required by Line 3 of Algorithm 6, are first performed
and the result stored in RAM. The u and v elements are then powered to q using the F24m
pow(q) module. Their values are then sent to the external F24m multiplier and the control
system waits the correct number of clock cycles for a result. Subsequently v is again sent
through the pow(q) module and w and v are multiplied according to Lines 7 and 8. The
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F24m inversion of w can be performed in parallel with the operations of Lines 9-11. This
means that the extension field inversion can be performed in parallel with the powerings
to q and the two extension field multiplications of Lines 9-11. An F24m multiplication of c
by the result of the inversion is required on Line 13. On completion of this operation the
Tate pairing value is available at the output of the extension field multiplier.
This type of architecture provides a very efficient way to implement exponentiation as use
is made of resource intensive units that would otherwise be redundant.
4.6 The Characteristic 2 Elliptic Curve Pairing Processor
The hardware processor that has been created for accelerated pairing computation in
the characteristic 2 elliptic curve case is presented in Figure 4.9. An ηT computation is
followed by an exponentiation to return a Tate pairing value. The processor receives the
input points P = (xP , yP ) and Q = (xQ, yQ) on the 2m-bit buses DIn0 and DIn1. The
clock and the rst and en control signals are supplied by an external source. The Tate
result 〈P,ψ(Q)〉MN is returned on the 4m-bit DOut0 output bus on completion of pairing
computation.
4.6.1 Operation Scheduling
Field operations are performed in the F24m multiplication unit and the four custom hard-
ware units. These units, discussed as separate systems in Subsection 4.4.2 and in the
previous section, each perform a specific function. The more general motivation behind
the design of the units can now be explained in the context of the top level of the archi-
tecture. The for loop of Algorithm 5 iterates (m−14 − 1) times. Every iteration consists
of three main computational stages: the calculation of u0 and u1, the computation of
u = smul(u0, u1), and the F24m multiplication mill = mill.u. The hardware units each
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Figure 4.9: The Characteristic 2 Elliptic Curve Tate Pairing Processor
complete their assigned computation in (m/D+2) cycles. A small number of clock cycles,
denoted ζ, is also required for register writes and for the propagation of signals. Com-
pletion of the for loop would, therefore, require (m−14 − 1)(3m/D + 2 + ζ) clock cycles
if each iteration were considered in isolation. The processor and its units have, however,
been designed so that the computational stages of different iterations of the loop can be
performed in parallel.
The (u0, u1) computation unit receives its inputs from the precomputation block and does
not rely on results from any previous iteration. Let (u0,1)i=0 be the values of u0 and u1
that are calculated on the first iteration. Once (u0,1)i=0 have been stored in the registers
at its output, the (u0, u1) computation unit can be reset and the computation of (u0,1)i=2
can begin almost immediately. When (u0,1)i=0 are available, the smul unit computes
ui=0 = smul
(
(u0,1)i=0
)
and the result is stored at its output. The smul unit is now reset
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and the computation of ui=2 = smul
(
(u0,1)i=2
)
can begin immediately. This is possible
since the (u0,1)i=2 polynomials have been calculated in parallel with the ui=0 computation.
The value of milli=0 = 1.ui=0 is now computed in the F24m multiplication unit and stored
at its output. The multiplication milli=2 = milli=0.ui=2 can begin immediately after this
since ui=2 has been calculated in parallel with milli=0. Computation proceeds in this
manner until the value of the mill variable at the end of the for loop has been returned.
The calculation of f and u, according to Lines 2 and 14 of Algorithm 5, respectively can
also be performed in parallel with other operations near the end of the for loop. The
scheduling of operations through the hardware units is detailed in Table 4.5.
Table 4.5: Scheduling of the for loop of Algorithm 5 through the Tate pairing processor
(u0, u1) Unit smul Unit F24m Mult. Unit
(u0,1)i=0 ——— ———
(u0,1)i=2 ui=0 = smul
(
(u0,1)i=0
)
———
(u0,1)i=4 ui=2 = smul
(
(u0,1)i=2
)
milli=0 = 1.ui=0
(u0,1)i=6 ui=4 = smul
(
(u0,1)i=4
)
milli=2 = milli=0.ui=2
(u0,1)i=8 ui=6 = smul
(
(u0,1)i=6
)
milli=4 = milli=2.ui=4
(u0,1)i=10 ui=8 = smul
(
(u0,1)i=8
)
milli=6 = milli=4.ui=6
· · ·
· · ·
· · ·
(u0,1)i=m−12 −3 ui=m−12 −5 = smul
(
(u0,1)i=m−12 −5
)
milli=m−12 −7 = milli=m−12 −9.ui=m−12 −7
(u0,1)i=m−12 −1 ui=m−12 −3 = smul
(
(u0,1)i=m−12 −3
)
milli=m−12 −5 = milli=m−12 −7.ui=m−12 −5
f ui=m−12 −1 = smul
(
(u0,1)i=m−12 −1
)
milli=m−12 −1 = milli=m−12 −5.ui=m−12 −3
u – milli=m−12 −1 = milli=m−12 −3.ui=m−12 −1
A total of (m−14 + 1) steps are required. Each step is completed in (m/D + θ) clock
cycles, where θ is a small number of cycles required for control and for the propagation of
signals through all of the registers and combinatorial logic in the data chain. A further
two F24m multiplications are required by Lines 15 and 16 of Algorithm 5. Precomputation
is performed in (m + 2) clock cycles. This means that an ηT result can be returned in(
m+ 2 + (m−14 + 3)(m/D + θ)
)
clock cycles.
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4.6.2 Architectural Overview
Tate pairing computation begins when rst is toggled and en is set. A control system
containing an FSM outputs all of the signals that are required to manage the arithmetic
and storage units and to handle bus selection.
The 2m-bit pairing input points P and Q are stored in the precomputation block on
initialisation. All squares and square roots are then computed and stored. The control
unit ensures that the required precomputation results are available at the output of the
unit during the for loop.
The u0 and u1 polynomials are computed and stored in two 2m-bit registers at the output
of the (u0, u1) computation unit. The u0 branch of this unit is also used to calculate the
f and u polynomials outside of the loop and an extra m-bit register is required to store
the degree 2 coefficients. The outputs of the u0 and u1 registers are sent to the smul unit.
The result in the m-bit register is combined with the output of the u0 register, padded
and sent to the F24m multiplication unit since f and u must be multiplied by the mill
variable at the end of the algorithm.
The smul unit is used to compute u during the for loop and the result is stored in a 4m-bit
register at its output. It also receives a 6m-bit input bus from the exponentiation unit
as its F2m multipliers are used during extension field inversion. The F2m multiplication
results are sent to the exponentiation unit on a 3m-bit bus.
The F24m multiplication unit returns the product of the two 4m-bit buses at its input.
The result is stored in the 4m-bit mill register at its output and is also sent to the
exponentiation unit. Various F24m multiplications must be performed during Algorithms
5 and 6. Tri-state buffers are used for input selection as the buses are relatively wide at
this location and a multiplexer system would introduce unacceptably large combinatorial
delays. These buffers are also used to minimise resource usage as they are available in
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every FPGA slice. The first multiplication input is selected from either the output of the
mill register or from the upper half of an 8m-bit bus that is sent from the exponentiation
unit. The second input is selected from the (f, u) bus, the u register or from the lower 4m-
bits of the exponentiation bus. This routing and selection system enables the computation
of all extension field multiplications while minimising the required area.
The ηT pairing result is located at the output of the mill unit on completion of all of the
computations required by Algorithm 5. The exponentiation unit is used to perform the
field operations of Algorithm 6. It has access to the three F2m multipliers of the smul
unit and to the F24m multiplier. An internal control system is used to manage the field
operations performed by its own logic modules and by the external multipliers. A 4m-bit
Tate pairing result is produced at the output of the mill register on completion of the
exponentiation.
4.6.3 Results and Comparisons
The characteristic 2 elliptic curve Tate pairing processor was captured in VHDL and
implemented on a Virtex-II Pro FPGA (xc2vp100-6ff1696). This FPGA contains 44,096
slices. The VHDL is generated by the C++ design system and receives input variables such
as field size, irreducible polynomial and F2m multiplier digit size from the user. This means
that the processor can be modified with ease if security, clock cycle or area requirements
change.
Implementations of the processor on an elliptic curve E(F2m), where m = 313, were
used to gather speed and area data. The irreducible polynomial defining the field is
x313 + x79 + 1. The extension field is k × m = 1252 bits in size. The security level
of an application that uses this implementation is roughly equivalent to 1024-bit RSA.
Results for implementations using multiplier digit sizes of 1, 4, 8 and 12 are presented in
Table 4.6. The Area column lists the number of slices required by each version whilst the
Utilisation column lists the percentage of the FPGA that is occupied in each case. The
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Clock Cycles column lists the number of clock cycles required by the processor to compute
ηT (P,Q)
MT = 〈P,ψ(Q)〉MN in each case. The AC Product column contains products of
clock cycles and area usage. The AC products are measured in slice.cycles and can be
used as an indication of efficiency.
Table 4.6: Results returned by the characteristic 2 Tate pairing processor for m = 313
D Area Utilisation Clock Cycles AC Product
(Bits) (Slices) (Mslice.cycles)
1 28435 64% 17340 493
4 34675 79% 11165 387
8 41078 93% 6200 255
12 44060 99% 4818 212
The D = 12 case returns a Tate pairing result in 4,818 clock cycles. The AC product in
this case is 212 Mslice.cycles. This is a 17% reduction on the D = 8 case. However, the
D = 8 case provides a much larger reduction of 34% over the D = 4 case. This indicates
that the D = 8 case may be the better option as the extra area required by the D = 12
case may incur a drop in clock frequency that does not compensate for the relatively small
reduction in clock cycles over the D = 8 case. The processors occupy a large percentage
of the FPGA. As utilisation increases, unrelated logic must be packed into slices and some
slices must be used by the Xilinx tool to enable an efficient place and route process. This
can result in a decreased in the maximum clock frequency. It would be interesting to
investigate whether slice usage would decrease on larger FPGAs on which the routing
matrix could be used more efficiently to place and route the design.
Barreto et al. perform a software computation of the η and ηT pairings in [63]. Pairings are
computed on a Pentium IV processor operating at 3 GHz. Results are returned (without
exponentiation to the Tate pairing) in 5.83 ms and 3 ms in the η and ηT cases respectively.
The custom processor described in this chapter provides a significant reduction in pairing
computation time, even for relatively low clock frequencies.
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Results returned by other hardware implementations of characteristic 2 elliptic curve pair-
ing processors are listed in Table 4.7. As discussed previously, the security of pairing-based
systems can be measured in terms of the cost of the index calculus attack in the extension
field. This means that the size of the extension field can be used to compare the security
level returned by different implementations. The implementations of [8] and [95] both use
an extension field of 1132 bits. It should be kept in mind while analysing the results that
this is smaller than the 1252 bits of our implementations.
Table 4.7: Results returned by characteristic 2 elliptic curve pairing implementations in
the literature
Ref. m Alg. Device Arch. D Area Cycles AC
(Bits) (Slices) (MSl.cycles)
[8] 283 BKLS Virtex-II Macro 4 27411 68250 1871
6 29421 55110 1621
Mi. 1 6 4273 240000 1026
Mi. 9 6 15065 120000 1808
[95] 283 η Virtex-II P (PPR) Macro 16 22726 7308 166
32 37803 4392 166
ηT 16 33252 4368 145
In [8], Keller et al. compute the Tate pairing using the BKLS algorithm described in
[60]. Two types of processor, which they call macro and micro, are presented. The macro
processor contains dedicated, hard-wired, logic units for extension field operations. An
implementation on a Virtex-II FPGA with m = 283 and D = 6 returns a Tate pairing
in 55,110 clock cycles. The custom processor provides an 11.4x speed up on this. A
total of 29,421 slices are required, resulting in an AC product of 1621 Mslice.cycles. The
AC product of the processor discussed in this chapter is only 13.1% of this value. The
micro processor does not contain any extension field logic units. A number of F2m logic
units, including digit-serial multipliers, are used. This processor can be implemented with
various quantities of parallel F2m multipliers. An implementation with nine multipliers,
each with a digit size of 6, requires 120,000 clock cycles for computation. The custom
processor is 24.9x faster. The implementation uses 15,065 slices and has an AC product
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of 1,808. The custom processor’s AC product is only 11.7% of this value.
Shu et al. [95] discuss a Tate pairing implementation using the η and ηT methods. This
was published contemporaneously with much of the subject matter of this chapter. They
use a more traditional architecture with a main controller, central memory, interconnec-
tion networks and a central ALU. The ALU contains one extension field multiplier and a
number of subfield arithmetic units. Their results are generated from information returned
by the place and route tools of the Xilinx software, rather than from actual FPGA imple-
mentations. They also use a subfield size of 283 bits in comparison to the 313 bits used
here. These factors make it difficult to perform a direct comparison but a brief analysis
follows. Their processor returns a Tate pairing in 4,368 clock cycles using F2m multipliers
of digit size 16, a speed up of 1.1x in comparison. A total of 33,252 slices are required,
which results in an AC product of 145 Mslice.cycles. This is a 30% reduction in compari-
son to 212 Mslice.cycles. It will be seen in Chapter 6 that the ALU-based processors that
have been designed during this work can return a smaller AC product at these field sizes.
4.7 Conclusions
The computation of the characteristic 2 elliptic curve Tate pairing using the ηT methods
has been discussed in this chapter. Calculation of the ηT pairing, followed by a suitable
exponentiation, returns a Tate result in a very efficient manner.
Hardware architectures for F2m arithmetic have been described. Digit-serial multipliers
are used to perform F2m multiplication since, through modification of their digit size, they
enable a useful speed/area trade-off. Field arithmetic is ideally suited to hardware compu-
tation as many of the operations can be performed in parallel. Hardware architectures and
design methods for the computation of F24m arithmetic have also been presented. Many
of the required operations can be performed in terms of parallel F2m operations. This
provides further motivation for hardware implementation when large finite fields are in
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use. All efforts have been made to design arithmetic modules that return results quickly
while endeavouring to minimise resource usage.
Dedicated hardware units for the computation of the major stages of the pairing algorithms
have been presented. A precomputation unit stores all of the squares and square roots
required by the ηT computation in (m + 2) cycles. Another three units compute the
operations required by the for loop of Algorithm 5. An exponentiation unit controls the
operations required by Algorithm 6. Although implementing distinct stages of the pairing
algorithms, the units have been created with their use and connectivity at the top level
of the processor in mind. An efficient scheduling system has been created that allows
simultaneous use of the units during the for loop of Algorithm 5. This strategy results in
a very fast pairing computation.
An overview of the top level architecture of the pairing processor has also been provided.
The processor utilises a relatively simple control scheme to schedule operations and to store
intermediate variables. Results returned by the processor, when implemented on a Virtex-
II FPGA with various multiplier digit sizes, have been presented. The processor returns
its fastest Tate pairing result in 4,818 clock cycles. The results show that a hardware
implementation of the elliptic curve characteristic 2 Tate pairing can return a result very
quickly and in an efficient manner.
The topics and architectures discussed in this chapter have been published in [6], [7], and
[8].
120
Chapter 5
A Processor for the Tate Pairing
on a Genus 2 Hyperelliptic Curve
5.1 Introduction
Algorithms for Tate pairing computation on genus 2 curves are more complex than on
elliptic cures as group addition, doubling and other curve arithmetic are generally more
intricate. Supersingular genus 2 curves also have an embedding degree of k = 12, which
is larger than the k = 4 and k = 6 characteristic 2 and characteristic 3 elliptic cases,
respectively. The degree 12 extension field computations require many more base field
arithmetic operations. These issues provide a barrier against the computation of the Tate
pairing in the genus 2 case. However, Barreto et al. show that the Tate pairing can be
computed efficiently on genus 2 curves using the ηT methods [63]. On another positive
note, the security level of systems that rely on pairings are largely dependent on the
product k × m. This means that m can be 3 and 2 times smaller than in equivalent
characteristic 2 and 3 elliptic curve systems. Implementations on genus 2 curves scale
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better as the value of m increases at a smaller rate as the security level is increased. This
means that a system based on a genus 2 Tate pairing can provide an attractive alternative
to more traditional elliptic curve based systems.
During this work hardware units, dedicated to the fast computation of the various op-
erations required by the genus 2 Tate pairing, have been created. The more complex
extension field computations are reduced to sub-field operations that are calculated in
parallel. An efficient processor has been created that performs a fast genus 2 Tate pairing
computation. This processor is more hybrid in nature than the characteristic 2 elliptic
curve processor as the units share some operations.
Section 5.2 provides an introduction to Tate pairing computation, using the ηT method, on
genus 2 curves. The hardware units that have been designed for the accelerated implemen-
tation of the main stages of pairing computation are discussed in Section 5.3. The genus
2 Tate pairing processor is then presented in Section 5.4, along with some implementation
results.
5.2 The Genus 2 ηT and Tate Pairings
An introduction to Tate pairing computation using the ηT method in the genus 2 case
is provided in this section. More detailed treatments of some of this subject matter are
available in [62], [68] and [63].
Consider the supersingular genus 2 hyperelliptic curve C(Fq) : y2 + y = x5 +x3 +d, where
q = 2m, d = 0 or 1 and m is coprime to 6. This curve has embedding degree k = 12.
Duursma and Lee [62] showed that degenerate divisors of the form D = (P )− (∞) can be
used to compute the Tate pairing on curves of genus greater than 1. Katagi et al. show
that this does not result in a loss of security [96]. The order of the Jacobian, #JC(Fq), is
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given by
22m + (−1)d2(3m+1)/2 + 2m + (−1)d2(m+1)/2 + 1
if m ≡ (1, 7, 17, 23) mod 24, or by
22m − (−1)d2(3m+1)/2 + 2m − (−1)d2(m+1)/2 + 1
if m ≡ (5, 11, 13, 19) mod 24.
The F212m field can be built as a degree 12 extension of F2m using an irreducible polynomial
of degree 12 with coefficients in F2. The extension field can also be constructed as a degree
2 extension of F26m . The F26m field is first generated using an irreducible polynomial of
degree 6. The F26m field is then extended to F212m using an irreducible polynomial of
degree 2. The latter method allows arithmetic on F212m to be expressed in terms of field
operations on F26m . Operations on F26m can then be written in terms of arithmetic on
F2m . This is advantageous from a hardware standpoint as some of the F212m operations
can be implemented using F26m logic units that operate in parallel. The F26m units can
be implemented so that the required F2m arithmetic operations are also performed in
parallel. This greatly simplifies the design process without reducing the attainable level
of parallelism.
Extension fields are commonly generated by irreducible polynomials with coefficients in
F2. There is, however, a well known distortion map on the curve that moves points from
C(F2m) to C(F212m). This mapping can be performed relatively trivially if the degree 2
extension of F26m to F212m is performed using an irreducible polynomial with coefficients
in F26m .
The extension fields are constructed as follows. Let F2m be an m-degree extension of
F2 generated by an irreducible polynomial f . Consider the field F26 generated by the
irreducible polynomial
g = x6 + x5 + x3 + x2 + 1 (5.1)
Let w ∈ F26 be a root of g. Members of F26m can be represented using the polynomial
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basis:
{1, w, w2, w3, w4, w5} (5.2)
For example, an element a ∈ F26m can be written in polynomial form as
a =
5∑
i=0
aiw
i = a0 + a1w + a2w
2 + a3w
3 + a4w
4 + a5w
5 (5.3)
where all ai ∈ F2m . Note that since g = 0 ∈ F26 , then w6 = w5 + w3 + w2 + 1, w7 =
w5 +w4 +w2 +w + 1, w8 = w + 1 etc. These relationships can be used for the reduction
of polynomials to F26m when necessary.
Now, consider the degree 2 extension. Let h be a generator polynomial such that
h = y2 + y + w5 + w3 (5.4)
and let s0 ∈ F12 be a root of h. Members of the field F212m can be represented using the
basis
{1, w, w2, w3, w4, w5, s0, ws0, w2s0, w3s0, w4s0, w5s0} (5.5)
A member b ∈ F212m can be written as
b =b0 + b1w + b2w
2 + b3w
3 + b4w
4 + b5w
5+
b6s0 + b7ws0 + b8w
2s0 + b9w
3s0 + b10w
4s0 + b11w
5s0
(5.6)
for all bi ∈ F2m , or as
b = u+ s0v (5.7)
where u, v ∈ F26m such that u =
∑5
i=0 uiw
i, v =
∑5
i=0 viw
i and all ui, vi ∈ F2m .
Let s1 = w
2 + w4 and s2 = w
4 + 1. The distortion map moving a point P = (x, y) from
C(F2m) to C(F212m) is given by
ψ(x, y) = (x+ w, y + s2x
2 + s1x+ s0) (5.8)
This is an inexpensive operation due to the manner in which F212m was constructed.
Substituting for s1 and s2 means that ψ(x, y) can be computed according to
x→ x+ w
y → (y + x2) + xw2 + (x+ x2)w4 + s0
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This mapping can also be expressed using the basis representation:
x→{x, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}
y →{y + x2, 0, x, 0, x+ x2, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}
This requires one squaring and two additions on F2m . Note also that the x-coordinate is
a member of the sub-field F26m , which shows that the denominator elimination technique
used to calculate the ηT pairing applies.
There is a very efficient octupling operation on the curve. Given a degenerate divisor
D = (P )−∞, a multiplication by 8 returns another degenerate divisor [8]D = ([8]P )−(∞),
where
[8]P = (x2
6
+ 1, y2
6
+ x2
7
+ 1) (5.9)
This operation is inexpensive as it relies on squaring elements of F2m , which is a relatively
trivial operation. Let pi be the 2-power Frobenius map and φ(x, y) = (x+ 1, y + x2 + 1).
Equation (5.9) can be written as [8]P = φpi6(P ).
Barreto et al. [63] show how the Duursma and Lee computation techniques can be
expressed in the generalised notation of Theorem 3.3.1. The value of T is given by
T = q = 23m. This value means that the octupling formula can be used with ease.
Note that pairing computation requires at most m iterations as octupling and not dou-
bling forms the basis for the calculation of the Miller function. The value of N is given by
N = 26m + 1. From Theorem 3.3.1, this means that the values of the other variables can
be set as c = 0, a = 2 and L = 1. The exponent M is given by M = (qk − 1)/N = 26m−1.
Let D1, D2 ∈ JC(Fq). The relationship between the ηT and Tate pairings is given by(
ηT (D1, D2)
M
)2q
= 〈D1, ψ(D2)〉MN (5.10)
The value of T can be reduced. Let q = 23m and N = #JC(Fq) = 2
2m± 2(3m+1)/2 + 2m±
2(m+1)/2+1. Condition 1 of Theorem 3.3.1 holds if T = ∓2(3m+1)/2−1. Computation of the
pairing using this value of T requires approximately m/2 iterations using the octupling for-
mula. The resultant value of c is −(2m∓2(m+1)/2+1). If a = 2 is selected, then L = 2m+1∓
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2(m+3)/2+2. The exponentM is given by (212m − 1)/(22m ± 2(3m+1)/2 + 2m ± 2(m+1)/2 + 1).
The relationship between the ηT and Tate pairings is now given by(
ηT (D1, D2)
M
)2T
=
(
〈D1, ψ(D2)〉MN
)L
(5.11)
5.2.1 Computation of the ηT Pairing
The ηT pairing is returned by ηT (D1, D2) = fT,D1(ψ(D2)). If T < 0 then T should be
set to −T and D1 to −D1. This means that T = 2(3m+1)/2 ± 1. The Miller function is
computed according to Equations (3.13) and (3.14). The fast octupling operation is used
during the accumulation of this function. Since the multiplication of a degenerate divisor
by 8 returns another degenerate divisor, computation of the intermediate functions can
be expressed in terms of operations that are performed on the points in the support of
the input divisors. Let D1 = (P ) − (∞) and D2 = (Q) − (∞), where P = (xP , yP ) and
Q = (xQ, yQ). An intermediate function f8,P can be evaluated according to
f8,P (x, y) = (y + b4(x))
2(y + b8(x)) (5.12)
where
b4(x) =y
4
P + (x
4
P )x+ (x
8
P + x
4
P )x
2 + x3
b8(x) =(y
16
P + x
16
P + x
48
P + 1) + (x
32
P + x
16
P )x+ (x
32
P + 1)x
2
The value of T can be rewritten as T = 23(m−1)/2+2 ± 1 to accommodate the octupling
operation. This means that the Miller function can be computed with (m−1)/2 octuplings,
two point doublings and a final point addition or subtraction. The value of ηT (P,Q) can
now be computed according to
fT,P (ψ(Q)) =
(m−3)/2∏
i=0
f8,[8i]P (ψ(Q))
2(3m−5)/2−3i)
 .l1(ψ(Q))2.l2(ψ(Q)).l3(ψ(Q)) (5.13)
where l1 and l2 are functions arising from final point doublings and l3 corresponds to the
final point addition or subtraction, as appropriate.
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Barreto et al. described several efficient methods for the computation of Equation (5.13)
in [63]. The f8,[8i]P (ψ(Q)) evaluations can be computed without the requirement that
[8i]P be explicitly calculated. The distortion map can also be incorporated into the func-
tions, which further simplifies the calculations. The exponentiations of the intermediate
functions to 2(3m−5)/2−3i can be performed using 2-power Frobenius operations on the
coordinates of P and Q. Using these techniques, the relationship
(m−3)/2∏
i=0
f8,[8i]P (ψ(Q))
2(3m−5)/2−3i) =
(m−3)/2∏
i=0
α.β (5.14)
holds, where α and β are some members of F212m , defined as follows.
The efficient calculation of α and β requires that powers of squares of the input coordinates
be precomputed. This can be achieved trivially using the 2-power Frobenius map pi. The
notation x
(i)
P = x
2i
P is used from this point. On initiation of pairing computation, the
values of x
(i)
P , x
(i)
Q , y
(i)
P , y
(i)
Q for all 0 ≤ i ≤ m− 1 are calculated and stored.
The value of α ∈ F212m is given by
α = a+ bw + cw2 + dw4 + s0 (5.15)
where
a = y
((3m−7−6i)/2)
Q + (x
((3m−1+6i)/2)
P + x
((3m−3+6i)/2)
P ).x
((3m−5−6i)/2)
Q
+ (x
((3m−3+6i)/2)
P + 1 + x
((3m−5−6i)/2)
Q ).x
((3m−7−6i)/2)
Q + y
((3m−3+6i)/2)
P + γ
b = x
((3m−5−6i)/2)
Q + x
((3m−7−6i)/2)
Q
c = x
((3m−5−6i)/2)
Q + x
((3m−3+6i)/2)
P + 1
d = x
((3m−1+6i)/2)
P + x
((3m−3+6i)/2)
P
The value of β ∈ F212m is given by
β = e+ f2w + gw
2 + hw4 + s0 (5.16)
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where
e = (x
((3m+1+6i)/2)
P + x
((3m−1+6i)/2)
P ).x
((3m−9−6i)/2)
Q + (x
((3m−1+6i)/2)
P + x
((3m−7−6i)/2)
Q )
.x
((3m+1+6i)/2)
P + y
((3m−1+6i)/2)
P + x
((3m−1+6i)/2)
P + y
((3m−9−6i)/2)
Q + γ
f2 = x
((3m+1+6i)/2)
P + x
((3m−1+6i)/2)
P
g = x
((3m+1+6i)/2)
P + x
((3m−9−6i)/2)
Q + 1
h = x
((3m−7−6i)/2)
Q + x
((3m−9−6i)/2)
Q
Indices that are larger than m are reduced modulo m. The γ variable is set to 1 if i ≡ 1
mod 4 and 0 otherwise.
Let f ′(ψ(Q)) =
∏(m−3)/2
i=0 f8,[8i]P (ψ(Q))
2(3m−5)/2−3i) . The ηT pairing of Equation (5.13) is
returned by multiplication of f ′(ψ(Q)) by the evaluations of the l1, l2 and l3 functions
at ψ(Q). This can be performed efficiently by analysing the divisors of the functions
and the effect they have on the overall computation. Let D′ be the divisor of f ′, where
D′ = (P ′)− (∞) and P ′ = (xP ′ , yP ′). Let l(x, y) be a function such that
l(x, y) = y + x3 + (x8P ′ + x
4
P ′)x
2 + (x4P ′)x+ y
4
P ′ (5.17)
The value of f ′(ψ(Q)).l1(ψ(Q))2.l2(ψ(Q)).l3(ψ(Q)) can be computed by squaring f ′(ψ(Q))
twice and multiplying the result by l(ψ(Q)).
To summarise, the computation of the ηT pairing on the divisors D1 = (P ) − (∞) and
D2 = (Q)− (∞) can be performed according to
ηT (P,Q) =
(
(m−3)/2∏
i=0
α.β
)4
.l(ψ(Q)) (5.18)
where α and β are calculated according to Equations (5.15) and (5.16), respectively, and
l(ψ(Q)) is calculated according to Equation (5.17).
The operations that are required for the computation of ηT (P,Q) using a field size of
m = 103 are listed in Algorithm 10. This is the same field size and algorithm as that used
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Algorithm 10 Computation of ηT (P,Q) in the genus 2 case for m = 103
Input: P = (xP , yP ), Q = (xQ, yQ), where P,Q ∈ JC(F2m)
Output: f = ηT (P,Q), where f ∈ F212m
1: Initialise: f ← 1, γ ← 0
2: for (i← 0, i ≤ m− 1, i← i+ 1) do
3: x1[i]← x2iP , y1[i]← y2
i
P , x2[i]← x2
i
Q , y2[i]← y2
i
Q
4: end for
5: for (i← 0, i ≤ (m− 3)/2, i← i+ 1) do
6: . The following indices should be reduced modulo m
7: k1 ← (3m− 9− 6i)/2, k2 ← (k1 + 1), k3 ← (k2 + 1)
8: k4 ← (3m− 3 + 6i)/2, k5 ← (k4 + 1), k6 ← (k5 + 1)
9: . Calculate α← a+ bw + cw2 + dw4 + s0
10: b← x2[k3] + x2[k2]
11: c← x2[k3] + x1[k4] + 1
12: d← x1[k4] + x1[k5]
13: a← d.x2[k3] + c.x2[k2] + y2[k2] + y1[k4] + γ
14: . Calculate β ← e+ f2w + gw2 + hw4 + s0
15: f2 ← x1[k5] + x1[k6]
16: g ← x2[k1] + x1[k6] + 1
17: h← x2[k2] + x2[k1]
18: e← f2.x2[k1] + (x1[k5] + x2[k2]).x1[k6] + y2[k1] + y1[k5] + x1[k5] + γ
19: fcurrent ← cmul(α, β)
20: f ← f.fcurrent
21: end for
22: . Perform the final operations
23: x3 ← x1[m− 3] + 1
24: y3 ← y1[m− 3] + x1[m− 2]
25: t← (y2[0] + x2[1].(1 + x2[0] + x83 + x43) + x43.x2[0] + y43)
26: f ← f4.(t+ (x2[1] + x43)w + (x83 + x43)w2 + w3 + (x2[1] + x2[0])w4 + s0)
Return: f
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by Barreto et al. in [63]. The resultant extension field size is km = 1, 236. Note that very
minor changes are required to generalise the algorithm to any given field size.
The required powers of squares of the input coordinates are first computed using the
2-power Frobenius map. Once precomputation is complete, the main for loop of the al-
gorithm begins to iterate. Six indices are used to access the precomputed values. The
value of α ∈ F212m is first calculated. This requires six additions and two multiplica-
tions on F2m and two 1-bit additions. The value of β ∈ F212m is also calculated, which
requires eight additions and two multiplications on F2m and two 1-bit additions. Subse-
quently, fcurrent ∈ F212m is computed by multiplying α by β. Due to the sparse nature
of the operands, computing their product requires less computations than a regular F212m
multiplication. A customised routine, denoted cmul, has been created to perform this
multiplication. Finally, the accumulating polynomial f ∈ F212m is multiplied by fcurrent,
which requires a regular multiplication on F212m . The final operations are performed after
loop completion and require two 1-bit additions, eight F2m additions, two F2m multiplica-
tions and a multiplication on F212m .
5.2.2 Exponentiation to the Tate Pairing
The ηT (P,Q) pairing result of Algorithm 10 must be exponentiated to a Tate pairing value.
From Equation (5.11), the relationship between the pairings is given by
(
ηT (D1, D2)
M
)2T
=(〈D1, ψ(D2)〉MN )L. This means that an exponentiation of the ηT pairing result to 2TML re-
turns 〈D1, ψ(D2)〉MN . The exponentiation can be performed efficiently by factoring and
cancelling terms when possible. The M term can be factored to give
M = (26m − 1)(2m ∓ 2(m+1)/2 + 1)(23m ∓ 2(3m+1)/2 + 1) (5.19)
The L term can be written as
L = 2(2m ∓ 2(m+1)/2 + 1) (5.20)
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After further cancellation, the exponent is given by
2TM
L
= (26m − 1)(23m ∓ 24m2(m+1)/2 − 1) (5.21)
The operations required to perform the conversion to the Tate pairing are detailed in
Algorithm 11 for m = 103. The exponent is (26m− 1)(23m− 24m2(m+1)/2− 1) in this case.
Exponentiation to the first factor is computed on Lines 2-4. Powering to 26m is performed
using a simple conjugation. This is followed by a multiplication and an inversion on
F212m . The 23m and −24m2(m+1)/2 terms of the second factor are computed on Lines 5-9,
requiring four applications of the Frobenius map and (m + 1)/2 squarings. These terms
are immediately multiplied by z3, the first factor of the exponent. The (−1) term of
the second factor is included last as the inverse of an element that has been powered to
any multiple of (26m − 1) is returned by the conjugate of that element. Exponentiation
requires a total of four Frobenius actions, (m + 1)/2 squarings, two conjugations, three
multiplications and an inversion on F212m .
Algorithm 11 Exponentiation of ηT (P,Q) to 〈P,ψ(Q)〉MN in genus 2, m = 103 case
Input: f = ηT (P,Q), where f ∈ F212m
Output: z = 〈P,ψ(Q)〉MN , where z ∈ F212m
1: z1 ← f
2: z2 ← conj(z1)
3: z1 ← z−11
4: z3 ← z2.z1
5: z4 ← (z3)23m
6: z5 ← (z4)2
m
7: for (i← 0, i < (m+ 1)/2, i← i+ 1) do
8: z5 ← z5.z5
9: end for
10: z5 ← z5.z3
11: z5 ← conj(z5)
12: z ← z4.z5
Return: z
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The hardware implementation of all operations required to compute a Tate pairing using
Algorithms 10 and 11 are described in the next section.
5.3 Hardware Units for Pairing Computation
Various strategies for fast Tate pairing computation were explored since no hardware
implementations of any genus 2 pairings existed in the literature at the time of design.
An embedding degree of k = 12 means that the extension field arithmetic operations
require many computations on F2m . A direct implementation may, therefore, result in
a prohibitively large area footprint. The F212m/F26m/F2m tower of extensions is again
advantageous as operations on F212m can be expressed in terms of operations on F26m ,
thereby simplifying the design process. Arithmetic on F2m is implemented using the F2m
hardware architectures previously discussed in Section 4.3.
The principal operations required for ηT pairing computation are:
1. The precomputation of the powers of the squares of the input coordinates before the
for loop of Algorithm 10.
2. Calculation of the α and β terms on each iteration of the loop.
3. Computation of fcurrent = cmul(α, β), where cmul is a special routine that performs
the multiplication of α by β in an efficient manner.
4. The F212m multiplication of f by fcurrent.
5. The final operations that are required to return an ηT pairing value.
6. Exponentiation to the Tate pairing according to Algorithm 11.
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The genus 2 Tate pairing processor contains a precomputation unit, a unit for the calcu-
lation of α and β, a dual mode multiplication unit that can perform either cmul(α, β) or
F212m multiplication, and an exponentiation unit. These units are discussed in this section.
The interconnectivity of these units at the upper architectural levels of the processor will
be discussed in Section 5.4.
5.3.1 The Precomputation Unit
The precomputation of (x1[i], y1[i]) = (xP
2i , yP
2i) and (x2[i], y2[i]) = (xQ
2i , yQ
2i) is re-
quired for all 0 ≤ i ≤ m − 1. Precomputation modules have been created that calculate
and store the required powers of squares for each of the input coordinates. Each module
contains m×m bit block RAM for storage, an F2m squarer and a control unit to handle
reads and writes. The xP module is illustrated in Figure 5.1. On initiation of the pairing
computation, write en is set, a counter within the control unit iterates from 0 to m − 1
and the required powers of xP are stored.
On completion of the precomputation stage, the main for loop of Algorithm 10 can pro-
ceed. On each iteration, powers of squares must be read according to the indices defined
on Lines 7 and 8. These indices must be calculated modulo m. Hardware implementation
of modular reduction can be avoided in this case as the indices rely solely on the field size
m and the iterator i. The VHDL for the genus 2 processor is generated by C++ software.
This means that once the variable defining the field size has been defined, the indices that
are required for all values of i can be generated in software and stored as constants in
hardware. The indices are stored in arrays within the control unit. The control system
uses the indices to generate the desired RAM address signals on each iteration and ensures
that the correct powers are supplied.
The full precomputation unit is illustrated in Figure 5.2. It contains a precomputation
module for each of the m-bit input coordinates. The calculations of α and β each require
the availability of 2 x1[i] values, 2 x2[i] values, 1 y1[i] value and 1 y2[i] value on each
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Figure 5.1: Precomputation Module for xP
iteration. For this reason, the xP and xQ modules contain dual port RAM and the yP
and yQ modules contain single port RAM. The precomputation unit has α and β modes,
the selection of which is controlled by the read mode input signal. In the first mode the
m-bit powers required for α are provided while, in the second mode, the m-bit β powers
are provided. The precomputation unit computes and stores all powers of the input
coordinates in (m+ 2) clock cycles and ensures the timely provision of powers during loop
iteration.
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Figure 5.2: Precomputation Unit
5.3.2 Unit for the Calculation of α and β
The values of α, β ∈ F212m are calculated on Lines 9-18 of Algorithm 10. Similarities
between the terms of these variables can be exploited so that resources can be shared.
The unit that has been designed for the calculation of α and β is illustrated in Figure
5.3. It receives six m-bit inputs directly from the precomputation block and a 1-bit
input corresponding to the value of γ. The input values are dependent on the read mode
control signal that is used to set the precomputation block to either α or β mode. The first
F2m multiplier calculates d.x2[k3] in α mode and f2.x2[k1] in β mode. Two multiplexers
are used to select the inputs to the second multiplier as its inputs will be on different
precomputation buses in the different modes. A mode signal, with the same value as
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read mode, is used on the select line of these multiplexers. The second multiplier calculates
c.x2[k2] when in α mode and (x1[k5] + x2[k2]).x1[k6] when in β mode, the results of which
are added to a third term to produce either a or e, respectively. The b, c, d terms of α and
f2, g, h terms of β require additions alone and are collected from m-bit XOR gates. The
unit contains a total of two 1-bit XOR gates, eight m-bit XOR gates and two m-bit digit
serial multipliers of digit size D. An α or β result is returned in (m/D + 2) clock cycles.
1
0
X
X
cor g
1
0
g
0
1
a or e
m
o
de
m
o
de
m
o
de
x [k ]1 5
x [k ]2 2
d or f2
x [k ] or x [k ]2 3 2 1
y [k ] or y [k ]1 4 1 5
y [k ] or y [k ]2 2 2 1
mul1
mul2
m
m
m
m
m
1
x [k ]1 5
x [k ]1 4 or x [k ]1 6 d or f2
c or g
x [k ]2 2 b or h
m
m
m
1
Figure 5.3: Unit for the calculation of α and β
5.3.3 Unit for Computation of cmul(α, β) and F212m Multiplication
The values of α, β ∈ F212m must be multiplied together on Line 19 of Algorithm 10. This
is performed by building a dedicated routine, cmul(α, β), that takes advantage of the
sparse input polynomials. The resulting element, fcurrent, must then be multiplied by the
accumulating polynomial f , which requires a multiplication on F212m .
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As will be seen in this section, multiplication on F212m requires three multiplications on
F26m and a number of other, less expensive, arithmetic operations. The computation
of cmul(α, β) requires one F26m multiplication and some other, trivial, operations. A
dedicated extension field multiplication unit containing three F26m multiplication modules
would require a prohibitively large area, even with the use of F2m multipliers of low digit
size. Due to the similarities between the arithmetic operations required by cmul and full
F212m multiplication, the design of a unit for the shared computation of both operations
is attractive from an efficiency perspective. Such a unit has been designed, the main
component of which is one F26m multiplier. Other hardware modules are included in this
unit so that both cmul(α, β) and F212m multiplication can be computed using only one
such sub-field multiplier.
In this section, multiplication on F212m is first expressed in terms of arithmetic on F26m .
The operations required by the cmul routine are also discussed. An architecture for fast
F26m multiplication is provided. A dual mode multiplication unit that can perform both
cmul(α, β) and multiplication on F212m efficiently is then presented.
Multiplication on F212m
An efficient technique for multiplication on fields of type F(qn)2 is described in [97]. Using
this method, the composition and reduction stages of F212m multiplication can be per-
formed in one step. Recall from Section 5.2 that the irreducible polynomial defining F26 is
x6+x5+x3+x2+1. Let w ∈ F26 be a root of this polynomial. The irreducible polynomial
defining F212 is y2 + y + w5 + w3. Let s0 ∈ F12 be a root. Then s02 + s0 = w5 + w3.
Let a = u1 + s0v1 and b = u2 + s0v2, where a, b ∈ F212m and u1, u2, v1, v2 ∈ F26m . Then
c = a.b, where c ∈ F212m , is given by
c = u3 + s0v3 (5.22)
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and
u3 = u1.u2 + (w
5 + w3)(v1.v2)
v3 = (u1 + v1).(u2 + v2) + u1.u2
The multiplication of (w5 + w3) by (v1.v2) can be performed by creating a composition
polynomial and reducing by g. This process does not require multiplication and can be
achieved using F2m addition alone. This means that multiplication on F212m requires three
F26m multiplications, four F26m additions and 13 F2m additions that are required for the
multiplication of (w5 + w3) by (v1.v2).
The Multiplication of α by β
The sparse nature of the α and β polynomials means that computing their product using
a full F212m multiplication would be inefficient. From Algorithm 10, α is given by
α = a+ bw + cw2 + dw4 + s0 (5.23)
where a, b, c, d ∈ F2m . This can be rewritten as α = u1 + s0, where u1 ∈ F26m . Similarly,
β = u2 + s0.
The routine cmul(α, β) = α.β can now be defined. It is computed according to
cmul(α, β) = (u1 + s0).(u2 + s0)
= u1.u2 + s0(u1 + u2) + s
2
0
(5.24)
Recall that s20 + s0 = (w
5 + w3). Substituting for s20 gives
cmul(α, β) = u1.u2 + s0(u1 + u2) + s0 + (w
5 + w3)
= (u1.u2 + w
5 + w3) + s0(u1 + u2 + 1)
(5.25)
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The calculation of the u component, therefore, requires one F26m multiplication and two
1-bit additions. The calculation of the v component requires one F26m addition and one
1-bit addition.
F26m Multiplication
The most expensive operation required by both cmul(α, β) and by F212m multiplication is
multiplication on F26m . The pairing processor contains a dedicated module for fast F26m
multiplication for this reason. The Karatsuba algorithm [92] for polynomial multiplication
can be used to perform multiplication on F26m . This algorithm is advantageous as it
reduces the quantity of required F2m multiplications at the expense of more additions,
which are less expensive.
Consider the multiplication c = a.b, where a, b, c ∈ F26m . Let a =
∑i=5
i=0 aiw
i, b =∑i=5
i=0 biw
i and c = a.b =
∑i=5
i=0 ciw
i, where all ai, bi, ci ∈ F2m . The calculation of c
begins with a composition stage, in which a degree 10 polynomial, c′, is computed. The a
and b polynomials are first separated into lower and upper half polynomials of degree 2:
a = (a0 + a1w + a2w
2) + w3(a3 + a4w + a5w
2)
= Al + w
3Ah
(5.26)
b = (b0 + b1w + b2w
2) + w3(b3 + b4w + b5w
2)
= Bl + w
3Bh
(5.27)
Three polynomials are then computed according to
P = Al.Bl
Q = (Al +Ah).(Bl +Bh)
R = Ah.Bh
(5.28)
where P =
∑4
i=0 piw
i, Q =
∑4
i=0 qiw
i, R =
∑4
i=0 riw
i and all pi, qi, ri ∈ F2m .
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These degree 2 multiplications can be performed by again separating the inputs into lower
and upper halves. Let a′ =
∑2
i=0 a
′
iw
i, b′ =
∑2
i=0 b
′
iw
i, and d′ =
∑4
i=0 d
′
iw
i where all
a′i, b
′
i, d
′
i ∈ F2m . The degree 4 polynomial d′ = a′.b′ can be computed by first performing
the following six F2m multiplications:
mul0 = a
′
0.b
′
0 mul1 = a
′
1.b
′
1 mul2 = a
′
2.b
′
2
mul3 = (a
′
0 + a
′
1)(b
′
0 + b
′
1) mul4 = (a
′
1 + a
′
2)(b
′
1 + b
′
2) mul5 = (a
′
0 + a
′
2)(b
′
0 + b
′
2)
The coefficients of the degree 4 polynomial d′ is given in vector form by
d′0
d′1
d′2
d′3
d′4

=

mul0
mul3 +mul1 +mul0
mul1 +mul5 +mul0 +mul2
mul4 +mul1 +mul2
mul2

(5.29)
The computation of d′, therefore, requires a total of six F2m multiplications and 13 F2m
additions.
Once calculated, the P , Q and R polynomials of Equation (5.28) can be used to evaluate c′,
the degree 10 composition polynomial of the original F26m multiplication. This polynomial
is given by
c′ =
4∑
i=0
piw
i +
7∑
i=3
(pi−3 + qi−3 + ri−3)wi +
10∑
i=6
ri−6wi (5.30)
This composition polynomial must be reduced modulo the irreducible polynomial x6 +
x5 + x3 + x2 + 1. The final, reduced, result c = a.b is returned according to
c0
c1
c2
c3
c4
c5

=

c′0 + c′6 + c′7 + c′8
c′1 + c′7 + c′8 + c′9
c′2 + c′6 + c′7 + c′9 + c′10
c′3 + c′6 + c′10
c′4 + c′7
c′5 + c′6 + c′7

(5.31)
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The degree 2 polynomial multiplication required during the calculation of the P , Q and
R polynomials of Equation (5.28) is the most expensive aspect of F26m multiplication.
A hardware architecture has been created for accelerated degree 2 multiplication and is
illustrated in Figure 5.4. The module contains six digit-serial F2m multipliers and 13 F2m
adders. The multipliers operate in parallel. A degree 2 multiplication result is returned
in (m/D + 2) clock cycles, where D is the digit size of the multipliers.
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Figure 5.4: Module for degree 2 polynomial multiplication using the Karatsuba method
The hardware unit dedicated to the fast implementation of F26m multiplication is illus-
trated in Figure 5.5. The unit receives a pair of 6m-bit signals A and B and returns
C = A.B on a 6m-bit output bus. The architecture contains three degree 2 multiplication
modules so that P , Q and R can be computed in parallel. The F2m additions that are
required at the end of the composition stage and during reduction are combined, since
some cancellations occur and nesting is possible. The unit returns an F26m multiplication
result in (m/D + 4) clock cycles.
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Figure 5.5: The F26m Multiplication Unit
Dual Mode Multiplication Architecture
A hardware architecture has been designed that implements both the cmul routine and
F212m multiplication. This is known as the dual mode multiplication unit and is shown
in Figure 5.6. The unit takes as input two 12m-bit operands and separates each input
into 6m-bit u and v components. The result of a cmul routine or an F212m multiplication
appears on the 12m-bit res output bus on completion.
The most costly arithmetic operation is F26m multiplication. The cmul computation re-
quires one F26m multiplication, while multiplication on F212m requires three. The F26m
multiplier has a relatively large area footprint due to the quantity of parallel F2m multi-
pliers required to ensure a high speed computation. The dual mode multiplier contains
only one F26m multiplier for this reason.
In the first mode of operation, cmul(α, β) is computed according to Equation (5.25). The
6m-bit u components of α and β appear at the u1 and u2 unit inputs. The sel1 line is
set to 0 and u1.u2 is computed by the F26m multiplier. A 1 is added to the w5 and w3
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Figure 5.6: The Dual Mode Multiplier
components of the result before it reaches the multiplexer controlling the bus sent to the u
component of the result. The v component of cmul(α, β) is given by (u1 + u2 + 1), which
can be implemented using two m-bit adders and one 1-bit adder. The sel2 line is set to 1
so that the correct outputs are collected on the u and v output buses.
In the second mode of operation, an F212m multiplication is performed according to Equa-
tion (5.22). Let a = u1 +v1s0, b = u2 +v2s0 and c = a.b = u3 +v3s0, where a, b, c ∈ F212m .
The values of u1, u2, v1, v2 ∈ F26m appear at the input buses before the F212m multipli-
cation c = a.b is initiated. The sel1 line is first set to 0 and the F26m multiplication
u1.u2 performed. Once available, the result is stored in a 6m-bit register at the output
of the F26m multiplier. The sel1 line is then set to 1 and v1.v2 is computed and stored.
Finally, the sel1 line is set to 2 and (u1 + v1).(u2 + v2) is computed and stored. The
value of u3 is given by u1.u2 + (w
5 +w3)(v1.v2). The constant multiplication of (w
5 +w3)
by (v1.v2) is implemented combinatorially using XOR gates contained within the const
module. The result is added to (u1.u2) using a 6m-bit adder. The value of v3 is given by
(u1 + v1).(u2 + v2) + (u1.u2), which is implemented using a 6m-bit adder. The sel2 line is
set to 0 so that the correct u and v values are collected on the res output bus.
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The dual mode multiplication unit returns a result very quickly while ensuring that re-
sources are used efficiently. The cmul(α, β) routine is performed in (m/D+8) clock cycles,
where D is the digit size of the multipliers. An F212m multiplication result can be returned
in (3m/D + 20) clock cycles.
5.3.4 The Exponentiation Unit
Exponentiation of the ηT result to a Tate pairing value is performed according to Algorithm
11. As discussed in Subsection 5.2.2, exponentiation requires four Frobenius actions,
(m + 1)/2 squarings, two conjugations, three multiplications and one inversion, all of
which are performed on F212m . Multiplication on F212m has already been discussed. The
other operations can be expressed in terms of arithmetic on F26m . These F26m arithmetic
operations are then implemented in the same way as in the F24m case of the previous
chapter.
Let a = u+ s0v, where a ∈ F212m and u, v ∈ F26m . The conjugate, a˜, of a is given by
a˜ = (u+ v) + s0v (5.32)
The value of a2 is computed according to
a2 = u2 + (w5 + w3)v2 + s0v
2 (5.33)
The Frobenius computation depends on the value of m modulo 12. The next section
contains results returned by a pairing processor when implemented using a field size of
m = 103, which means that m mod 12 ≡ 7. The Frobenius map in this case is
aq = uq + (1 + w3 + w5)vq + s0v
q (5.34)
Inversion on F212m can be performed with only one F26m inversion and a number of less
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expensive operations. The computation
e =
(
u.(u+ v) + (w5 + w3)v2
)−1
(5.35)
is first performed, where e ∈ F26m . The inverse of a is then given by
a−1 = (u+ v).e+ s0(v.e) (5.36)
The inversion on F212m , therefore, requires one F26m inversion, three F26m multiplications,
one F26m addition and the 13 F2m additions required for the constant multiplication of v2
by (w5 + w3). The F26m inversion is computed using the Extended Euclidean Algorithm
(previously discussed in Subsection 4.4.5) and requires one F2m inversion and several
multiplications and additions on F2m .
To ensure a fast exponentiation, the pairing processor contains a dedicated exponentiation
unit. This unit contains modules implementing conjugation, squaring and the Frobenius
map. These operations require combinatorial logic alone. The unit also contains an F2m
inverter. The required extension field multiplications are performed by the dual mode
multiplier. The sequence of operations is controlled by a system at the top level of the
pairing processor.
5.4 The Characteristic 2 Genus 2 Tate Pairing Processor
The hardware processor performing a fast genus 2 Tate pairing computation is presented
in Figure 5.7. The processor receives four m-bit input buses on which the xP , yP , xQ, yQ
input coordinates are loaded. The Tate pairing 〈P,ψ(Q)〉MN appears on the 12m-bit result
output bus on computation completion.
The processor contains the precomputation unit, the unit for the calculation of α and β,
the dual mode multiplication unit and the exponentiation unit. Recall that, in the elliptic
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Figure 5.7: The Genus 2 Tate Pairing Processor
curve processor described in the previous chapter, all variables were stored in registers
at the inputs and outputs of the computation units. The genus 2 processor employs a
different storage scheme. In this case, all computation stages of the main for loop in
Algorithm 10 cannot be performed in parallel. The dual mode multiplication unit must
perform both the cmul operation and subsequent F212m multiplication of the result by the
accumulating function f . A central storage system provides the best solution in this case.
Dual port 12m-bit RAM is used instead of registers. The values of α and β, padded to
12m bits, are stored using the DInA RAM input. The RAM outputs are each connected
to both the dual mode multiplication unit and the exponentiation unit. A multiplexer
is used to select the result to be sent to the DInB RAM input on the 12m-bit res bus.
Exponentiation can be performed with ease by performing the required F2m inversion and
combinatorial operations in the exponentiation unit, storing the intermediate variables in
RAM and accessing the dual mode multiplication unit when required. This system also
provides a straightforward solution to the problem of routing large buses at the top level
of the processor.
The control scheme is relatively uncomplicated. The system contains a finite state machine
that outputs all necessary control signals while stepping through the required operations.
These signals are used to handle reading from RAM, to manage the reset and enable
sequences of the arithmetic units and to store results after the correct number of clock
cycles.
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On processor reset, all required powers of squares of the input coordinates are immedi-
ately computed and stored in the precomputation block. The controller then initiates the
operations that are required during the for loop of Algorithm 10. Note that the com-
putation of α and β does not depend on the results from any previous iteration of the
loop as, after precomputation, all input operands are available. On the first iteration the
values of α and β are calculated and stored. The value of fcurrent = cmul(α, β) is then
computed. After this, the F212m multiplication f.fcurrent begins. The values of α and β
that will be required on the second iteration are computed in parallel with this extension
field multiplication. This means that the cmul operation of the second iteration can begin
immediately after the F212m multiplication of the first iteration. This system provides a
saving of 2(m/D + 2) clock cycles on each loop iteration after the first. Recall from Sub-
section 5.3.3 that the cmul operation can be performed in (m/D + 8) clock cycles, while
F212m multiplication requires (3m/D+ 20) clock cycles. This means that each iteration is
completed in (4m/D+ 28 + θ) clock cycles, where θ is a relatively small number of cycles
required by the control system and for reads from and writes to RAM.
On completion of the for loop, the final operations of Algorithm 10 must be performed.
These computations are implemented using both the dual mode multiplier and the com-
binatorial logic within the exponentiation unit. Exponentiation of the ηT value to a Tate
result is then performed according to Algorithm 11. On completion, the Tate pairing value
〈P,ψ(Q)〉MN is available on the 12m-bit result bus at the output of the processor.
5.4.1 Results and Comparisons
The architectures described in this chapter were defined at the VHDL RTL level. The code
was automatically generated by the C++ design system. The processor was implemented
on the Xilinx Virtex-II Pro FPGA (xc2vp100-6ff1696) containing 44,096 slices. This is
the same FPGA on which the characteristic 2 elliptic curve processor was implemented in
the previous chapter. The results in this subsection are for an implementation on the field
F2103 , which has irreducible polynomial x103+x9+1. The extension field is 12×103 = 1236
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bits in size.
The results returned by processor implementations with F2m multipliers of digit size 4, 8,
12 and 16 are presented in Table 5.1. A full Tate pairing 〈P,ψ(Q)〉MN is performed in each
case.
Table 5.1: Results returned by the genus 2 Tate pairing processor for m = 103
D Area Utilisation Clock Cycles AC Product
(Bits) (Slices) (Msl.cycles)
4 21021 48% 10506 221
8 24290 55% 6992 170
12 27182 62% 5805 157
16 30464 69% 5412 165
The D = 16 case returns a Tate pairing in 5,412 clock cycles. This implementation requires
30,464 slices and has an AC product of 165 Mslice.cycles. The D = 12 implementation has
a lower AC product as the extra 3,282 slices required in the D = 16 case results in a saving
of only 393 clock cycles. As the number of cycles required for multiplication decreases,
the impact of the relatively constant number of cycles required for combinatorial logic,
storage and control becomes more significant. Increasing the digit size beyond 16 further
reduces efficiency. It can also result in a reduction in clock frequency. The D = 12 case
is the most attractive option, requiring 27,182 slices and returning a Tate pairing result
in only 5,805 cycles. As in the processor of the previous chapter, it would be interesting
to investigate slice usage on larger FPGAs due to the relatively high occupancy of these
implementations.
Barreto et al. provide the results of a software computation of the genus 2 ηT pairing
in [63]. An ηT pairing is returned in 1.8 ms when computed on a Pentium IV processor
operating at 3 GHz. Note that exponentiation to the Tate pairing is not performed. The
custom hardware processor provides a significant acceleration over this result, even for low
frequencies.
148
At the time, there had been no published hardware implementations of any genus 2 pairing.
The results can, however, be compared fairly against those returned by the characteristic 2
elliptic curve processor of the previous chapter. That processor returned its fastest pairing
in 4,818 clock cycles with a corresponding AC product of 212 Mslice.cycles, the lowest of
those implementations. The D = 12 genus 2 processor has a significantly smaller AC
product of 157 Mslice.cycles. Furthermore, the genus 2 D = 12 case outperforms all but
one of the elliptic curve processors. It can, for example, return a pairing in 5,805 cycles
using 27,182 slices. Conversely, the D = 8 elliptic implementation requires a similar 6,200
clock cycles but it is larger by 13,896 slices. The genus 2 implementations are the more
efficient in all cases.
5.5 Conclusions
Computation of the genus 2 Tate pairing using the ηT method has been discussed in this
chapter. The required operations have been separated into distinct stages. The extension
field operations that underpin these stages have been expressed in a manner that makes
them suited to parallel hardware implementation. Custom hardware units that implement
the pairing computation stages rapidly and efficiently have been presented. A genus 2 Tate
pairing processor comprising these units has been implemented on an FPGA and results
presented.
The more complex pairing computation and higher embedding degree previously provided
a barrier to Tate pairing implementation on genus 2 hyperelliptic curves. This work
shows that genus 2 curves offer a viable alternative to elliptic curves for Tate pairing
implementation on hardware platforms. Furthermore, if the security level of a system
based on the Tate pairing must be increased, the field size will grow at a lower rate in the
genus 2 case. This means that a hardware processor accelerating the genus 2 Tate pairing
may become increasingly attractive.
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The topics and architectures discussed in this chapter formed the basis for papers that
were published in [9] and [10].
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Chapter 6
A Design System for Pairing
Computation Using Flexible
Processors
6.1 Introduction
Flexibility is an important aspect of hardware processors that are used in a cryptographic
context. If the security level of an application must be changed, the size of the finite fields
on which the algorithms are implemented must also be changed. It should also be kept in
mind that cryptographic systems must operate in a broad range of environments. A large
server side system may, for example, have to communicate with client side devices that
are much more constrained in terms of area. Speed of pairing computation may be the
most desirable property in the former environment, while a very small footprint may be
required in the latter. The characteristic 2 elliptic and genus 2 processors of the previous
chapters return pairing results in a very low number of clock cycles. Their efficient use
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may, however, require area resources that are not available in some systems.
The computation and hardware implementation of the Tate pairing on characteristic 3
elliptic curves has not been discussed until this point in the thesis. A supersingular char-
acteristic 3 elliptic curve has an embedding degree of 6, larger than the characteristic
2 case of 4. It is generally more difficult to perform attacks on characteristic 3 pairings.
These factors mean that a smaller field size can be used in the characteristic 3 elliptic case.
Hardware is, however, a binary environment and characteristic 3 storage and arithmetic
operations have an area overhead. As an example, Kerins et al. [98] describe a charac-
teristic 3 architecture that implements the Tate pairing using the Duursma Lee methods
on F397 . Their architecture contains several units for computation on F36m . They return
a Tate result in 12,750 clock cycles but estimate a large area footprint of 55,616 slices. A
different approach was taken to the hardware implementation of characteristic 3 pairings
in this work to reduce the required resources.
A flexible architecture for Tate pairing computation has been created. Its architectural
parameters can be varied in a manner that supports both characteristic 2 and 3 Tate
pairing implementation. The aim is to provide implementation solutions for a large range
of environments. The architecture does not contain any units that are dedicated to ex-
tension field arithmetic operations: it contains a variable quantity of subfield modules
alone. A flexible C++ software system has also been created for the efficient generation,
analysis and implementation of these processors. It contains a class for the automatic
generation of instruction sequences according to high level algorithmic descriptions. The
system significantly reduces the level of intervention required by a user when designing
the architectures discussed in this chapter.
A processor with some similar features was presented by Byrne et al. in [99]. Their ar-
chitecture can be selected to contain modules performing arithmetic on F2m , on Fpm for
p ≥ 2, and on Fp, where p is a large prime. However, in each case the quantity of mod-
ules cannot be varied. Implementation results are returned for elliptic curve point scalar
multiplications: pairings are not performed. Although the VHDL for the processor is gen-
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erated in software, the instruction sequences must be defined manually. The large variety
of subfield and extension field operations required for pairing computation means that the
manual creation of instruction sequences would be a significant challenge. It should be
noted that the author of this thesis provided some assistance during the initial stages of
the creation of this system. Subsequently, Byrne et al. discussed side channel attacks (de-
scribed in Subsection 7.2.2) on systems implementing elliptic curve scalar multiplication
and pairings [100], [101].
Characteristic 3 elliptic curve Tate pairing computation using the ηT method has not yet
been introduced and is outlined in Section 6.2. The hardware implementation of arithmetic
on F3 and F3m is discussed in Section 6.3. Arithmetic on F36m is also discussed with regards
to its computation using F3m modules alone. The pairing processor is described in Section
6.4. The design system that has been created to aid in the creation and prototyping of the
processor is also outlined. Characteristic 2 and 3 pairing results returned by the processor
when implemented using various architectural parameters are also presented.
6.2 The Characteristic 3 Elliptic Curve ηT and Tate Pairings
Duursma and Lee provide efficient techniques for the computation of pairings for p ≥ 3
on a small subset of curves in [62]. Barreto et al. generalise these methods in [63] and
show that the size of the computational loop can be halved on supersingular curves of
characteristic 3 using the ηT method. This section provides an overview of Tate pairing
calculation on characteristic 3 elliptic curves using these techniques.
Let E(Fq) : y2 = x3 − x + b be an elliptic curve defined on Fq = F3m , where b = ±1 and
m is not divisible by 6. This curve has embedding degree k = 6. The order of the curve is
#E(F3m) = 3m+1 + b3(m+1)/2 if m ≡ (1, 11) mod 12 or #E(F3m) = 3m+1− b3(m+1)/2 if
m ≡ (5, 7) mod 12. The ηT and Tate pairings of this section are calculated on the points
P = (xP , yP ) and Q = (xQ, yQ), where P,Q ∈ E(Fq).
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A distortion map that allows denominator elimination is available. This map is ψ(x, y) =
(ρ − x, σy) where ρ, σ ∈ F36m such that σ2 = −1 and ρ3 = ρ + b. The relationships
ρ3
2
= ρ+ 2b and ρ3
3
= ρ are useful for pairing computation. A fast tripling formula exists
on the curve. Given a point P = (x, y), then [3]P = (x3, y3) where x3 = (x
3)3 − b and
y3 = −(y3)3. Let pi be the 3-power Frobenius on Fq and let φ be a function such that
φ(x, y) = (x− b,−y). Then
[3]P = φpi2(x, y) (6.1)
Multiplication of a point by q = 3m is given by [q]P = [3m]P = φmpi2m(x, y) = φm(x, y)
since pi2m(x, y) = (x, y). The automorphism on the curve is, therefore, given by γ = φm.
The F36m field is constructed as a degree 3 extension of F32m . The F32m field is generated
by an irreducible polynomial g such that
F32m ≡ F3m [y]/g(y) where g(y) = y2 + 1 (6.2)
The F36m extension is then given by
F36m ≡ F32m [z]/h(z) where h(z) = z3 − z − b (6.3)
The use of this extension and these particular irreducible polynomials means that the
distortion map is simplified and that the complexity of arithmetic on the extension field
is minimised.
Members of F36m can be represented using the basis (1, σ, ρ, σρ, ρ2, σρ2). An element
a ∈ F36m can be written as
a = a0 + a1σ + a2ρ+ a3σρ+ a4ρ
2 + a5σρ
2 (6.4)
where a0, a1, a2, a3, a4, a5 ∈ F3m . A 3-tuple representation can also be used:
a = aˆ0 + aˆ1ρ+ aˆ2ρ
2 (6.5)
where aˆ0 = a0 + a1σ, aˆ1 = a2 + a3σ, aˆ2 = a4 + a5σ and aˆ1, aˆ1, aˆ2 ∈ F32m .
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Duursma and Lee use a group of order N = q3 + 1 to compute the Tate pairing. Barreto
et al. relate this to the ηT pairing using Theorem 3.3.1. In this case, T = q = 3
m.
The remaining variables are given by a = 3, L = 1 and c = 0. The value of M is
(qk − 1)/N = (q6 − 1)/(q3 + 1) = q3 − 1. The relationship between the ηT and Tate
pairings is given by (
ηT (P,Q)
M
)3q2
= 〈P,ψ(Q)〉MN (6.6)
Further optimisations are possible. Let N = #E(F3m) = 3m+1±3(m+1)/2. Given a point
P ∈ E(Fq) then [N ]P =∞. It has already been established that an automorphism exists
on the curve such that γ(P ) = [q]P . It follows that
γ(P ) = [q]P
= [q]P − [N ]P
= [q −N ]P
= [3m − (3m + 1± 3(m+1)/2)]P
= [∓3(m+1)/2 − 1]P
The ηT pairing can, therefore, be calculated with T = ∓3(m+1)/2 − 1. The remaining
variables can now be selected. Since T = q+cN then c must equal −1. From T a+1 = LN ,
choose a = 3. This means that L = ∓3(m+3)/2. The value of M is given by M =
(36m − 1)/N = (36m − 1)/(3m + 1± 3(m+1)/2) = (33m − 1)(3m + 1)(3m ∓ 3(m+1)/2 + 1). In
this case, the ηT pairing is related to the Tate pairing by(
ηT (P,Q)
M
)3T 2
=
(
〈P,ψ(Q)〉MN
)L
(6.7)
The computation of the ηT pairing, followed by the conversion of the result to a Tate
pairing value, are discussed for the remainder of this section.
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6.2.1 Computation of the ηT Pairing
Given the points P,Q ∈ E(F3m), then the ηT pairing is calculated according to ηT (P,Q) =
fT,P (P,ψ(Q)), where fT,P is the Miller function to be evaluated. The intermediate func-
tions are computed using the fast tripling operation and the evaluations at ψ(Q) are
accumulated. For any point A = (xA, yA) on the curve then
gA(x, y) = y
3
Ay − (x3A − x+ b)2 (6.8)
where div(gA(x, y)) = 3(A) + (−3A)− 4(∞).
If ηT (P,Q) is to be computed and T is negative, then the input point P should be re-
placed by −P and −T should be used for computation. In practice, this means that
T = 3(m+1)/2 + b and −P are used when m ≡ (1, 11) mod 12 whilst T = 3(m+1)/2 − b
and P are used when m ≡ (5, 7) mod 12. From Equations (3.13) and (3.14), the Miller
function can be evaluated according to
fT,P (ψ(Q)) =
(
(m−1)/2∏
i=0
(
g[3i]P (ψ(Q))
)3(m−1)/2−i)
.l(ψ(Q) (6.9)
where l(ψ(Q)) is the line function arising from the final addition of [3(m+1)/2]P with ±P .
As in the characteristic 2 case, the exponentiations to 3(m−1)/2−i on each iteration can be
avoided if the Miller function is accumulated in a different manner. Let P ′ = [3(m−1)/2]P .
From Equation (6.1), the value of P ′ can be computed on each iteration according to
P ′ = [φ(m−1)/2pim−1]P = φ(m−1)/2(x1/3P , y
1/3
P ) (6.10)
The Miller function can now be computed according to
fT,P (ψ(Q)) = l(ψ(Q)).
(
(m−1)/2∏
j=0
g[3−j ]P ′(ψ(Q))
3j
)
(6.11)
The definition of the line function depends on the value of m mod 12. The results at
the end of this chapter are returned by implementations of the Tate pairing processor on
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fields with m = 79 and m = 97. These values return m mod 12 ≡ 7 and m mod 12 ≡ 1,
respectively. In this section, only the line function for the latter case is provided for
simplicity. The former case differs very slightly. Let l(x, y) be the final line function. This
has slope λ = −yP . It can be shown that
l(x, y) = λ(x− xP ) + byP (6.12)
The cube roots that are required for the calculation of P ′ on each iteration can be avoided
by precomputing a set of cubes and accessing them in reverse order. This means that a
cube rooting module is not required in a hardware implementation.
The intermediate functions are calculated using Equation (6.8). For simplicity, the nota-
tion a(i) = a3
i
is used. Now
g[3−j ]P ′(ψ(Q))
3j = (σy
(−j)
P y
(j)
Q − u2)− ρu− ρ2 (6.13)
where u = x
(−j)
P + x
(j)
Q + b.
The operations required for the computation of ηT (P,Q) in the m mod 12 ≡ 1 case are
provided in Algorithm 12. Note that the notation used on Line 15 refers to a ceiling
function. The ceiling of a rational number a, denoted dae, is the the least integer that is
greater than or equal to a. The elliptic curve used for this work is y2 = x3 − x− 1, which
means that b = −1. The required cubes of xQ and yQ are first precomputed. The values
calculated in the for loop of Lines 2-4 do not need to be stored. The cubes of the second
loop are stored in reverse order so that cube roots can be accessed with ease. The for loop
that evaluates the intermediate functions g ∈ F36m and accumulates the results begins on
Line 9. The individual components of g are calculated on Lines 10-12. Note that squaring
is not a trivial operation and is performed by multiplication of an element with itself to
avoid the necessity of a subfield squaring module in the pairing processor. A total of one
addition, two negations and two multiplications on F3m are required for the computation
of g. A 1-bit addition is also required. The value of g is multiplied by the accumulating
function f on Line 14 using a special multiplication routine dmul(f, g). This routine takes
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advantage of the sparse nature of the g polynomial to minimise the quantity of required
F3m multiplications. This special multiplication is described in the next section. On
loop exit, the line function is calculated, requiring one addition, two negations and one
multiplication on F3m . A 1-bit addition must also be performed. Finally, the result is
multiplied by the accumulated function f and the value of ηT (P,Q) is returned.
Algorithm 12 Computation of ηT (P,Q) on E(F3m) : y2 = x3 − x− 1, m mod 12 ≡ 1
Input: P = (xP , yP ), Q = (xQ, yQ), where P,Q ∈ E(F3m)
Output: f = ηT (P,Q), where f ∈ F36m
1: Initialise: f ← 1
2: for (i← m− 1, i > (m+ 1)/2, i← i− 1) do
3: xQ ← xQ3, yQ ← yQ3
4: end for
5: for (i← (m+ 1)/2, i ≥ 0, i← i− 1) do
6: xQ ← xQ3, yQ ← yQ3
7: x′Q[i]← xQ, y′Q[i]← yQ
8: end for
9: for (i← 1, i ≤ (m+ 1)/2, i← i+ 1) do
10: u← xP + x′Q[i] + 1
11: c0 ← −u.u
12: c1 ← −yP .y′Q[i]
13: g ← c0 + (c1)σ + (−u)ρ+ (0)σρ+ (−1)ρ2 + (0)σρ2
14: f ← dmul(f, g)
15: if i < dm+12 e then
16: xP ← x3P , yP ← y3P
17: end if
18: end for
19: g ← −yP .(x′Q[i] + xP + 1) + (−y′Q[i])σ + (yP )ρ
20: f ← f.g
Return: f
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6.2.2 Exponentiation to the Tate Pairing
The value of f = ηT (P,Q) must be exponentiated to return a unique Tate pairing result.
Recall from Equation (6.7) that ((ηT (P,Q)
M )3T
2
= (〈P,ψ(Q)〉MN )L. This means that the
Tate pairing 〈P,ψ(Q)〉MN can be calculated by raising f to the power M3T 2/L. This
exponentiation can be performed by unrolling the different factors and cancelling when
possible. This process was already discussed in detail in Chapters 4 and 5 and will not be
described in detail in this case.
The exponentiation to M requires ((m+1)/2+1) cubings, 10 multiplications, one squaring,
and an inversion, all performed on the extension field. The squaring is again performed
by multiplication. The trivial 3m-power Frobenius operation must also be performed nine
times. Exponentiation to 3T 2/L is computed by first raising ηT (P,Q)
M to the power
3T 2q/L and then applying the (inexpensive) inverse q-power Frobenius map. Another m
cubings, one squaring, three multiplications and three conjugations, all on the extension
field, are required to return the unique Tate pairing value 〈P,ψ(Q)〉MN .
6.3 Implementation of Arithmetic on F3, F3m and F36m
The characteristic 3 arrangement of the processor discussed here contains modules for F3m
addition, subtraction, cubing, inversion and multiplication. Extension field operations are
computed using these modules. The hardware implementation of arithmetic on F3 and
F3m is discussed in this section. The extension field arithmetic operations required by the
Tate pairing are then presented in terms of the necessary subfield operations.
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6.3.1 Hardware Implementation of Arithmetic on F3
The binary nature of FPGAs means that storage and arithmetic operations on the F2 field
is convenient. It contains the elements 0 and 1, each of which can be stored in one bit.
The addition and multiplication operations are performed using one XOR and one AND
gate, respectively. Implementation of the F3 field is more complicated as it contains the
members 0, 1 and 2. These elements require two hardware bits for storage. In this work,
the representations {00, 01} = 0, {10} = 1 and {11} = 2 are used. This mapping system
means that a check if zero operation can be performed by inspecting the most significant
bit of an F3 element.
Addition, subtraction, multiplication and negation must be performed on F3. Fortunately,
FPGAs provide a relatively efficient means for the implementation of these operations.
Input-output maps for each of the 2-bit arithmetic operations can be placed on a pair
of 4-input, 1-output Look Up Tables (LUTs). Negation can be computed by subtraction
from 0 to save area.
6.3.2 Computation and Implementation of Arithmetic on F3m
Tate pairing computation requires addition, subtraction, cubing, multiplication and inver-
sion on F3m . These operations can be implemented in hardware in a similar manner to
that of the F2m field and are briefly discussed here.
Addition is performed coefficient-wise and is implemented on 2m LUTs, each with input-
output maps corresponding to F3 addition. Subtraction requires 2m of the F3 subtraction
LUTs. These operations are combinatorial and a result can be returned in one clock cycle.
Cubing is implemented using the techniques of Bertoni et al. [102]. Cubing is a linear
operation on F3. The F3m input polynomial is first padded with zeros, resulting in a
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composition polynomial of degree (3m − 3). This is then separated into lower, middle
and upper intermediate polynomials, each of degree (m− 1). Let f = xm ± xt ± 1 be the
irreducible polynomial defining F3m . If t < m/3 then the lower intermediate polynomial
does not need to be reduced. This is the case for the implementations of this work. The
middle and upper polynomials can be reduced in one step using combinatorial logic. A
total area of 4m LUTs are required and a result is returned in just one clock cycle.
Multiplication is performed using a characteristic 3 version of the digit-serial multipliers
previously described in Subsection 4.3.2. The multipliers operate on D coefficients of one
of the input polynomials at a time. A result is returned in m/D clock cycles. In the
characteristic 3 case, the input polynomials have twice the number of bits. As before,
a definition of the required subfield operations is generated by product and reduction
matrices that are dependent on the field size and irreducible polynomial. The characteristic
3 digit-serial multipliers require more area than their characteristic 2 counterparts as LUTs
must be used instead of gates. An overview of the characteristic 3 digit-serial multipliers
is available in [102].
Inversion on F3m is computed using a characteristic 3 variant of the extended Euclidean
algorithm. Implementation using this method is discussed in [103]. The F3m inverter
contains two chains of F3 arithmetic modules and some storage and control circuitry. A
result is returned in 2m clock cycles.
6.3.3 Arithmetic on F36m
The ηT pairing of Algorithm 12 requires multiplication of the g polynomial by the ac-
cumulating f polynomial on each iteration of the loop using the dmul(f, g) routine. An
extension field multiplication is also required after loop exit. Exponentiation of the re-
sult to the Tate pairing requires addition, subtraction, multiplication, squaring, cubing,
powering to q (the Frobenius mapping) and conjugation, all on F36m .
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Addition and subtraction are again performed coefficient-wise. Conjugation can be per-
formed by first converting the operand to a pair of F33m elements. This requires addi-
tion and subtraction alone. Extension field squaring is expensive and is performed by
multiplying elements by themselves. The other extension field operations are described
in more detail in this subsection. Note that the equations of this subsection are for a
field with m mod 3 ≡ 1 (as is the case for m = 97) with b = −1 on the elliptic curve
E(F3m) : y2 − x3 − x+ b. These are the parameters used by Barreto et al. in [63]. Minor
changes are required in other cases.
The dmul(f, g) Routine
The multiplication of f by g can be performed by regular extension field multiplication.
This would not, however, exploit the sparse form of g. It is important that this multipli-
cation be performed as efficiently as possible as it is performed on each iteration of the
main for loop.
The intermediate polynomials g have the structure
g = (g0 + g1σ + g2ρ+ (0)σρ+ (−1)ρ2 + (0)σρ2)
Consider f = (f0 +f1σ+f2ρ+f3σρ+f4ρ
2 +f5σρ
2), where f0, f1, f2, f3, f4, f5 ∈ F3m . The
dmul(f, g) routine proceeds with 13 F3m multiplications, all of which can be performed in
parallel, if desired.
mul0 = f0.g0 mul7 = (f0 + f1 + f2 + f3).(g0 + g1 + g2)
mul1 = f1.g1 mul8 = (f0 + f4).(g0 + 2)
mul2 = (f0 + f1).(g0 + g1) mul9 = (f1 + f5).(g1)
mul3 = f2.g2 mul10 = (f0 + f1 + f4 + f5).(g0 + g1 + 2)
mul4 = f3.g2 mul11 = (f2 + f4).(g2 + 2)
mul5 = (f0 + f2).(g0 + g2) mul12 = (f3 + f5).(g2 + 2)
mul6 = (f1 + f3).(g1)
(6.14)
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The final result c = dmul(f, g), where c ∈ F36m , is returned by the following two steps,
which require F3m addition, negation and subtraction alone.
t00r = mul0 −mul1 t00i = mul2 −mul0 −mul1
t11r = mul3 t11i = mul4
t22r = −f4 t22i = −f5
t01r = mul5 −mul6 t01i = mul7 −mul5 −mul6
t02r = mul8 −mul9 t02i = mul10 −mul8 −mul9
t12r = mul11 t12i = mul12
(6.15)
c0 = t00r − t12r + t11r + t22r
c1 = t00i − t12i + t11i + t22i
c2 = t01r − t00r + t11r + t12r + t22r
c3 = t01i − t00i + t11i + t12i + t22i
c4 = t02r − t00r + t11r
c5 = t02i − t00i + t11i
(6.16)
Note that the addition and subtraction of elements of F3m with members of F3 is performed
using F3m modules and are counted as arithmetic on F3m . The dmul(f, g) routine requires
a total of 13 F3m multiplications and 51 F3m additions/subtractions.
F36m Multiplication
Extension field multiplication using Karatsuba methods requires six multiplications on
F32m . Each of these operations require three multiplications on F3m . A total of 18 F3m
multiplications and 72 additions/subtractions are required. Gorla et al. show how ex-
tension field multiplication can be performed using techniques based on the fast Fourier
transform [104]. The fourth roots of unity of F36m are used to reduce the number of
required F32m multiplications to 15. They also show how a discrete Fourier transform
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matrix can be used to devise explicit formulae for extension field multiplication. The first
stage requires 15 multiplications on F3m , all of which can be performed in parallel. Re-
duction is performed after this, requiring some additions and subtractions. A total of 15
multiplications and 90 additions/subtractions on F3m are required. This provides a saving
of three multiplications over the Karatsuba method, at the expense of 18 more trivial
additions/subtractions.
F36m Cubing
The extension field cubing operation uses the 3-tuple representation of Equation (6.5). Let
a = aˆ0+aˆ1ρ+aˆ2ρ
2, where aˆ0 = a0+a1σ, aˆ1 = a2+a3σ, aˆ2 = a4+a5σ and aˆ0, aˆ1, aˆ2 ∈ F32m
and a0, a1, a2, a3, a4, a5 ∈ F3m . First
a3 = aˆ30 + aˆ
3
1ρ
3 + aˆ32ρ
6 (6.17)
From h(z) = z3− z+ 1, the irreducible polynomial generating the extension from F32m to
F36m , the relationships ρ3 = ρ− 1 and ρ6 = ρ2 + ρ+ 1 hold. Now
a3 =aˆ30 + aˆ
3
1(ρ− 1) + aˆ23(ρ2 + ρ+ 1)
=(aˆ30 − aˆ31 + aˆ32) + (aˆ31 + aˆ32)ρ+ aˆ32ρ2
(6.18)
The irreducible polynomial defining F32m is g(y) = y2 + 1. Then σ2 = −1 and therefore
aˆ30 =(a0
3 − σa13)
aˆ31 =(a2
3 − σa33)
aˆ32 =(a4
3 − σa53)
(6.19)
Substituting (6.18) into (6.19) and rearranging gives
a3 =(a0
3 − a23 + a43) + (a33 − a13 − a53)σ
+ (a2
3 + a4
3)ρ+ (−a33 − a53)σρ
+ (a4
3)ρ2 + (−a53)σρ2
(6.20)
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A cubing on F36m ,therefore, requires two additions, six subtractions and six cubings on
F2m , all of which can be performed using combinatorial logic.
F36m Powering to q
Consider a = aˆ0 + aˆ1ρ+ aˆ2ρ
2, as before. Powering to q begins with the computation
aq =aˆ3
m
0 + aˆ
3m
1 ρ
3m + aˆ2
3m(ρ2)
3m
= aˆ3
m
0 + aˆ
3m
1 ρ
3 + aˆ2
3mρ6
(6.21)
The equations ρ3 = ρ− 1, ρ6 = ρ2 + ρ+ 1, σ2 = −1 and σ3 = −σ can be derived from the
irreducible polynomials. Now
aq =aˆ3
m
0 + aˆ
3m
1 (ρ− 1) + aˆ3
m
2 (ρ
2 + ρ+ 1)
=(aˆ3
m
0 − aˆ3
m
1 + aˆ
3m
2 ) + (aˆ
3m
1 + aˆ
3m
2 )ρ+ aˆ
3m
2 ρ
2
=((a3
m
0 − σa3
m
1 )− (a3
m
2 − σa3
m
3 ) + (a
3m
4 − σa3
m
5 ))
+(a3
m
2 − σa3
m
3 + a
3m
4 − σa3
m
5 )ρ+ (a
3m
4 − σa3
m
5 )ρ
2
(6.22)
Since aqi = ai for all ai ∈ F3m
aq = (a0 − a2 + a4) + (a3 − a1 − a5)σ
+ (a2 + a4)ρ+ (−a3 − a5)σρ+ a4ρ2 + (−a5)σρ2
(6.23)
Powering to q is, therefore, trivial and can be performed in two additions and six subtrac-
tions on F3m .
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F36m Inversion
The techniques described by Kerins et al. are used here to perform F36m inversion [103].
The F36m field is reconstructed as a degree 2 extension of F33m :
F33m ≡ F3m [y]/h(y) where h(y) = y3 − y + 1
F36m ≡ F33m [z]/g(z) where g(z) = z2 + 1
(6.24)
An element a ∈ F36m is written as a = aˆ0 + aˆ1σ where aˆ0 = a0 + a1ρ + a2ρ2 and aˆ1 =
a3+a4ρ+a5ρ
2 for aˆ0, aˆ1 ∈ F33m . Since σ2 = −1, the inversion can be carried out efficiently
using conjugate methods. A full F36m inversion costs 33 multiplications, four cubings, 67
additions/subtractions and one inversion, all on F3m .
6.4 The Flexible Tate Pairing Processor
The architecture of the flexible Tate pairing processor is discussed in this section. The
processor can compute a Tate pairing on both characteristic 2 and 3 curves. The efficient
sequencing of subfield operations is paramount. A flexible software subsystem that enables
the rapid generation of instruction sequences is described in detail. Processors that can be
used in a large number of applications and environments can also be analysed and created
with ease by using the features of this subsystem in conjunction with the overall design
system discussed in Subsection 3.5.3. Results that are returned by various implementations
of the pairing processor are also presented in this section.
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6.4.1 Architecture
The flexible processor architecture does not contain extension field arithmetic units. An
ALU containing a number of subfield modules that operate in parallel is used instead.
The characteristic 2 ALU contains an F2m adder, squarer, inverter and a number of F2m
multipliers. The characteristic 3 ALU contains one module for each of addition, subtrac-
tion, cubing, inversion and a number of modules for F3m multiplication. As multiplication
is performed so often and is a time consuming operation the system has been designed so
that the number of multipliers in an ALU can be varied with little impact on the overall
architecture. The digit size of the multipliers is also variable.
An example of a characteristic 3 Tate pairing processor, generated by the design system,
is illustrated in Figure 6.1. In this case, the ALU contains k F3m digit-serial multipliers.
The pairing inputs and intermediate variables are stored centrally in dual port 2m-bit
RAM. A pair of 2m-bit buses are sent from the RAM to the ALU and are connected to
the subfield modules. The ALU also contains (k+3) 2m-bit tri-state buffers that select the
module output to be stored. The buff sel control bus handles the buffers. On completion
of the Tate pairing computation the done signal is asserted and the F36m Tate pairing
value is read serially from the first RAM output. Note that the DOut bus is tied to an
output enable control signal so that intermediate values cannot be read from it if pairing
computation halts before completion.
The architecture implementing the Tate pairing in characteristic 2 has a very similar
structure as ease of architectural modification is a fundamental design principle. The
modules within the ALUs perform F2m arithmetic. The data buses are m bits wide and
m-bit RAM is used. The scheduling of operations is also modified to implement the new
pairing.
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Figure 6.1: Characteristic 3 Tate pairing processor containing k multipliers
6.4.2 Operation Scheduling
Scheduling must be performed with care as a large amount of subfield arithmetic must be
implemented. When possible, addition, subtraction, cubing and squaring are computed
and stored while multiplication and inversion are in progress. Particular care is taken over
the scheduling of operations within the main for loops of the ηT algorithms as these loops
must be iterated many times and require operations that are expensive in terms of clock
cycles.
As an example of the scheduling techniques employed, consider the characteristic 3 ηT
pairing computation of Algorithm 12. The first values of c0 = −u.u and c1 = −yP .y′Q[i]
are computed and stored in RAM before the hardware begins to implement the loop.
After this, the computation f ← dmul(f, g) of the first iteration can begin immediately
as its inputs will be available. The values of c0 and c1 that will be required on the second
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iteration can be computed in parallel with the dmul operation of this first iteration. This
scheduling technique means that 15 F3m multiplications required on each iteration can
be performed in parallel, if desired. The additions required by the dmul routine are also
carefully scheduled so that they are performed while the multipliers are in use.
The quantity of operations required for ηT computation far exceeds that required to per-
form the exponentiation to the Tate pairing value. This conversion should, however, also
be scheduled intelligently as it is more serial in nature and there is less parallelism available
as a result.
6.4.3 Control System
The aim of the control system is to minimise the quantity of clock cycles required to handle
storage and module resets and enables. The hardware units are chosen to reduce the work
that is required of a designer to generate the control signals that are necessary to perform
the pairing. The control unit consists of a counter, a ROM and an FSM. A sequence of
instructions that describe the operations required for Tate pairing computation is loaded
into the ROM. The ROM output is connected to the FSM. At the beginning of a pairing
computation, the FSM resets the counter and then enables it. The counter is then used
to access the instructions consecutively.
Most bit sequences of the ROM instructions are used to handle RAM reads and writes, to
reset and enable the modules within the ALU and to control the tri-state buffers. These
bits pass straight through the FSM module and appear at one of its outputs. A small
number of bits are used to communicate with the FSM. The FSM checks these bits on
every clock cycle and will enter a particular state when required. If, for example, an F3m
multiplication must be performed, an instruction will provide RAM read addresses and
reset and enable signals for the chosen multiplier and indicate to the FSM that a mul mode
state should be entered. This state halts the counter for m/D clock cycles. This means
that the next instruction, which will contain control signals for storage of the result, will
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not be accessed until the multiplication operation has been completed. The counter also
contains a load control bit and a data in bus. When the load bit is asserted the counter
will change its output to the value on the data in bus. An instruction can indicate to the
FSM that it should enter a jump mode and provides the desired counter output value. This
is useful as this means that it is not necessary that the ROM be accessed in a consecutive
fashion. Jumps can be used to return to the beginning of a long sequence of operations
that must be repeated. As an example, a jump is performed at the end of each iteration
of the main for loop of the ηT computation.
This system provides a simple method for the provision of flexibility. It eliminates the
requirement for a large, complicated FSM as its sole purpose is to control the counter.
The FSM does not need to be modified for the implementation of other algorithms. A new
sequence of instructions can be generated and simply loaded into ROM. This versatility
is very important as it means the processors can be used to implement other finite field
based cryptographic operations with ease.
6.4.4 Flexible Design System for Processor Creation and Implementa-
tion
A software design system (design sys) that has been created for software pairing compu-
tation, VHDL generation, hardware implementation, verification and benchmarking was
discussed in Subsection 3.5.3. The software is written in the C++ language. It contains
a class, called flex sub sys, that has not been described up to this point. This provides
added functionality when designing, analysing and implementing the processors described
in this chapter. It is also written in C++. The features of this subsystem are described in
this subsection.
The flexible processors do not contain extension field arithmetic units. This means that
many streams of bits describing F2m or F3m operations must be defined to implement
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a pairing algorithm. These streams must be converted into sequences of instructions.
This can be a very long, tedious process that has an inherently high probability of error.
Furthermore, if errors are made, it is difficult to isolate the problem due to the large
number of operations involved.
The overall design system already contains a class for software pairing computation. This
contains base classes for performing arithmetic on F2m , F24m , F3m , F32m and F36m . Al-
gorithms are computed in software using functions within these classes. An instruction
set generation class has been created that provides similar functionality. This contains a
subfield base class in which sequences of instructions are defined for subfield arithmetic.
An extension field base class has been created in which instruction sequences for extension
field arithmetic can be defined using the instruction sequences within the subfield class. A
full sequence of instructions can then be generated to implement a pairing algorithm that
can be added to the system in a very similar fashion to that of the software computation
case.
The subfield base class contains members of integer type. Variables hold the RAM ad-
dresses of subfield elements. Arithmetic operations are overloaded so that instruction
sequences are automatically generated when they are used. The instructions define the
RAM addresses and provide the necessary control signals. As an example, consider the
class members v, w and z that contain the RAM locations of three subfield variables. Let
v = 10, w = 20 and z = 30. If the operation z = v + w is entered, two instructions are
generated. The first puts addr ram a to 10, addr ram b to 20 and opens the tri-state
buffer at the output of the adder. The next instruction puts the value of 30 on addr ram
b and writes the result to that address. Multiplication is a special case as the number of
modules is variable. The multiplicative operator is overloaded in such a manner that it can
take arrays of class members as operands. For example, consider v = [10, 11, 12, 13, 14],
w = [20, 21, 22, 23, 24] and z = [30, 31, 32, 33, 34] containing the locations of five subfield
elements each. Five multiplications must be performed. The software checks whether this
exceeds the number of multipliers in the processor. If it does, the software minimises the
number of multiplication runs required. If, for example, there are three multipliers, then
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30 = 10 × 20, 31 = 11 × 21 and 32 = 12 × 22 are first performed in parallel and the
remaining multiplications performed on the next run.
The members of the extension field class are k-length arrays of subfield members, where k
is the extension degree of the curve in use. Extension field arithmetic is defined in terms
of operations on members of the subfield class. As an example, let r = [40, 41, 42, 43],
s = [50, 51, 52, 53] and t = [60, 61, 62, 64] be elements of the F24m extension field. If the
command t = r + s is entered, a sequence of instructions is automatically generated that
contains the address and control signals required to implement the four F2m additions
of the members of s and t and to store the result in the RAM addresses defined by t.
Inversion and multiplication are defined in the same manner. The combination of these
classes means that the instruction sequences required for extension field arithmetic do not
have to be written manually: the sequences for the subfield operations have already been
defined and are used.
A designer can now define a desired pairing algorithm in terms of operations on members
of the subfield and extension field classes. Commands can be entered using all of the
functionality of the C++ language. The instruction sequence is then automatically gener-
ated for any desired characteristic, field size, quantity of multipliers and digit size. This
system significantly reduces design cycle time as many algorithms and processors can be
implemented without having to manually update the sequences.
The automatic generation of the instruction sequences within the software system enables
rapid analysis of the clock cycles required by various algorithms when implemented on
a processor. A breakdown of the cost of all operations is available immediately after
algorithmic definition. These costs can be returned for any desired version of the processor.
This means that detailed analysis can be performed within the software system and avoids
the necessity for hardware implementation. This can be very beneficial while exploring
the use of hardware for various applications and environments.
All of the other features of the design system are available when working with the flexible
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processors. VHDL can be automatically generated by the vhdl sub sys class according to
a desired characteristic, field size, digit size and quantity of multipliers. Xilinx tools can
be called, bit files automatically generated and FPGA communication handled within the
imp sub sys. Sets of elliptic curve points can be generated in the soft sys class and au-
tomatically sent to the FPGA. Verification is performed by sending these input points to
the processor and comparing the hardware results to those of the software computations.
Benchmarking and efficiency analysis be performed. If more than one implementation is
required, an array can be used to define the desired architectures and implementation, ver-
ification and benchmarking performed automatically. This makes the system particularly
desirable for the prototyping of these types of architectures.
6.4.5 Results and Comparisons
Various versions of the architecture discussed in this chapter were implemented on the
Xilinx Virtex-II Pro FPGA (xc2vp100-6ff1696). This device contains 44,096 slices.
The results returned by other characteristic 3 elliptic curve pairing implementations in
the literature are for fields with m = 97. For this reason, versions of the flexible processor
were built using several digit sizes and quantities of multipliers on F397 . This field returns
approximately the same level of security as a characteristic 2 field with m = 271. A number
of characteristic 2 processors were also implemented on F2271 so that a direct comparison
could be made. The fast characteristic 2 elliptic curve Tate pairing processor discussed in
Chapter 4 was implemented on the field F2313 . Results returned by the flexible processor
at this field size are also presented in this section so that the two types of processors can
be compared.
The results returned by the flexible processor when implemented on F2271 and F397 are
presented in Tables 6.1 and 6.2, respectively. A full Tate pairing 〈P,ψ(Q)〉MN is performed
in each case. The processors were implemented with multipliers of digit size 4, 8, 12
and 16 in both cases. Larger digit sizes are not used as, with further increases, the
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efficiencies of the resultant processors fall dramatically as the clock cycles required for
control and combinatorial operations are fixed. The quantities of subfield multiplication
modules included in the implementations are shown in the first column. The characteristic
2 processors were built using one, two, three, four, five and seven multipliers. A total of
14 F2m multiplications must be performed during the main iterative loop of the ηT pairing
computation (see Algorithm 5). All of these operations can be performed in parallel if
sufficient resources are available. A processor containing five multipliers requires three
runs to complete these 13 multiplications. A processor with six multipliers needs the same
number of runs and is not constructed for this reason. In the characteristic 3 case, a total
of 15 F3m multiplications are required during loop iteration (Algorithm 12). Processors
with six and seven multipliers do not provide an advantage over a processor containing
five modules and are, therefore, not implemented.
The fastest characteristic 2 processor contains seven multipliers of digit size 16 and returns
a Tate pairing result in 17,347 cycles. A total of 20,591 slices are required, yielding an AC
product of 358 Mslice.cycles. The lowest AC product is 160 Mslice.cycles and is returned
by two versions. The first contains two multipliers of digit size 8 and provides a pairing
result in 30,912 cycles. This implementation requires 5,170 slices. The second contains
two multipliers of digit size 12 and provides a result in 25,110 cycles. This implementation
occupies 6,365 slices. On analysis of the results presented in Table 6.1, it is clear that
the architectures that require a relatively small area can return a Tate pairing value in a
relatively low number of clock cycles.
The fastest characteristic 3 version contains four multipliers of digit size 16. This imple-
mentation returns a Tate pairing result in 16,127 cycles and requires 22,240 slices. Note
that this is not the largest of the implementations. In the {#M = 5, D = 16} and
{#M = 8, D = 16} cases the reduction in multiplicative runs is counteracted by the cost
of the control and storage cycles associated with the extra multipliers. The lowest AC
product is 140 Mslice.cycles. This is provided by an architecture with three multipliers of
digit size 4 and the implementation occupies 6,690 slices. A Tate pairing result is returned
in 20,996 clock cycles. At moderate clock frequencies this provides a substantial reduction
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Characteristic 2, m=271
Digit Size
4 8 12 16
#M Area (slices)
1 3360 3748 4441 5106
2 4389 5170 6365 7716
3 5318 6519 8149 10362
4 6202 7905 10272 12920
5 7131 9146 12114 15632
7 8989 12111 15963 20591
Cycles
1 86508 51072 39870 33947
2 48924 30912 25110 22576
3 37692 24960 21510 18592
4 32616 22272 19800 19173
5 27108 20544 19170 18592
7 23760 18528 17460 17347
AC Product (Mslice.cycles)
1 291 192 178 174
2 215 160 160 175
3 201 163 176 193
4 203 177 204 248
5 194 188 233 291
7 214 225 279 358
Table 6.1: Tate pairing Results for F2271
Characteristic 3, m=97
Digit Size
4 8 12 16
#M Area (slices)
1 4347 4979 6300 7670
2 5366 7016 9821 12639
3 6690 9052 13246 17441
4 7992 11093 16888 22240
5 9336 13147 19071 27049
8 13369 19368 29662 39956
Cycles
1 41249 28437 24155 22010
2 26646 20096 18316 17564
3 20996 17618 16941 16595
4 19794 16573 16436 16127
5 18409 16855 16329 16145
8 17835 16581 16376 16299
AC Product (Mslice.cycles)
1 179 142 152 169
2 143 141 180 222
3 140 159 224 289
4 158 184 278 359
5 172 222 311 437
8 238 321 486 651
Table 6.2: Tate pairing results for F397
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in computation time in comparison to the software result of 2.72 ms provided in [63].
It is useful to examine how changes in architectural parameters affect the AC product.
The AC products of the characteristic 2 processor implementations are plotted against
the number of multipliers employed for digit sizes of 4, 8, 12 and 16 in Figure 6.2. It is
clear that the product increases once the number of multipliers surpasses two in all but
the D = 4 case. This comes about as the proportion of cycles required for control and
storage grows as the number of multiplication runs decreases. Overall, the D = 8 case
provides a high degree of efficiency throughout. The AC products of the characteristic 3
implementations are plotted in the same manner in Figure 6.3. In all but the D = 4 case,
the products grow when the number of multipliers exceeds two. Increases in digit size have
a larger area impact in the characteristic 3 case due to the architecture of the multipliers.
The D = 4 case provides a relatively low product throughout. On examination of Figures
6.2 and 6.3, it is clear that the characteristic 3 version of the processor is the more efficient
in the majority of cases. It can also be seen that, in general, maximal efficiency is returned
by implementations with smaller area footprints.
The characteristic 2 and 3 processor implementations can also be directly compared. Clock
cycles are plotted against area for versions of the processors on F2271 and F397 in Figure
6.4. While both processors perform well, the characteristic 3 implementation returns the
more desirable results in the overwhelming majority of cases. The plot points at which the
lowest AC product occurs in the characteristic 2 and 3 cases are also noted. The design
environment enables the rapid and automatic generation of many versions of the flexible
processor, as demonstrated by the quantity of results returned. Solutions for various
applications can be explored quickly and with minimum effort if desired.
Various versions of the processor were also implemented on an elliptic curve defined on
the field F2313 . This means that a direct comparison with the characteristic 2 elliptic and
genus 2 hyperelliptic processors of Chapters 4 and 5 can be made as those implementa-
tions provide the same security level. The results returned by the flexible processor when
implementing the Tate pairing on F2313 are presented in Table 6.3. The most efficient im-
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Figure 6.2: Processor AC products on F2271
plementation is the {#M = 2, D = 12} case. This has an AC product of 223 Mslice.cycles,
requires 7,120 slices, and returns a Tate pairing result in 31,239 clock cycles.
The AC products of the F2313 implementations are illustrated in Figure 6.5. It is clear
that the most efficient architectures are those with three multipliers or less. As in the
F2271 and F397 cases, the flexible processor is most efficient when a relatively small area
footprint is used.
Comparisons
The performance of the flexible processor is compared with the processors discussed in
Chapters 4 and 5 and with other hardware pairing architectures in the literature in this
subsection. A summary of results is provided in Table 6.4. Note that only the most
177
Figure 6.3: Processor AC products on F397
Figure 6.4: Clock cycles versus area for F2271 and F397
efficient implementations results of Chapters 4, 5 and 6 are listed as these processors and
their results have already been discussed in detail.
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#M Area (slices) Cycles AC (Msl.cycles)
Digit Size Digit Size Digit Size
4 8 12 16 4 8 12 16 4 8 12 16
1 3835 4283 4910 5838 112457 65740 50285 42444 432 282 247 248
2 5026 5806 7120 8839 62702 39140 31239 27135 316 228 223 240
3 6185 7232 9329 11858 47936 31160 25721 21708 297 226 240 258
4 7069 8770 11516 14840 41195 27645 23229 22437 292 243 268 333
5 8138 10409 13753 17858 33919 24700 22428 21708 277 258 309 388
7 10276 13543 18111 23723 29104 22040 20470 19926 300 299 371 473
Table 6.3: Implementation results for F2313
Figure 6.5: Processor AC products on F2313
The characteristic 2 implementations of Keller et al. [8] and Shu et al. [95] have already
been compared to the elliptic curve characteristic 2 processor of Chapter 4. The best AC
product of the flexible processor of 160,000 slice.cycles is much lower than the 1,026,000
slice.cycles of the most efficient implementation of Keller et al. Their fastest architecture
returns a pairing in 120,000 cycles and requires 15,065 slices. The flexible processor com-
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Table 6.4: Comparisons with results returned by Tate pairing hardware implementations
in the literature
Ref. m Alg. Device #M D Area Cycles AC
(Bits) (Slices) (kSl.cy)
Characteristic 2 Implementations from the Literature
[8] 283 BKLS V-II Ma. 9 4 27411 68250 1871
Ma. 9 6 29421 55110 1621
Mi. 1 6 4273 240000 1026
Mi. 9 6 15065 120000 1808
[95] 283 η V-II Pro 7+1+1 16,4,8 22726 7308 166
7+1+1 32,8,16 37803 4392 166
ηT 7+1+1 16,4,8 33252 4368 145
Characteristic 3 Implementations from the Literature
[103] 97 BKLS V-II 18+1 1,4 33790 242526 8195
4,4 46590 122610 5712
4,8 50286 112480 5651
DL V-II Pro 18 4 55616 12900 717
[105] 97 DL V-II Pro 1 4 4481 59946 269
89 Kwon V-II Pro 1 4 4481 64602 289
[106] 97 ηT (no exp) V-II Pro – – 1888 32618 61
Implementations From This Thesis
Ch. 4 313 ηT V-II Pro 14 12 44060 4818 212
Ch. 5 103 ηT V-II Pro 20 12 27182 5805 157
Ch. 6 c.2 271 ηT V-II Pro 2 8 5170 30912 160
271 ηT V-II Pro 2 12 6365 25110 160
313 ηT V-II Pro 2 12 7120 31239 223
Ch. 6 c.3 97 ηT V-II Pro 3 4 6690 20996 140
97 ηT V-II Pro 1 8 4979 28437 142
pares well with this, returning the same result in 25,110 cycles while requiring only 6,365
slices in the {#M = 2, D = 12} case. The implementations of Shu et al. have AC products
of 166,000 slice.cycles and 145,000 slice.cycles. Each of their processors returns a result in
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a low number of clock cycles. An implementation employing 33,252 slices computes a Tate
pairing in 4,368 cycles. It may, however, be difficult to substantially reduce the number
of slices required by their architecture. Their processor has an ALU that contains an
F24m multiplication unit and an F2m multiplier. The F24m multiplication unit contains six
subfield multipliers. The ALU also contains an exponentiation subsystem that contains
another two F2m multipliers. Shu et al. use seven multipliers with digit sizes of 16, one
with a digit size of 4 and one with a digit size of 8 to return their best result. These selec-
tions result in a relatively high area footprint and, due to the fixed quantity of multipliers
and the relatively large digit sizes required, it may be difficult to maintain efficiency while
attempting to reduce area. The flexible processor can, when {#M = 2, D = 8}, return
a Tate result in 30,912 cycles using only 5,170 slices. This indicates that it may be more
suited to environments in which a low area footprint is required.
Kerins et al. describe two distinct processors for Tate pairing computation on elliptic
curves of characteristic 3 in [103]. The first implements the BKLS algorithm for Tate
pairing computation discussed in [60]. The architecture contains a general purpose elliptic
curve coprocessor and an F36m multiplier. The coprocessor can be used to perform elliptic
curve point multiplication or to perform the subfield operations required during iteration
of the for loop of the pairing. The F36m unit contains 18 F3m multipliers. The fastest
and most efficient version of this processor has an AC product of 5,651,000 slice.cycles
and returns a result in 112,480 cycles. A total of 50,286 slices are required. Although the
number of clock cycles and slices required are high, an advantage of this architecture is that
it can be used to perform the elliptic curve group operation and Tate pairing computation.
Kerins et al. propose a second processor that could be used to implement the Duursma and
Lee algorithm for Tate pairing computation. Their proposed architecture contains the F36m
multiplication unit, which contains 18 F3m multipliers and some subfield cubing, addition
and negation circuitry. This processor is not implemented but, through calculation, the
authors state that a total of 12,900 cycles would be required to return a pairing with the
use of multipliers with digit sizes of 4. They suggest that such an architecture would
require a high percentage of slice utilisation on a Virtex-II Pro FPGA containing 55,616
slices. This approximation returns an AC product of 717,000 slice.cycles. Factors such as
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the low digit sizes already in use and the fixed number of multipliers would, again, make
it very difficult to reduce area requirement without a substantial increase in clock cycles.
The most efficient characteristic 3 flexible processor architecture has an AC product of
140,000 slice.cycles. This requires only 6,690 slices and returns a result in 20,996 cycles.
The processor of this chapter may, therefore, be more suited to constrained environments
than both of the processor architectures described by Kerins et al.
Grabher and Page present a characteristic 3 Tate pairing processor in [105]. They use
an F3m microprocessor architecture, implemented on an FPGA, connected to a general
purpose serial processor through a Xilinx microblaze core. The FPGA contains storage
registers and an ALU containing one multiplier and a number of other subfield units.
The authors allocate 4,481 FPGA slices to their coprocessor. An implementation of the
Duursma and Lee method returns a pairing in 59,946 cycles. An implementation of the
Kwon algorithm [107] returns a result in 64,602 cycles. This system requires a small
number of slices. An {#M = 1, D = 8} flexible processor can, however, return a pairing
in a much lower 28,437 cycles with only a slightly higher area usage of 4,979 slices. The
implementation of Grabher et al. is also not as versatile as the flexible processor as the
quantity of subfield modules within the ALU is fixed.
Beuchat et al. implement an ηT pairing computation in [106]. This is an extension of their
work described in [108] and [109]. A novel ηT pairing algorithm is proposed. The authors
suggest that the characteristic 3 ηT pairing algorithm described by Barreto et al. in [63]
can be improved upon. They demonstrate that some of the more expensive field operations
required during loop iteration can be replaced with less costly operations by employing
some pre- and post-processing techniques. They also develop a unified arithmetic operator.
This contains an array multiplication architecture and some circuitry to enable resource
sharing for addition, multiplication and cubing. This operator performs all required field
arithmetic. An ηT pairing is returned in 32,618 cycles with an area usage of 1,888 slices.
This is an excellent result, comparing very well with the characteristic 3 implementations
of the flexible processor. The {#M = 3, D = 4} flexible processor returns a result in
a lower 20,996 cycles but requires a larger area of 6,690 slices. Beuchat et al. do not,
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however, perform an exponentiation to a Tate pairing. During this research it was noted
that the number of cycles required by the conversion is significant due to its serial nature
and the large cost of the required extension field operations.
The flexible processor can also be compared with the fast characteristic 2 elliptic and
genus 2 hyperelliptic curve processors of Chapters 4 and 5, respectively. The processor of
Chapter 4 has an AC product of 212,000 slice.cycles, returns a Tate pairing in 4,818 cycles
and requires 44,060 slices. The genus 2 processor has an AC product of 157,000 slice.cycles,
returns a Tate pairing in 5,805 cycles and requires 27,182 slices. The most efficient F2313
flexible processor is ({#M = 2, D = 12}). This has an AC product of 223,000 slice.cycles.
This implementation returns a pairing in a much larger 31,239 cycles but requires only
7,120 slices. It is difficult to substantially reduce the area of the processors of Chapters 4
and 5 due to the fixed quantity of multipliers. Again, the flexible processor is more suited
to a low area environment in comparison to the other processors.
The results of this section indicate that pairing processors with units dedicated to extension
field arithmetic can return a pairing in a very low number of clock cycles but are, due to
their very nature, not suited to environments with stringent area requirements. The most
efficient versions of the flexible processor are those that provide a low area implementation.
6.5 Conclusions
The implementation of the characteristic 3 elliptic curve Tate pairing, computed using the
ηT methods, has been discussed in this chapter.
An overview of the underlying field and curve mathematics has been provided. The pairing
algorithm and techniques for its efficient computation have been described. The hardware
implementation of characteristic 3 arithmetic is not as straightforward as in the binary
case: 2m bits are required to store an element of F3m . Some intermediate mapping is also
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required. A useful representation for characteristic 3 elements in such an environment has
been provided. The operations required to perform F3m and F36m arithmetic have also
been discussed with a hardware target in mind.
Initial exploration indicated that the runtime benefits of extension field units would not
be offset by the resulting high cost resource requirements. A pairing processor with an
ALU that contains subfield units operating in parallel was created instead. This ALU
contains one module for addition, subtraction, cubing and inversion. The quantity of
digit-serial multipliers and their digit sizes can be varied to return a result in a desired
number of clock cycles or to satisfy a particular resource requirement. The ALU can
be programmed to contain either F2m or F3m units, which means that it can be used
to perform both characteristic 2 and 3 Tate pairings. Results are stored in dual port
RAM. The control unit consists of a counter, a ROM unit and an FSM. An instruction
sequence describing the subfield operations required to compute a pairing is flashed to the
ROM. The FSM uses the counter to control access to the ROM. Operations are scheduled
carefully: addition, subtraction and cubing are performed during multiplication, when
possible. The implementation process does not have to be repeated if a different algorithm
is to be implemented: the new set of instructions can simply be flashed to ROM.
A flexible C++ software class has been written to reduce the effort required to produce
desired processors and to define instruction sequences. The sequences required for F2m ,
F24m , F3m and F36m arithmetic and storage are defined in a software library. A user can
then generate an instruction sequence using all of the capabilities and functionality of
high-level software.
The Tate pairing has been computed on the supersingular elliptic curves E(F2271), E(F397)
and E(F2313). Processors with various architectural parameters were implemented on a
Virtex-II Pro FPGA. Results show that the flexible processor is excellently suited to
systems in which area utilisation is a primary concern. A processor with a footprint of
only 5,170 slices returns an E(F2271) pairing in 30,912 clock cycles, while a characteristic
3 version that uses only 9,052 slices returns an E(F397) Tate pairing in 20,996 cycles.
184
The processor described in this chapter is an ideal platform on which to perform pairings
when area is at a premium. There is a floor beyond which dedicated, highly parallel,
processors cannot perform efficiently. The flexibility of the processor means that it is suited
to embedded environments in which bandwidth may be costly. Algorithmic modifications
can be performed by sending and remotely flashing an instruction sequence. This avoids
the necessity for transferring a bit file, which is often significantly larger. The processor
can also be programmed to perform both point scalar multiplication and Tate pairing
computation, which is useful for many applications.
The subject matter of this chapter has been published in [11], [12] and [13].
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Chapter 7
Modern Directions in
Pairing-Based Cryptography: A
Review
In this chapter, modern trends and developments in pairing-based cryptography are dis-
cussed. The computation and use of bilinear pairings for cryptographic applications has
received much attention in the literature. A family of secure and efficiently computable
pairings have been introduced. More attacks on pairing-based systems have been sug-
gested and associated countermeasures devised. New optimisation techniques have been
presented. There has been an ongoing investigation into the fast and efficient implemen-
tation of pairings in hardware. Pairings can now be computed very effectively in software
due to advances in the processing power of general purpose sequential processors. The use
of pairings in embedded systems in which area and energy are highly constrained has also
been investigated. Proposals for novel and interesting pairing-based schemes have been
made. The aim of this chapter is to provide an overview of these topics.
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Some modern algorithms for pairing computation are outlined in Section 7.1. Security
considerations for the use of pairings in cryptography are discussed in Section 7.2. An
overview of side channel attacks, an area that has received much attention in recent years,
is also provided. The software computation of pairings is discussed in Section 7.3. Hard-
ware systems for pairing computation are described in 7.4. Some modern applications for
pairings are discussed in Section 7.5. Suggestions for future work in the field are then
provided in Section 7.6.
7.1 Pairings
An elliptic curve E(Fq) is known as pairing-friendly if, for pairing input points of order r,
r ≥ √q, where r|#E(Fq) and k ≤ (log(r)/8). The former condition ensures that the DLP
is sufficiently difficult while the latter enables computability.
In 2005, Barreto and Naehrig showed that pairing-friendly ordinary elliptic curves with
embedding degree 12 can be constructed [110]. These curves are defined on the field Fp,
where p is a prime. They are known as BN or BN-p curves, where p is the value of the
prime. The BN family have curve equation E(Fp) : y2 = x3 + b, where b 6= 0. The number
of rational points, denoted r, is also prime. The high embedding degree makes these curves
very suitable to implementations at the 128-bit security level and above. The prime p, the
group order r and the trace of Frobenius t are parameterised according to:
p(u) =36u4 + 36u3 + 24u2 + 6u+ 1
r(u) =36u4 + 36u3 + 18u2 + 6u+ 1
t(u) =6u2 + 1
(7.1)
for some u ∈ Z that returns prime p and r.
In 2006, Hess et al. introduced the Ate pairing [111]. This simplifies the ηT pairing and
extends the techniques to ordinary elliptic curves. The Ate pairing can be computed effi-
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ciently on elliptic curves that admit twists. Let E and E′ be two elliptic curves defined on
Fq and with embedded degree k. E′ is a degree d twist of E if there exists an isomorphism
ψd : E
′ → E defined over Fpd and d is minimal. In Ate pairing computation one of the
inputs is a point on E(Fp) while the other is a point on E′(Fpv), where v = k/d. Hess
et al. show that at high security levels the Ate pairing can provide significant advantages
over the Tate pairing if the curve has certain properties.
The r-Ate pairing was introduced by Lee et al. in 2009 [112]. This is a generalisation
and an improvement of the Ate pairing techniques. A reduced Miller loop length can be
used on some pairing-friendly elliptic curves. It is shown that the r-Ate pairing can be
computed 50% faster than the Ate pairing on certain BN curves.
In 2010, Lubicz and Robert discussed the Tate and Weil pairings on general abelian
varieties [113]. They show that, cryptographically, security is not restricted to the Jacobian
of an algebraic curve. They describe efficient algorithms that use theta functions to perform
pairing computation.
In 2010, Vercauteren presented optimal pairings [114]. A pairing is optimal if it can be
computed in the theoretical minimum number of Miller iterations on the family of curves
on which it is defined. An algorithm that can be used to construct optimal Ate pairings
on all types of pairing-friendly curves is provided. Computation of an optimal Ate pairing
is often written as aopt.
Following these advances, much emphasis has been placed on the computation of the
optimal Ate pairing on BN curves. The high embedding degree (k = 12) means that
BN curves are an ideal candidate for pairing computation. For example, an Ate pairing
that is computed on p = 256 returns 128-bit security while p = 640 returns 192-bit
security. Another benefit is that there is a large quantity of curves within the family.
Some of these curves have properties that can be exploited to return a fast pairing. As
many of the implementations described later in this chapter compute the optimal Ate
pairing on BN curves, the operations required to compute it are discussed briefly here.
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BN curves admit a sextic twist, which means that k/d = 2. Let u be the value defining
the parameters of a BN curve E(Fp). Let ψ : E
′ → E be the isomorphism defining the
twist and let pip be the Frobenius automorphism on E such that pip(x, y) = (x
p, yp). Let
z = (pk − 1)/r = (p12 − 1)/r. Consider the points P ∈ E(Fp)[r] and Q ∈ E′(Fp2)[r]. The
optimal Ate pairing is computed according to
aopt(P,Q) =
((
fs,Q(P )).
(
g[s]Q,pip(Q)(P )
)
.
(
g[s]Q+pip(Q),−pi2(Q)(P )
)) p12−1r
(7.2)
where fs,Q is the Miller function such that div(fs,Q) = s(Q)− ([s]Q)− (s− 1)(∞) and s
is the pairing loop length given by s = 6u+ 2. A term gQ1,Q2(P ) ∈ Fp12 is the function of
the line through Q1 and Q2, evaluated at P .
The operations required to compute the Ate pairing are listed in Algorithm 13. The value
of fs,Q(P ) is computed during the loop of Lines 7-14. The computations required for
point doubling and addition on the twisted curve and for defining the line functions during
these operations are performed on Fp2 . The E′(Fp2) curve arithmetic can be performed
in either affine or projective coordinates. Projective coordinates are usually used since
inversions are not required during addition and doubling in this system. The line functions
must, however, be evaluated at the point P ∈ E(Fp), which has projective coordinates.
The overhead introduced by the incorporation of two different coordinate systems can be
reduced using explicit formulae [115]. The evaluation of the line functions at P can also be
performed in parallel with some of the operations required by the addition and doubling
operations. The evaluation results are sparse members of Fp12 . This sparseness reduces
the number of extension field operations required during the accumulation step at the end
of the iterative loop.
Good overviews of Ate pairing computation on BN curves are provided in [116] and [117].
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Algorithm 13 Optimal Ate pairing computation on BN curves
Input: P , Q, s, where P ∈ E(Fp)[r], Q ∈ E′(Fp2)[r] and s = 6u+ 2 =
∑log2(s)
i=0 si2
i
Output: f = aopt(P,Q), where f ∈ Fp12
1: Initialise: d1 ← 1
2: T ← [2]Q and evaluate d2 ← gQ,Q(P )
3: if (sblog2(s)−1c = 1) then
4: T ← T +Q and evaluate d1 ← gT,Q(P )
5: end if
6: f ← d1.d2
7: for (i← blog2(s)c − 2, i ≥ 0, i← i− 1) do
8: T ← [2]T and evaluate gT,T (P )
9: f ← f2.gT,T (P )
10: if si = 1 then
11: T ← T +Q and evaluate gT,Q(P )
12: f ← f.gT,Q(P )
13: end if
14: end for
15: Q1 ← pip(Q)
16: Q2 ← pi2(Q)
17: if u < 0 then
18: T ← −T
19: f ← fp6
20: end if
21: T ← T +Q1 and evaluate d1 ← gT,Q1(P )
22: T ← T −Q2 and evaluate d2 ← gT,−Q2(P )
23: f ← d1.d2
24: f ← f (p12−1)/r
Return: f
190
7.2 Security
Computational attacks on finite field and curve-based cryptography until the end of 2007
have already been discussed in Subsections 2.6.1 and 3.4.1. In this section, the most
notable modern computational attacks are discussed. Cryptographic systems that are
implemented in insecure locations must be secured against physical attack. This applies to
software processors, to constrained devices such as phones and smart cards and to hardware
architectures. In recent years physical attacks on curve and pairing-based systems have
received a lot of attention. Some of these attacks and their countermeasures are discussed
in this section.
7.2.1 Computational Attacks
The best known computational attacks on the DLP, the ECDLP and the HCDLP until the
end of 2007 were discussed in Subsection 2.6.1. Each of these problems are susceptible to
brute force and generic attacks, such as Pollard’s rho algorithm. In 2013, Joux published a
paper, made available in preprint form, that startled the cryptographic community [118].
He provides a new algorithm to solve the DLP in fields of form Fq2n , where n ≤ q + d
and d is some small integer. The algorithm has heuristic complexity L(1/4 + o(1), c), for
some value of c. Prior to this discovery, the best known attack on the DLP required sub-
exponential time. Joux’s method reduces this to heuristic polynomial time. Barbulescu
et al. [119] then showed that the DLP can be solved in quasi-polynomial time for fields of
type Fqkn , where k ≥ 2, d is a very small integer and n ≤ q + d. Subsequent publications
concentrated on attacking fields with features that enabled the fastest solution to the DLP.
It was not, however, clear whether the new solution methods applied to fields on which
pairings are constructed. In 2014, Granger et al. detailed new techniques for solving
the DLP on some binary fields on which pairing security relies [120]. They apply their
techniques on two finite fields to demonstrate their efficacy. The first is F24.1223 , a field
arising from an elliptic curve implementation with embedding degree 4. They show that
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this field, previously believed to have a 128-bit security level, is in fact only 94.6-bit secure.
They also show that the F212.367 field, applicable to genus 2 pairing implementation, could
be fully broken.
Due to these significant advances, the use of fields of small characteristic for pairing-based
cryptography is currently not recommended. A good overview of the discrete logarithm
problem and its history of attacks was published by Joux et al. in 2014 [121].
7.2.2 Side Channel Attacks
Side channel attacks exploit the leakage of physical information from a device while it
implements a cryptographic computation. Resource constrained platforms, such as smart
cards, are particularly vulnerable to such attacks due to the ease of physical access that an
adversary may have. Some such attacks are passive, which means that they do not interfere
with the operation of the device. In active attacks, an adversary physically tampers with
the device, influences its internal operation and aims to gain some information from the
unintended operations. Such attacks are usually called fault attacks. A fault can be
injected by laser, by electromagnetic pulse or by introducing power variations and clock
glitches [122]. Much of the literature relevant to pairing-based systems concentrates on
attacks against identity-based protocols. The attacks assume that the pairing algorithm
and its result are known to an adversary. Security relies on keeping one of the pairing
input arguments secret. These assumptions are also made in this subsection. Excellent
overviews of side channel attacks on devices implementing pairings are available in [123]
and [124].
In 1996, Kocher et al. were the first to describe how side channel attacks can be used on
cryptographic devices [125]. They discuss a passive attack that analyses the time taken by
private key operations in RSA and Diffie-Hellman protocols in order to return the secret
information on which the security of the protocols rely. In 1999, Kocher et al. showed
how the power dissipated by a device can be be measured and used to efficiently compute
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confidential data [126]. Simple Power Analysis (SPA) and Differential Power Analysis
(DPA) attacks are discussed. SPA involves the analysis of one power consumption trace
in order to gain some information about the instructions performed during computation.
The implementation of some operations may, for example, be conditional on key bits and
intermediate variables. In DPA, the aim is to find a correlation between the data under
manipulation and variations in power consumption. More than one power trace is required.
Statistical functions are used to distinguish minor variations from background noise. It
is shown how SPA and DPA can be used to retrieve secret information from a device
implementing the Data Encryption Standard [127]. They state that susceptibility to SPA
can be reduced by removing conditional branches from algorithms. This can, however,
result in a performance penalty. Kocher et al. suggest various countermeasures against
DPA. These include the balancing of state transitions, the physical shielding of the device,
the deliberate addition of noise and the use of hash functions to render the information
garnered from the leaked information useless.
In 2006, Page and Vercauteren described the first known fault attack on a system employ-
ing pairings [128]. The reduced Tate pairing e(P,Q), computed using the Duursma and
Lee methods, is considered. The point Q is publicly available while security relies on the
secrecy of P . A valid pairing result is first collected by the adversary. The attacker then
injects a fault that changes the number of iterations of the Miller loop. The resultant
pairing value is also collected by the attacker. The secret P can be computed from the
quotient of the two pairing results. The Kwon-BGOS algorithm [107] can be attacked in
a similar manner. Page and Vercauteren suggest that point blinding techniques can be
used to defend against such attacks. The attacks that they describe are only successful
if the adversary has knowledge of one of the input points. Fortunately, the bilinearity of
the pairing provides an efficient solution to this problem. If the operation e(P,Q) must
be performed then, for the random integers a and b, e(a[P ], b[Q]) = e(P,Q)ab is instead
computed. The exponent can be eliminated if values of a and b can be found such that
ab mod l ≡ 1. This countermeasure may, however, be expensive as two extra point scalar
multiplications are needed for every pairing computation.
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Whelan and Scott discussed passive DPA attacks on the Tate, ηT and Ate pairings in the
same year [129]. They show that some hardware architectures implementing finite field
arithmetic may be vulnerable to attacks that use statistical correlation. The type of ex-
pansion and accumulation employed in modular multiplication architectures means that it
is possible to efficiently compute the input operands from substrings of the multiplicative
result. They also show how a square root implementation can leak information about
the operand. These weaknesses can be exploited to extract information about the pairing
input coordinates. Whelan and Scott hypothesise that the Tate and Ate pairings may be
resistant to such attacks if the secret point is the first input. The ηT pairing is, however,
susceptible to the attacks, regardless of the order of its input arguments. A countermea-
sure, in which intermediate results can be multiplied by random subfield elements, can be
used to close this avenue of attack [130]. The final exponentiation eliminates this randomi-
sation. Point blinding can also be employed, but with its inherent extra cost. Whelan
and Scott considered a fault attack on the Weil, Tate and ηT pairings in 2007 [131]. They
assume that an adversary is able to change the sign of one of the input coordinates by
interfering with a single bit. The quotient of the corrupted and correct pairing results can
be used to gain some secret information. The optimal time at which to inject the attack
is on the final iteration of the Miller loop. The computation of the secret is more difficult,
but remains possible, in other cases. This attack is possible on the ηT and Weil pairings.
Whelan and Scott claim that the Tate pairing is not vulnerable to this type of attack due
to its more complex final exponentiation.
In 2009, DPA attacks on the Tate, ηT and Ate pairings, when computed using the Jaco-
bian coordinate system, were presented by El Mrabet et al. [132]. A practical system,
created to demonstrate the feasibility of the attack, is presented. An 8-bit architecture is
synthesised and tested in a simulation environment. It is shown that the restriction of the
secret value to the first pairing input does not provide adequate security. A DPA of one
modular subtraction and one modular multiplication is required for attack. Point blinding
does, however, provide protection. In the same year, El Mrabet extended her previous
work and discussed the vulnerability of pairing implementations that use both affine and
projective coordinates [133]. Miller’s algorithm is attacked by modifying the number of
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loop iterations. This is a generalisation of the fault attack previously described by Page
and Vercauteren [128] and can be performed on the Tate, ηT , Ate and optimal pairings.
A fault is injected into the counter that controls loop iteration. The aim is to gain access
to intermediate values produced by two successive iterations of the loop. Pairing compu-
tations are corrupted until this is achieved. The retrieved values can be used to extract
secret information. A DPA of a modular addition and a modular multiplication is required
to perform this attack. As in the previous case, point blinding provides protection against
this attack.
In 2013, Blomer et al. discussed a DPA attack that exploits the modular addition operation
required during pairing computation. The attack requires analysis of either one modular
addition or one modular multiplication, but not both. A point blinding countermeasure
relevant to these attacks that is slighlty more efficient than that of Page and Vercauteren
[128] is also provided. In the same year, Bae et al. described an attack on Miller’s algorithm
in which a fault is injected into the instruction sequence that controls the operations to be
performed [134]. The fault removes the point addition performed during the final iteration
of the Miller loop by skipping the instruction defining the last if statement. Only one
successful attack of this type is required to enable the efficient computation of the secret.
The corrupted Miller output can be compared to the correct result to retrieve the secret
information. To investigate the practicality of their attack, Bae et al. perform a laser fault
injection on a microchip implementing a simple test algorithm. It should be noted that
this attack assumes that the Miller results can be accessed before the final exponentiation.
Lashermes et al. presented a fault attack on the final exponentiation in the same year [135].
This attack is applicable to pairings with complex exponentiations that were previously
thought to protect them from SCA. In [136], it was suggested that the final exponentiation
on pairing-friendly ordinary curves can be computed efficiently by decomposing it into
three distinct parts. Lashermes et al. show that exponentiation using this technique can
be reversed by injecting three different faults into the final exponentiation. These must
be introduced on three separate implementations of the same pairing.
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7.3 Software Computation of Pairings
Since the beginning of 2008, significant strives have been made in the area of software
pairing computation. Prime field pairing computation is, in particular, very suited to
software implementation as field arithmetic can be performed very efficiently using integer,
floating point and other native operations. The computation of both small characteristic
and prime characteristic pairings on general purpose sequential processors is discussed in
this section. Note that in the case of small characteristic implementations, it is assumed
that the DLP security breach described in Subsection 7.2.1 is not available. It would not
be possible to compare the implementations in terms of their assumed security otherwise.
Pairings can also be computed on highly constrained devices, such as smart cards and
microprocessor systems. Implementation on these devices will be discussed in Section 7.5.
The most notable literature contributions to the software computation of pairings on small
characteristic curves are described in this section. The most significant results of each of
the publications that are discussed are listed in Table 7.1.
In 2008, Hankerson et al. [137] discussed the software computation of pairings on small
characteristic and prime field elliptic curves at the 128-bit security level. This is a detailed
and interesting paper that focuses on the implementation of small characteristic and large
characteristic pairings on general purpose processors using various available features. The
strengths and weaknesses of the 32-bit Intel Pentium 4, the 64-bit AMD Opteron and the
64-bit Intel Core 2 architectures are discussed. The most attractive results are returned
by a C code implementation on the Intel Core 2 processor. In the prime field case, a pair-
ing is performed on a BN curve of 256 bits. Field elements are stored as integers, which
enables the efficient use of a relatively fast 64-bit multiplier for modular arithmetic. An
implementation of a 128-bit secure ηT pairing, computed on E(F21223), is also performed.
In the Intel Core 2 case, Single Instruction, Multiple Data (SIMD) supplementary instruc-
tion sets are employed. These instruction sets are used to decompose an operation into
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Table 7.1: Notable modern contributions to the software computation of pairings. An (a)
after a BN curve definition indicates that curve arithmetic is performed using the affine
coordinate system. All other BN curve implementations are performed using projective
coordinates.
Ref. Year Sec. Curve Alg. Device F. Cycles Time
(Bits) (GHz) (×106) (ms)
Computation on Curves of Small Characteristic
[137] 2008 128 E(F21223) ηT Intel C2 2.4 39 16.25
128 E(F3509) ηT Intel C2 2.4 33 13.75
[138] 2010 128 E(F21223) ηT Intel X 2 17.4 8.7
128 Intel X (x8) 2 3.02 1.51
Computation on Curves of Large Characteristic
[137] 2008 128 BN-256 Ate Intel C2 2.4 15 6.25
r-Ate Intel C2 2.4 10 4.17
[139] 2008 128 BN-256 aopt Intel C2D 2.4 28.45 11.85
Intel C2D (x2) 2.4 14.43 6.01
[115] 2010 128 BN-257 aopt Intel C2D 2.83 4.38 1.54
[116] 2010 128 BN-254 aopt Intel Ci7 2.8 2.33 0.83
[140] 2011 128 BN-254 aopt AMD PII 3 1.57 0.52
[141] 2012 BN-254(a) aopt Intel C2D 2.4 14.21 5.92
164 BN-446(a) 44.3 18.46
192 BN-638(a) 136.5 56.88
[142] 2012 128 BN-254 aopt ARM C-A9 1.2 11.89 9.91
164 BN-446 aopt 1.2 47.46 39.55
192 BN-638 aopt 1.2 119.23 99.36
[143] 2015 128 BN-254 aopt ARM C-A15 1.7 7.89 4.64
128 BN-254 ARM C-A15(N) 1.7 6.09 3.58
164 BN-446 ARM C-A15(N) 1.7 30.07 17.69
192 BN-638 ARM C-A15(N) 1.7 79.84 46.97
sub operations that can be performed in parallel. On the Core 2 processor, the finite field
members can be packed into groups of 128-bit registers using SIMD Within a Register
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(SWAR). The Streaming SIMD Extensions (SSE) platform is then used to perform 128-
bit operations when possible. This is called a vectorised system. The finite field elements
are called vectors, while a string contained in one of the registers is known as a scalar.
A 128-bit secure characteristic 3 pairing, computed on E(F3509), is also performed. This
implementation also uses SIMD, SWAR and SSE. Characteristic 3 addition is written in
assembly language to ensure that the operation is compiled efficiently. As expected, the
prime field pairings provide the best results due to the availability of the 64-bit multiplier
and the high embedding degree of BN curves. The fastest 128-bit secure r-Ate pairing
result is returned in 4.17 ms. Interestingly, this is returned by a non-SSE implementa-
tion. The 128-bit secure characteristic 2 and 3 ηT pairings are returned in 16.25 ms and
13.75 ms, respectively. A significant contribution of this paper is the assertion that a faster
prime field pairing result is returned by a non-SSE instruction set: the organisational and
recombination operations that must be employed are not warranted as efficient use can be
made of the 64-bit multiplier by using an integer representation.
In 2008, Grabher et al. [139] investigated techniques for the software computation of the
optimal Ate pairing. The main focus is on the exploitation of available parallelism using
SIMD, SWAR and SSE features and of the sharing of operations across two processor
cores such as the Intel Core 2 Duo. The problems inherent in the use of SWAR storage
in elliptic curve systems are discussed. Finite field arithmetic often requires operations on
scalars that occupy different positions within their respective vectors. This may require
a large amount of decomposition and recombination, which can be relatively expensive.
Fortunately, the SSE instruction set can efficiently recode a SWAR register to a group of
registers that are of a smaller size. Consider, for example, a 128-bit finite field element.
This can be stored in one 128-bit register or four 32-bit registers. The widths of the
individual registers are known as digit sizes. Grabher et al. show that arithmetic can
be performed efficiently by separating the 128-bit elements into four 32-bit strings. Each
string is stored as the first scalar of a 128-bit vector. The other three registers in each of
the vectors remain empty. This means that 128-bit operations can be performed in terms
of 32-bit strings that are aligned within their respective vectors. This can significantly
reduce carry cost. For evaluation purposes, pairing computations are performed using
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SIMD and non-SIMD instruction sets at the 128-bit security level. In the former case, a
single core must be used and an optimal Ate pairing is returned in a minimum of 11.85 ms.
Interestingly, a single core implementation using a non-SIMD instruction set requires only
9.72 ms. This is due to the natural 64-bit datapath of the Core 2 Duo. If the security level
must be increased, however, the larger operands may mean that the SIMD implementation
will become more attractive. The fastest computation overall is returned by two cores,
operating in parallel, using non-SIMD instruction sets. The OpenMP multiprocessing API
is used to perform Fp12 arithmetic in terms of parallel Fp6 operations and Fp2 operations
in terms of parallel Fp operations. This system provides an optimal Ate result in 14.43
MCycles, which corresponds to 6.01 ms. These results support the assertion of Hankerson
et al. [137] that non-SSE instruction sets can be efficiently employed for prime field pairing
computation. A single core 128-bit r-Ate computation is performed in 10 Mcycles in their
case, while the implementation performed by Grabher et al. requires 44% more clock
cycles, despite the use of twice as many cores and the more efficient optimal Ate pairing
construction.
In 2010, Aranha et al. [138] described techniques for the software computation of the re-
duced characteristic 2 ηT pairing at the 128-bit security level. While the 2008 publication
of Hankerson et al. [137] endeavoured to clarify the cost differences between small char-
acteristic and prime field characteristic pairings on various processors in a general sense,
the purpose of this paper is to perform a high-speed pairing (of small characteristic) using
all available means. The ηT pairing is implemented on a dual quad-core Intel Xeon pro-
cessor. The use of SIMD vector instruction sets for characteristic 2 finite field arithmetic
is explored. Detailed algorithms, written in terms of the SSE instructions required to
implement them, are provided for squaring, multiplication, routing and inversion on F2m .
The use of these algorithms means that inefficiencies that may be introduced by poor
compilation of higher level code are avoided. A useful load balancing technique for multi
core platforms is also presented. A parallel version of the Miller loop of the ηT algorithm,
suitable for multi core implementation, is also developed. A relatively inexpensive pre-
computation reduces dependencies between different iterations of the Miller loop. Distinct
iterations are then performed in parallel on separate cores. A recombination step accumu-
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lates the intermediate functions by extension field multiplication. A pairing computation
is performed on E(F21223) using one core and eight cores of the Intel Xeon device. The
former computation requires 8.7 ms (17.4 Mcycles), while the latter requires 1.51 ms (3.02
Mcycles). The 5.76x speed up demonstrates that the use of multi core processors is desir-
able if the extra cost is affordable. A clock cycle reduction of 55% is achieved in the one
core case in comparison to the 2008 implementation of Hankerson et al. This reduction
can largely be explained by the direct SSE definition of the field operations required for
pairing computation.
In the same year, Naehrig et al. [115] discussed the computation of the optimal Ate pairing
on BN curves. The parameters of the BN curve polynomials (Equation (7.1)) are carefully
selected so that the number of point doubling and addition steps required during the Miller
loop is minimised. It is also shown that some of the line functions required by the original
definition of the optimal Ate pairing are not required and a more efficient algorithm is
provided. Elements of Fp are represented in a polynomial form that dramatically reduces
the number of operations required for multiplication and subsequent modular reduction.
Double-precision floating-point arithmetic is employed (contrary to Hankerson et al. [137],
whereby large integer arithmetic is performed by decomposition to integers and the use
of a 64-bit multiplier). Naehrig et al. store the 12 coefficients of each Fp element in
consecutive places of a double array of size 12. Members of Fp2 are interleaved in double
arrays of size 24. This representation enables the widespread and efficient utilisation of
SIMD operations for parallel extension field arithmetic. Techniques for avoiding overflow
are also discussed. A 128-bit secure optimal Ate pairing is implemented on one core of
an Intel Core 2 Duo processor. A result is returned in 1.54 ms (4.38 MCycles). This is a
clock cycle reduction of 56% in comparison to the cycles required by the implementation
of Hankerson et al. It should, however, be noted that the r-Ate pairing is performed in the
latter case. There is also a restriction on the number of curves on which the optimisations
of Naehrig et al. apply. A publically available and useful library for software computation
using their methods is available at [144].
In 2010, Beuchet et al. [116] presented a useful software library for the computation of the
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optimal Ate pairing on BN curves at the 126-bit security level. The pairing is computed
using a slightly modified version of the algorithm provided by Naehrig et al. [115]. The
main difference is that Beuchat et al. perform both point addition and subtraction during
Miller loop iteration. The Fp12 field is constructed as a quadratic extension of Fp6 , which
is itself a cubic extension of Fp2 . This is a similar construction method to that employed
in the genus 2 case of Chapter 5. The techniques for extension field arithmetic, previously
described by Hankerson et al. [137], are also employed here. The value of u defining the
BN curve parameters (Equation(7.1)) is selected in order to provide a low hamming weight
Miller loop with sparse arithmetic (in a similar manner to Naehrig et al. [115]). Beuchat
et al. do, however, choose a value of u that also speeds up the final exponentiation, which
is performed using the three step approach of Scott et al. [136]. The computation of
the optimal Ate pairing on software architectures that are more modern than those used
by the publications already discussed in this section ([137], [139], [138] and [115]) is then
described. An unsigned multiplication can be performed in only three clock cycles on a
processor such as an Intel Core i7, a significant reduction in cost compared to the other
processors. Field arithmetic techniques that take advantage of the smaller clock cycle
gap between additive and multiplicative operations are discussed. Algorithms, written in
assembly code, for the implementation of arithmetic on Fp and its extensions are provided.
The software library is prototyped on an Intel Core i7 processor. A 126-bit optimal Ate
pairing is returned in 0.83 ms (2.33 MCycles). This is a significant improvement on the
4.38 MCycles required by the optimal Ate pairing of Naehrig et al.. This is, however,
partly due to the newer architecture and more efficient instruction set, which means that
a meaningful comparison is difficult to make. The main contributions of this publication
are the algorithms that are explicitly created with the small clock cycle gap between
multiplication and addition in mind. The source code of the library is publically available
[145].
In 2011, Aranha et al. [140] discussed the fast computation of the optimal Ate pairing.
The tower construction of Beuchat et al. [116] is employed and it is shown how operations
on the sub and extension fields can be further optimised. In general, an Fpk Karatsuba
multiplication requires k(k+1)/2 reductions modulo p. It is shown that the prime field lazy
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reduction technique, described in [93] and [146], for fields of type Fp2 , can be generalised
to Fpk . The use of lazy reduction reduces the number of required modular reductions
to k. When arithmetic must be performed on the extensions, it is also possible to delay
the reductions required by the associated sub field arithmetic until the results must be
combined. The use of software words that are larger than the data that they hold is also
suggested. The unassigned bits within the words means that a combination of single-
and double-precision arithmetic can be employed. The optimal balance between the two
types of arithmetic is extensively explored in the case of multiplication on the sub and
extension fields. Miller’s algorithm itself is analysed and it is shown that some of the Fp
reductions required after the curve line evaluations can be delayed and merged with other
reductions that are performed during the later Fp2 multiplications. It is also shown that
the final exponentiation can be performed without inversion when the parameter defining
the BN curve is negative. The three stage exponentiation of Scott et al. [136] is employed
and it is shown that inversion on Fp12 can be avoided when BN curve parameter u (from
Equation (7.1)) has a negative value. The optimal Ate pairing is implemented on various
software platforms. In a similar manner to Beuchat et al. [116], algorithms for arithmetic
on Fp2 are written in assembly while higher-level algorithms are written in C code. The
fastest 128-bit secure optimal Ate pairing is returned on an AMD Phenom II processor
in 0.52 ms. The corresponding 1.57 MCycles is significantly lower than the 2.33 MCycles
required by the implementation of Beuchat et al.. It must be noted, however, that the
techniques discussed in their publication form the basis for some of the more significant
optimisations presented in the 2011 publication of Aranha et al. [140]
In 2012, Acar et al. [141] implemented the optimal Ate pairing on three ARM platforms
at several security levels. The main aim is to compare the use of affine and projective
coordinates for curve arithmetic during pairing evaluation in a quantitive manner. The
implementations employ many of the computational techniques described by Lauter et al.
[147]. A scalar multiplication on an elliptic curve using affine coordinates requires inversion
in the field on which it is defined. Lauter et al. use two previously known techniques to
reduce inversion cost. Inversion is moved from the extension field to the base field using the
optimal towering methods of Baktir and Sunar [148]. Schroeppel and Beaver [149] show
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that the number of inversions required during elliptic curve scalar multiplication can be
reduced by performing all point doublings first. The point additions can then be computed
together and the required inversions shared. This reduces the cost difference between field
inversion and multiplication and thus between affine and projective curve arithmetic. Acar
et al. compute separate pairings, each using either projective or affine curve arithmetic.
In the former case, computations are performed using the explicit formulae of Costello et
al. [150]. Optimal Ate pairings are implemented on x86, x86-64 and ARM devices. Acar
et al. state that optimisations that take advantage of the features of specific processors or
instruction sets are not employed. This means that a fair comparison can be made across
the three platforms and portability to other devices is not compromised. Computation is
performed on BN-254, BN-446 and BN-638 curves, which provide security levels of 128
bits, 164 bits and 192 bits, respectively. Results from implementations on an Intel Core 2
Duo processor are discussed here. These are representative of the main results of Acer et al.
Projective coordinate computations return optimal Ate pairings in 6.31 ms and 19.05 ms
at the 128-bit and 164-bit security levels, respectively. The corresponding affine pairings
are computed in 5.92 ms and 18.46 ms, a reduction of 6.2% and 3%, respectively. There
is a more significant difference at the 192-bit security level. A pairing using projective
curve arithmetic is computed in 65.95 ms, while an affine arithmetic pairing is computed
in 56.88 ms. This is a much more significant reduction in computation time (13.8%),
than in the lower security cases. This leads Acar et al. to hypothesise that as security
requirements grow, the use of affine curve arithmetic will become increasingly attractive.
In the same year, Grewal et al. [142] analysed the use of affine and projective curve arith-
metic for the optimal Ate pairing on ARM architectures. New optimisation techniques for
tower field and curve arithmetic are presented. It is shown that the lazy reduction method,
previously discussed by Aranha et al. [140] in the context of projective curve arithmetic
and extension field multiplication, can be used to perform affine curve arithmetic and
extension field inversion. Algorithms, employed during the multiplications of the Miller
loop, exploit the sparse nature of the extension field elements. Two types of sextic twists
that are available on BN curves are also discussed: D-type and M-type. The former is
usually used for pairing computation as the untwisting operation is the more trivial of
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the two. However, if an M-type twist is used and the pairing is computed on the twisted
curve itself, then untwisting can be performed at a very low cost. The two types of twist
evaluate a pairing in a similar time. This increases the number of curves that are suited to
efficient pairing computation. Techniques for efficient curve arithmetic in affine and pro-
jective coordinate systems are also discussed. The methods involve precomputation and
a careful selection of various field operations in order to take advantage of the features of
ARM processors. Optimal Ate pairings are computed on 254-bit, 446-bit and 638-bit BN
curves, returning security levels of 128, 164 and 192 bits, respectively. Implementation is
performed on a Cortex-A9 processor. Custom ARM assembly code for field addition and
multiplication is employed in the 254-bit BN curve case. Techniques include loop unrolling
to remove conditional statements, instruction reordering to maximise pipelining and the
avoidance of memory fetching by employing a maximal number of registers. Without as-
sembly optimisation, 254-bit secure optimal Ate affine and projective arithmetic pairings
are returned in 11.84 ms and 11.24 ms, respectively. The use of assembly code reduces
the affine and projective computation times to 10.57 ms and 9.91 ms, respectively. The
projective computation times are 5% faster in the non-assembly case and 6% faster in the
assembly case. Contrary to the results of Acer et al. [141], there is a negligible difference
in computation time between affine and projective arithmetic at the two higher security
levels. Grewal et al. state that theirs is a fairer comparison as the optimisations in field
and curve arithmetic provide a more level playing field. This claim is agreed with here.
In 2015, Azarderakhsh et al. [143] discussed the implementation of the optimal Ate pairing
on several x86-64 PC and ARM processors. This publication is essentially an implemen-
tation of the optimisations discussed by Grewal et al. [142] in 2012 on more modern
platforms that have features that benefit pairing computation. Optimised ARM assem-
bly code for field multiplication is employed in BN 254-bit and BN-446 cases. Optimised
addition is also performed in the former case. The 128-bit NEON SIMD engine, included
in some modern ARM processors, is also utilised to accelerate computation. Implemen-
tations on a Cortex-A15 demonstrate a considerable acceleration in pairing computation
when the NEON engine is used. In the BN-254 case, which provides 128-bit security, the
employment of NEON reduces pairing computation from 4.64 ms to 3.58 ms, a 23% de-
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crease. In the affine arithmetic case, computation time is reduced from 4.86 ms to 3.85 ms,
a decrease of 21%. On the BN-446 curve, affine and projective curve pairings are returned
in 18.04 ms and 17.69 ms (a 1.9% difference) while on BN-638, results are returned in
47.79 ms and 46.97 ms (a 1.7% difference), respectively. This further shows that an opti-
mal Ate computation using projective coordinates is significantly more attractive in the
BN-254 case (there is a 7% difference), while the gap between the two coordinate systems
becomes relatively insignificant as security increases.
7.4 Hardware Implementation of Pairings
Modern advances in the hardware implementation of pairings are summarised in this
section. The more notable literature contributions to the field are described. Some of
these methods are discussed in terms of their progression from the ideas, concepts and
architectural strategies that are presented in this thesis. It is, however, often difficult to
directly compare hardware implementations in terms of area, speed and AT product as the
various pairing algorithms are computed on devices with different features and at several
security levels. The aim of this section is to give an overview of the main contributions of
each of the discussed publications and to perform fair comparisons when possible.
Small characteristic implementations are discussed in Subsection 7.4.1, while prime char-
acteristic implementations are discussed in Subsection 7.4.2
7.4.1 Hardware Implementation of Pairings on Curves of Small Char-
acteristic
The most notable modern publications describing the hardware computation of pairings
on curves of small characteristic are presented in Table 7.2. The AES security levels listed
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assume that the attack on small characteristic implementations of the DLP (described
in Subsection 7.2.1) is not available as it would not otherwise be possible to compare
implementations.
Table 7.2: Modern contributions to the computation of pairings in hardware on curves
of small characteristic. Area is measured in either slices (Sl) or gates (G). Note that E
represents an elliptic curve while C represents a genus 2 hyperelliptic curve.
Ref. Year Sec. Curve Alg. Device Area F. Cycles Time
(Bits) (MHz) (×103) (µs)
[151] 2009 < 60 E(F2163) BKLS ASIC 27430 G 10.3 515 50,000
28155 G 5.44 272 50,000
[152] 2009 68 E(F2251) BKLS ASIC 329088 G 50 75.15 1503
[153] 2010 66 E(F397) ηT V-II Pro 10897 Sl 147 4.85 33
V-II Pro 10262 Sl 142 9.09 64
ASIC 193765 G 200 9.34 46.7
[154] 2010 128 E(F395.5) ηT V-4 4755 Sl 192 427.6 2227
[155] 2011 97 E(F3239) ηT V-4 66631 Sl 179 2.06 11.5
96 E(F2557) 55156 Sl 149 1.97 13.2
[156] 2011 128 E(F21223) ηT V-4 35458 Sl 168 48048 286
V-6 15167 Sl 250 47500 190
[157] 2012 128 C(F2367) ηT V-4 4518 Sl 220 773.96 3518
[158] 2012 128 E(F21223) ηT V-6 16403 Sl 267 27.23 102
ASIC 524286 G 500 27.3 54.6
[80] 2013 128 E(F21223) ηT V-6 16402 Sl 180 57.6 320
In 2009, Van Herrewege et al. [151] discussed the computation of pairings in constrained
environments. ASIC simulations of the BKLS algorithm on a supersingular curve E(F2163)
are described. The focus of the work is on energy efficiency and not speed. A simple unit
for F2m addition forms the basis for all field operations. Multiplication is achieved by
operand shifting and by performing accumulation through the addition unit. An archi-
tecture containing a memory unit (consisting of registers), a control unit and an F2m
arithmetic core implements Miller’s algorithm. More than one F2m addition unit can be
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included in the arithmetic core if a higher multiplicative throughput is required. The top
level architecture is very similar to that of the flexible processor of Chapter 6. Two ASIC
simulations, each with a pairing computation time of 50 ms, are performed in order to
investigate power consumption and area utilisation. The first employs one addition unit.
A clock frequency of 10.3 MHz is required to return a pairing in the desired time. This
processor has a dynamic power consumption of 98.3 µW. Two addition units are used in
the second simulation. A clock frequency of 5.44 MHz is required. The dynamic power
consumption in this case is 48.5 µW, which is approximately half that of the implementa-
tion using one addition unit. The areas required are 27,430 and 28,155 gates, respectively.
The increase of only 725 gates is more than justified by the reduction in power consump-
tion. Van Herrewege et al. state that their results may be improved upon by investigating
whether the footprint of the FSM can be reduced and by further maximising the efficiency
of register usage within the system. Later publications that concentrate on low power
consumption (such as those discussed in Section 7.5) implement the BN-256 optimal Ate
pairing on 8-, 16- and 32-bit microprocessors. It would be useful to implement the same
pairing using the architecture of Van Herrewege et al. as there is a greater level of architec-
tural flexibility available and, therefore, design freedom available. It may also, perhaps, be
interesting to simulate low-area ASIC implementations of the flexible processor of Chapter
6 at low frequencies in order to investigate power consumption and speed trade-offs.
In 2009, English et al. [152] implemented a characteristic 2 Tate pairing on an ASIC. The
primary design concern is power consumption. A 65 nm CMOS standard cell implementa-
tion of the macro Tate pairing processor described by Keller et al. [8] is performed. Keller
et al. implement the BKLS algorithm on an FPGA using several F24m arithmetic units.
The author of this thesis was involved in the work required to design that processor. The
F24m inversion technique, previously discussed in Subsection 4.4.5, forms the basis for the
extension field inverter used. A description of this inverter was co-published in [7]. The
methods used by English et al. to reduce the power consumption of the ASIC implemen-
tation include the isolation of unused functional units from the data bus, intermediate
operand storage to reduce unnecessary switching and careful clock gating. A processor
performing a Tate pairing computation on E(F2251) requires 329,088 gates. A result is
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returned in 1.5 ms at a frequency of 50 MHz. This implementation consumes 2.63 mW of
dynamic power and 1.23 mW of static power. The use of Network-on-Chip (NoC) Inter-
connect for ASIC implementations of the macro and micro pairing processors of Keller
et al. was later explored by English et al. in 2011 [159]. The architectures have costly
interconnect requirements, in large part due to the 251-bit cross chip data buses. NoCs
can be used to replace these wide buses with a network of routers and short pipelined links.
Network interface modules are used to provide a bridge between the serialised data and
the 251-bit inputs and outputs of the arithmetic units. A result of an arithmetic operation
is, for example, serialised and packetised before it is sent for storage. Results show that
the inclusion of an integrated circuit-switched NoC to the micro architecture results in
relatively large increases in computation time, area and energy although the total power
is reduced. A NoC point-to-point interconnect system for the micro architecture is also
described. In this case, the F2m multiplier and divider are provided with point-to-point
links to the system (there is no general system NoC). Each of the two units has three
links dedicated to the serial transmission of its operands and output. This facilitates the
removal of the large, expensive NoC switch and interfaces. Four variants of the micro
architecture, each with a different link width, are implemented. Results show that point-
to-point interconnect performs significantly better than the integrated switched NoC. The
implementations are also compared to the 2009 ASIC implementation. The throughput
and area results are similar but a 64-bit point-to-point interconnect produces a 70% re-
duction in top level wirelength and a switching power decrease of 96%. There is also a
reduction in congestion, which usually has a positive effect on yield and manufacturabil-
ity. A custom NoC topology for the macro processor is also discussed. A bidirectional
pipelined ring with packetised data circulates the system. The units use point-to-point
links to connect to the ring. However, this configuration incurs significant penalties in
terms of computation time and energy. The use of this NoC does, however, result in a
70% decrease in switching power and a 75% reduction in wirelength. English et al. pro-
vide a very detailed analysis of the utilisation of various methods for NoC interconnect
in the context of the implementations of Keller et al. It would be interesting to extend
this analysis to implementations of the ηT and Ate pairings although the effort involved
may be considerable. The analysis of the micro architecture may, in particular, be very
useful as the flexible architecture can be be easily modified to perform other elliptic curve
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operations.
Beuchat et al. [153] discussed the implementation of the characteristic 3 elliptic curve ηT
pairing in 2010. Two hardware architectures, each implementing an F397 pairing, are dis-
cussed. Both processors are implemented on FPGA, while an ASIC implementation of one
of the architectures is also described. A modified version of the ηT pairing algorithm, orig-
inally described by Beuchat et al. in [160], is used for computation. This algorithm does
not require cube rooting and thus eliminates the requirement for its associated circuitry.
The first processor contains an ALU that is carefully designed for the fast computation of
the Miller loop. The most costly operation is the sparse F36m multiplication required to
accumulate the Miller variable. Operands are fed through three parallel units that each
contain three F3m multipliers and some registers and multiplexers. The parallel outputs
are fed into another unit that contains another three F3m multipliers and a different config-
uration of registers and multiplexers. These units are embedded in an ALU that contains
combinatorial logic performing the other operations that are required on each iteration of
the loop. The processors of Chapters 4 and 5 aim to reduce the time required by the Miller
loop by performing the major operations of consecutive iterations of the loop in parallel.
Beuchat et al. use a different approach: they use bespoke circuitry that accelerates the
completion of each iteration. This results in a very fast datapath for each iteration of the
loop. Beuchat et al. also discuss a second processor, which they state is very similar to
the flexible processor of Chapter 6. While this is true, the number of multiplication units
is not variable in their system. The ALU contains nine F3m multipliers and one unit for
the F3m addition, subtraction, cubing and accumulation operations. The first processor
is implemented on a Virtex-II Pro FPGA. Using a multiplier digit size of 3, an F397 ηT
result is returned in 33 µs at a frequency of 147 MHz. A total of 10,897 slices are utilised.
At that point in time, this implementation returned the fastest pairing computation in
the literature. The techniques used to create the high throughput ALU had a significant
influence on later publications. As will be seen throughout this section, several other
processors have been created containing ALUs that aim to accelerate separate iterations
of the Miller loop in a similar manner for various characteristics, security levels and pair-
ing algorithms. The second processor returns a result in 64 µs at 142 MHz and requires
209
10,262 slices. A 180 nm ASIC implementation of this processor is also presented. This
device contains 193,765 gates and has a power consumption of 671.74 mW at 200 MHz. A
reduced ηT pairing is returned in a very impressive 46.7 µs.
In 2010, Estibals [154] discussed the resource-constrained hardware implementation of a
128-bit secure pairing on characteristic 3 supersingular curves. The curves that are used
are defined on composite extension fields Fqn , where q = 3m and n is a small integer.
This choice is motivated by the availability of many arithmetic optimisations on small
characteristic fields and on small characteristic supersingular curves. The vulnerability
of composite extension field curves to several attacks is considered. The time taken by
all known attacks on all possible supersingular curves with extension degrees that are
large enough to make 128-bit security a possibility are computed. The (assumed) secure
supersingular curve E(Fqn) : y2 = x3 − x − 1 , where q = 397 and n = 5, is used. A
pairing computation on this curve provides 128-bit AES security. The ηT algorithm of
Beuchat et al. [160] is used to perform the pairing. The algorithm must, in this case,
be computed in terms of operations on Fqn . The composite extension degree means that
the arithmetic can be performed efficiently in terms of Fq operations using a tower field
construction. A compact processor implements the Fq computations required to return
the pairing. This is the processor that Beuchat et al. use to perform the final exponenti-
ation of the characteristic 3 ηT pairing in [161]. It contains dual port RAM, a unit that
performs Fq additions and Frobenius operations, and an Fq digit-serial multiplier with
D = 14. Estibals discusses various extension field multiplication techniques in terms of
their suitability to this architecture. It is found that an algorithm described by Cenk and
O¨zbudak [162] that is based on the Chinese Remainder Theorem is the most efficient. A
Virtex-4 implementation of the 128-bit secure ηT pairing returns a result in 2.23 ms. The
area utilisation is very low, at 4,755 slices. The main contribution of this paper is to show
that the compact implementation of pairings on supersingular curves of composite exten-
sion degree is viable at relatively high security levels. Estibals states that a characteristic
2 implementation may provide even more attractive results due to the binary nature of
hardware. Since only one multiplier is used, the architecture may also become even more
attractive at higher security levels as one would expect that an extra multiplier could be
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efficiently utilised to maintain a practical computation time.
In 2011, Beuchat et al. [155] discussed the fast computation of characteristic 2 and 3
elliptic curve ηT pairings. This is an expansion of the implementation strategy previously
described by Beuchat et al. in [161], which was used to implement a characteristic 3 ηT
pairing in the previous year [153]. A custom, pipelined, Karatsuba multiplier is presented.
The input operands are first split into upper and lower components in the usual manner
and the first stage of a Karatsuba multiplication performed. The more efficient of either
the Karatsuba method or the schoolbook method for polynomial multiplication is used to
perform the next multiplicative stage. This process continues until a full result is returned.
Registers can be inserted between stages and the depth of the pipeline adjusted according
to the complexity of the operations to be performed. The most efficient configuration
for the computation of a characteristic 3 ηT pairing is that with seven pipeline stages.
The characteristic 3 ηT processor also contains multiplexers, registers and combinatorial
logic to handle the irregular datapath to and from the multiplier. On each iteration of
the Miller loop, the sparse F36m multiplication and the computation of the coefficients
for the sparse multiplication of the next iteration are computed in parallel. A scheduling
system that begins an F3m multiplication at each clock cycle is used. The characteristic
2 ηT pairing processor contains an F24m multiplier with five pipeline stages. It has a
different configuration of multiplexers, registers and combinatorial logic to deal with the
irregular datapath. A supplementary processor, presented by Beuchat et al. in [161], is
used to perform the final exponentiation of each pairing. This processor has a very similar
architecture to the flexible processor of Chapter 6. A 97-bit secure characteristic 3 ηT
pairing, computed on E(F3239), is implemented on a Xilinx Virtex-4 and returns a result
in 11.5 µs. The processor has a footprint of 66,631 slices. A 96-bit secure characteristic
2 ηT pairing, computed on E(F2557), is performed in 13.2 µs and occupies 55,156 slices.
This publication is a culmination of the small characteristic design efforts that Beuchat
et al. had presented in the years previous to 2012 (as already discussed in this section).
Their work is an excellent resource if familiarisation with optimisation techniques and
architectural strategies for the hardware implementation of small characteristic pairings
is desired.
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In 2011, Ghosh et al. [156] discussed the implementation of a 128-bit secure ηT pairing.
Computation is performed on the elliptic curve E(F21223). An efficient unit for 1223-bit
multiplication forms the basis for the ηT processor. An F21223 multiplication is first de-
composed into three 612-bit multiplications using the Karatsuba method. Each 612-bit
multiplication is further decomposed into three 306-bit multiplications. A module that
performs 306-bit Karatsuba multiplication in only one clock cycle by continuously decom-
posing the 306-bit operands is discussed. The nine 306-bit multiplications that are required
for 1223-bit multiplication are performed serially and the results recombined using com-
binatorial logic. The 306-bit multiplication module and its associated recomposition logic
is embedded in a 1223-bit multiplication unit containing shift registers and multipexers.
This unit is carefully designed so that input operands are immediately available to the
multiplier when required. A full 1223-bit multiplication is returned in 10 clock cycles.
The adopted strategy is very similar to that utilised to perform F212m multiplication in
the genus 2 processor of Chapter 5. In that case, the F212m multiplication was first de-
composed into three F26m multiplications. An F26m multiplication architecture containing
three degree 2 Karatsuba multipliers, each returning a multiplication result in m/D clock
cycles, was then created. The architecture of Chapter 5 requires m/D + 8 clock cycles
to return an F212m multiplication result (if fully parallel F2m multipliers were used, this
could be reduced to nine clock cycles). The shift register strategy used by Ghosh et al.
could be useful in that context although implementation may be more difficult due to its
dual mode nature (it must also perform the cmul(α, β) routine of Algorithm 10). Ghosh
et al. describe an ηT processor that is tailored to the efficient utilisation of the 1223-bit
multiplication unit. There is a common datapath for the computation of the non-reduced
ηT pairing and for the final exponentiation. A system of registers, multiplexers and F2m
combinatorial logic units provide the 1223-bit multiplication unit with the required inputs.
Control circuitry is used to select between operands for Miller computation and exponen-
tiation. Each iteration of the Miller loop is performed in two steps: the evaluation of the
intermediate function and accumulation by sparse F24m multiplication. The former com-
putation requires only 12 clock cycles, while the latter requires 61 clock cycles. An efficient
method for performing the final exponentiation is also discussed. This requires a total of
98 multiplications on F21223 and some combinatorial operations. The processor is created
in an exemplary fashion: Ghosh et al. endeavour not to waste even the smallest number
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of clock cycles, in particular during the Miller loop. This is reflected by very fast compu-
tation times. A 128-bit secure implementation on a Virtex-4 FPGA requires 35,458 slices
and returns a reduced ηT pairing in 286 µs. A Virtex-6 implementation requires 15,167
slices and produces a result in 190 µs. Both implementations require approximately the
same number of clock cycles: 47,500 in the former case and 48,048 in the latter case. The
difference in computation time can be explained by a higher achievable clock frequency on
the Virtex-6 device. The area discrepancy is due to the fact that each slice of a Virtex-6
contains four 6-input LUTs, while a Virtex-4 slice contains only two 4-input LUTs.
In 2012, Aranha et al. [157] presented new techniques for the computation of pairings
on supersingular characteristic 2 genus 2 hyperelliptic curves. The embedding degree of
12 is a significant factor in the ability to perform an efficient 128-bit secure pairing. The
optimal pairing technique of Vercauteren [114] is extended to the computation of the ηT
pairing. Aranha et al. call their technique an optimal ηT pairing computation. Two
Miller evaluations are required to compute their pairing. The first has a loop length of
(m− 1)/2 iterations, whilst the second is of length (m+ 1)/2. This provides a 33% saving
over the original ηT computation, which requires (3m+ 1)/2 iterations of the Miller loop.
Detailed costs associated with the optimal genus 2 ηT pairing computation are provided
in terms of operations on F2m . It would, however, have been helpful if the operations
required for an ηT computation using their field and curve construction were provided. The
pairing is implemented in both software and hardware. A 128-bit optimal ηT computation
using degenerate divisors (on the genus 2 curve C(F2367)) returns a result in 0.98 ms (2.44
MCycles) when implemented on an Intel Core i5. For the purposes of comparison, a
regular ηT result is returned in 2.7 ms (6.86 MCycles). The optimal genus 2 pairing is
also computed using general divisors on a Xilinx Virtex-4 FPGA. The exponentiation
coprocessor of Beuchat et al. [155] is used. A result (using a multiplier digit size of 16)
is returned in 3.52 ms with a corresponding area utilisation of 4,518 slices. The same
architecture was previously used by Estibals [154] to compute a 128-bit secure composite
curve pairing (using a digit size of 14) in only 2.23 ms with a similar area requirement of
4,755 slices. Aranha et al. do, however, claim that computation using degenerate divisors
would provide a 2x to 4x acceleration on the same platform.
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In 2012, Adikhari et al. [158] described a hardware architecture for the characteristic
2 elliptic curve ηT pairing at the 128-bit security level. Computation is performed on
E(F21223), the same curve that Ghosh et al. [156] used in their implementation of the
previous year. Adikhari et al. do not, however, use Karatsuba methods for field multipli-
cation. Instead, they use a Toeplitz Matrix Vector Product (TMVP) approach [83]. An
m×m Toeplitz matrix contains F2 elements sk,i, where i ≥ 0, k ≤ m− 1 and satisfies the
property that sk,i = sk−1,i−1 for i ≥ 1 and k ≤ m − 1. Fan and Hasan [163] show that a
Toeplitz matrix can be used to implement field multiplication faster than the Karatsuba
method while maintaining subquadratic space complexity. The matrix used during regular
matrix-vector polynomial multiplication is not of Toeplitz structure, but a conversion can
be achieved by performing some F2 addition, by rearranging elements and by padding when
necessary. The use of the Toeplitz matrix means that a polynomial multiplication can be
performed by recursively splitting the product matrices and performing them in parallel if
desired. An F2m multiplication can, for example, be performed by computing one TMVP
multiplication of size m, three TMVP multiplications of size m/2, or six TMVP multipli-
cations of size m/3. A multiplication unit that uses a three-way split is first discussed. It
contains a fully parallel 408-bit TMVP multiplier that returns a result in one clock cycle.
The six TMVP multiplications are performed sequentially. A multiplication unit that
utilises two recursions of the two-way split is also discussed. This performs 1224-bit mul-
tiplication by computing nine 306-bit TMVPs sequentially. Both units are implemented
on a Virtex-6 FPGA. The multiplier of Ghosh et al. requires 10 cycles per multiplication
and occupies 30,148 LUTs. The two-way split multiplier returns a result in nine clock
cycles and occupies only 19,721 LUTs. This is clearly a more desirable implementation in
terms of both computational speed and area. The three-way split multiplier produces an
overall result in six clock cycles but requires 33,546 LUTs. The processor of Adikhari et al.
consists of three main blocks: a binary arithmetic unit, an input and squaring unit and a
data handling unit. The first block contains some registers, the F21223 multiplication unit
and F21223 addition and squaring units. The second block contains combinatorial logic for
the squaring and square rooting of points during the Miller loop. It also contains registers
that store the results. The third block contains rewiring circuitry and registers that han-
dle the inputs to the first block and that store the intermediate evaluations during Miller
loop implementation. The final exponentiation is also performed using these blocks. The
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processor is synthesised on a Virtex-6 FPGA and on 65nm CMOS ASIC technology. A
Virtex-6 implementation that uses a two-way split multiplier returns a 128-bit secure ηT
pairing in 148 µs and occupies 13,596 slices. A three-way split implementation computes a
pairing in 102 µs and uses 16,403 slices. The latter implementation is the more attractive
of the two due to its lower AT product. These results are a significant improvement on
those of Ghosh et al., who return a 128-bit secure ηT pairing in 190 µs on a Virtex-6. An
ASIC synthesis using the two-way split multiplier returns a result in 80.64 µs and has a
gate count of 472,777. A three-way split implementation produces a value in 54.62 µs and
has a gate count of 524,286. The TMVP multiplication method does seem to provide an
improvement over the Karatsuba method as Adikhari et al. adopt a similar approach to
Ghosh et al. in designing their processor. Synthesis results on FPGA are, however, highly
optimistic in terms of achievable frequency and area utilisation: the complicated mapping
and place and route steps have not yet been performed. FPGA implementation results or,
at the very least, the post place and route metrics provided by the vendor tool (as used
by Ghosh et al.) are required to verify and reliably quantify the results.
In 2013, Cuevas-Farfa´n et al. [80] discussed the design and implementation of a processor
for characteristic 2 elliptic curve ηT pairing computation. The processor supports on-
the-fly changes in the elliptic curve, the tower field and the distortion map. This is
also the case for the flexible processor of Chapter 6: the ROM sequence can be defined
in terms of these properties and flashed to the FPGA without recompilation. Cuevas-
Farfa´n et al. first define a 16-bit instruction set for F2m arithmetic, loop control and
jumps. The instructions are then sequenced according to the operations required by
the pairing computation. Significant effort may, however, be required to complete the
instruction sequence generation process as an automated system for sequence generation
(as presented in Chapter 6) is not described. Registers are used for storage of F2m values.
An ALU contains units for F2m addition, multiplication, squaring and square rooting.
The controller contains a ROM on which the sequence of operations is stored. Two
computations are implemented on the curve E(F21223), which returns a 128-bit security
level. The first uses the ηT algorithm discussed by Barreto et al. in [63]. Cuevas-Farfa´n
et al. state that the second computation is performed using the curve, the tower field
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representation and the field properties discussed in Chapter 4 of this thesis (and published
in [6]). The final exponentiation is also computed using the operations discussed in that
chapter. An implementation of the algorithms and field constructions of Chapter 4 returns
an ηT pairing in 787 µs and requires 50,968 slices when implemented on a Virtex-4 FPGA.
A Virtex-6 implementation requires 320 µs, with an area utilisation of 16,402 slices. A
fair comparison can be made with the 128-bit secure characteristic 2 elliptic curve ηT
implementations of Ghosh et al. [156] and Adikari et al. [158] as they have similar
area requirements on Virtex-6 devices. These publications were previously discussed in
this section. The processor described by Ghosh et al. computes a pairing in 190 µs and
requires 15,167 slices, whilst the processor of Adikari et al. computes a pairing in 102 µs,
requiring 16,403 slices (although the latter are synthesis results). Both processors contain
large units that are custom built for pairing computation: they do not consist of an
ALU containing distinct units for F2m arithmetic alone. This is a useful demonstration of
the assertion made in Chapter 6 that processors with custom architectures are a better
option for fast pairing computation only when a relatively large implementation footprint
is available. It would be useful to implement the dedicated processors of Chapters 4 and 5
on the more modern Virtex-6 devices at the 128-bit security level. As discussed previously,
it is relatively trivial to scale those processors to higher security levels due to the design
strategies used. A comparison between the dedicated characteristic 2 elliptic and genus
2 processors at the 128-bit security level would, in particular, be very interesting as the
underlying field size increases at a smaller rate in the genus 2 case.
In 2015, Chung et al. [164] discussed the fabrication of an ASIC test chip for computation
of the reduced ηT pairing on E(F397). The algorithm of Beuchat et al. [160], which does
not require cube root computation, is used to compute the ηT pairing. Digit-serial multi-
pliers are employed for field multiplication. The sparse F36m multiplication of the Miller
loop is not performed using either Karatsuba multiplication or Lagrange interpolation. As
discussed in Section 6.3.3, Gorla et al. [104] use the latter method to compute a sparse ex-
tension field multiplication with a cost of 15 multiplications and 90 additions/subtractions
on F3m . Chung et al. state that the use of this method would result in the requirement for
a large adder with multiple inputs and an irregular datapath. Contrary to previous pub-
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lished implementations, they endeavour to reduce the number of combinatorial operations
at the expense of multiplications in order to simplify the datapath of their processor. By
rearranging the formulae, a sparse F36m multiplication is performed in 17 multiplications,
10 cubings and 35 additions, all on F3m . The reduction in the number of required combi-
natorial operations means that the architecture that surrounds their F3m multiplier can be
simplified. Exponentiation is performed using a torus representation [165], the Lagrange
methods of Gorla et al. [104] and Frobenius operations. In total, an exponentiation to
the reduced ηT pairing requires 79 multiplications, 390 cubings and 180 additions, all on
F3m . Chung et al. compare these quantities with those required during the exponenti-
ation to the reduced ηT pairing of Chapter 6 (as published in [11]), which requires 231
multiplications, 304 cubings and 1,321 additions. This is a significant improvement, and it
would be useful to use this method to perform exponentiation on that processor (although
a further exponentiation to the Tate pairing is still required). The pairing accelerator
contains separate coprocessors for the computation of the Miller loop and the final expo-
nentiation. The Miller coprocessor contains an F3m multiplier of digit size 7, a cubing unit
and a 4-input addition unit. A Miller loop iteration is performed in 17 cycles, resulting
in a total count of 17 × (97 + 1)/2 = 833 cycles for ηT computation. Chung et al. aim
to perform the final exponentiation in the same number of cycles. For this reason, the
exponentiation coprocessor contains three digit-serial multipliers of digit size 7, a cubing
unit and an addition unit. The cost of Miller computation and exponentiation is balanced:
the exponentiation of a particular pairing is performed while the Miller loop of the next
pairing is implemented. Timing results are reported by averaging computation times over
a large number of pairing computations. While this is sound practice, this means that
these results cannot be compared to other published implementations in a fair manner as
other results are listed in terms of the time taken by a single Miller loop computation,
serially followed by an exponentiation. This is why the results of Chung et al. are not
included in Table 7.2. Nevertheless, it is useful to list the results. A processor computing
a reduced ηT pairing on E(F397) is fabricated in a 90nm CMOS process. A total of 336,000
gates and two memory blocks of size 0.102mm2 are used. The total chip area is 1.47mm2.
The average power consumption is 78.36 mW at 175 MHz. A pipelined pairing result is
returned in 4.76 µs.
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7.4.2 Hardware Implementation of Pairings on Curves of Prime Char-
acteristic
The most significant literature contributions to the hardware implementation of prime
characteristic pairings are discussed in this subsection. The results returned by these
implementations are listed in Table 7.3. Note that all implementations provide roughly
the same level of security (126-128 bits). Note also that an effort is made to summarise the
most interesting results reported by each publication: the publications themselves should
be examined in order to view all reported results.
Table 7.3: Modern contributions to the computation of pairings in hardware on curves of
prime characteristic. Area is measured in either slices (Sl) or gates (G). The term DSP
refers to the dedicated Digital Signal Processing units available in some modern FPGAs.
Ref. Year Curve Alg. Dev. Area F. Cycles Time
(MHz) (×103) (µs)
[166] 2008 E(F512) BKLS V-II 33857 Sl 135 217.35 1610
[167] 2009 BN-256 Ate ASIC 164000 G 338 7706 22800
aopt 5340 15800
[168] 2009 BN-256 Ate ASIC 183000 G 204 861 4220
r-Ate 594 2910
[79] 2012 BN-256 Ate V-6 4014 Sl+42DSP 210 336.37 1600
aopt 210 245.43 1170
[169] 2012 BN-258 aopt V-6 5237 Sl+64DSP 230 82.34 358
[170] 2013 BN-256 BKLS V-6 23000 Sl 145 173 11930
Ate 120.6 8320
aopt 82.1 5660
[171] 2014 BN-256 aopt ASIC 116000 G 200 608 3040
In 2008, Barenghi et al. [166] discussed the FPGA implementation of the Tate pairing on
a prime field elliptic curve with an embedding degree of 2. The BKLS algorithm is used to
compute the pairing. The final exponentiation is implemented using the Lucas laddering
technique [172] and by exploiting the unitary norm of the non-reduced pairing value. A
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field size of 512 bits is considered, returning 128-bit security. Modular multiplication is
performed using the Montgomery method [173]. Each operand is first converted to the
Montgomery domain through multiplication by 22s+2 mod p, where s is the size of the
field in bits. Multiplication in the Montgomery domain does not require division by the
modulus, which can be a relatively expensive operation. Conversion of the result from
the Montgomery domain is performed through Montgomery multiplication by 1. This
technique is most efficient when the initial and final conversions do not need to be per-
formed before and after each operation. For this reason, the pairing input coordinates are
moved to the Montgomery domain before computation begins and all arithmetic opera-
tions performed there. Multiplication is implemented using the dedicated 18 × 18 ASIC
multipliers that are available on Virtex-II FPGAs. A single hardware component performs
both modular addition and subtraction. Subtraction is performed by converting the sec-
ond operand to a two’s compliment representation. Three carry-look ahead 512-bit adders
perform modular reduction. A software tool has been created to investigate the schedul-
ing of operations through different combinations of the arithmetic units using a Direct
Acyclic Graph (DAG). VHDL is automatically generated when a particular configuration
is selected. A control system employs an FSM. The architecture of the processor is very
similar to that of the flexible processor of Chapter 6. The chosen configuration contains
one addition unit and four multiplication units. Each unit receives two 512-bit inputs from
memory. Tristate buffers are used to select one output result for write. A Virtex-II imple-
mentation requiring 33,857 slices returns a Tate pairing on the curve E(F512) in 1.61 ms.
Since the software and processor architecture are very similar to those of Chapter 6, it
would be very interesting to explore various scheduling options using a DAG in order to
investigate whether a more efficient implementation of the flexible processor can be found.
In 2009, Kammler et al. [167] explored the use of an Application Specific Instruction
Set Processor (ASIP) for pairing computation. Computation is performed on a Reduced
Instruction Set Computing (RISC) core (simulated using a design tool) that is augmented
with a dedicated Fp hardware unit. The core is a 32-bit five stage pipelined system.
While the core itself contains a 32-bit integer multiplier, its use is not convenient due
to the large word widths required by pairing-based applications. A scalable hardware
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Montgomery multiplier consisting of an array of carry save multipliers is instead designed
and included in the Fp unit. The height of the array defines the critical path delay and
is set so that it has the same value as that of the RISC core. The width can be varied
according to performance and area requirements. A modular addition/subtraction unit
of variable width is also included in the Fp hardware unit. All arithmetic operations are
performed in the Montgomery domain. An application specific instruction set containing
Fp instructions is employed. Operations on extension fields are converted to sequences of
these instructions using software, a similar approach to that used in Chapter 6. A hardware
Memory Access Unit (MAU) is used to facilitate high data throughput throughout the
system. This unit extends the number of ports that can be used to access the RISC core
and organises storage into distinct blocks from which values can be accessed in parallel.
Various configurations of the system are synthesised using a 130 nm CMOS standard cell
library. Ate, optimal Ate and ηT pairings are computed at the 128-bit security level.
Results returned by various multiplication array sizes, addition/subtraction widths and
memory sizes are provided. The fastest optimal Ate computation is performed by a 128×8
multiplier and a 32-bit wide modular addition unit. A result is returned in 15.8 ms on a
system with a footprint of 164,000 gates. The strategy employed by Kammler et al. is
attractive for use in embedded systems: a relatively inexpensive microprocessor could be
used for storage and control, while an Fp arithmetic unit can be designed and connected
to accelerate arithmetic operations alone.
In 2009, Fan et al. [168] showed that if particular BN curve parameters are selected then
modular multiplication on Fp can be performed significantly faster than in the general case.
A BN-256 optimal Ate pairing implementation is discussed. On BN curves, the prime p
is characterised by the polynomial p(u) = 36u4 + 36u3 + 24u2 + 6u + 1 (from Equation
(7.1)). A modular multiplication technique is described that exploits the relationship
p(−1)(u) ≡ 1 mod u. The complexity of the required operations is minimised when u is a
pseudo-Marsenne number of form u = 2l + s for any suitable l ∈ Z and for some integer
s that should be minimised. An algorithm is provided that performs fast Fp modular
multiplication when these properties are satisfied. This is implemented using a unit that
they call a Hybrid Montgomery Multiplier (HMM). The HMM contains one 32× 16, four
220
64 × 16 multipliers and units for modular reduction, accumulation and recombination.
The selection of the curve parameters means that multiplication on F256 can be performed
in a total of one 32 × 32, eight 32 × 64 and 16 64 × 64 multiplications are required. A
total of 13 log2(s) × log2(µ) multiplications are also required, where µ is an integer such
that µ < 2k+6 and k is the embedding degree of the curve. The final 13 multiplications
can be performed quickly using shift and add operations when s is small. In comparison,
regular Montgomery multiplication on F256 is much more expensive, requiring 36 64× 64
multiplications. The top level architecture is similar to the flexible processor described
in Chapter 6. It has an ALU containing an adder and the HMM, 64-bit RAM and a
microcontroller that accesses instructions within a ROM. The system is synthesised using
a 130 nm standard cell library. An implementation containing 183,000 gates returns a
BN-256 Ate pairing in 4.22 ms and an r-Ate pairing in 2.91 ms. This is a speed up of
5.4x over the Ate result reported by Kammler et al. [167] in the same year, with an area
increase of only 11.56%. The subset of curves that can be used for pairing computation
using the methods of Fan et al. is, however, very restricted. This may prove problematic
if their attributes are successfully attacked in the future.
In 2012, Fan et al. [79] presented an efficient hardware architecture for the computation
of the Ate and optimal Ate pairings on BN-256 curves with certain properties. The
computation techniques are similar to those previously discussed by Fan et al. in 2009
[168]. Fast modular multiplication is performed when the parameter defining the BN curve
is a pseudo-Mersenne number. In the previous paper, a HMM is described that performs
interleaved multiplication and reduction. In this paper, the multiplication and reduction
steps are separated. A new HMM is presented that performs Fp multiplication on fields
of up to 260 bits in four phases. In Phase 1, one 65 × 32 and four 65 × 65 multipliers
perform polynomial multiplication. A one-round reduction of each of the partial products
is performed in Phase 2. The outputs of this step are always less than 77 bits in size. Phase
3 sees the accumulation of the partial products followed by one polynomial reduction. The
output is a 93-bit polynomial, which is separated and reduced in Phase 4 to return the
final result. The top-level architecture of [168], now containing the new HMM, is reused.
A C++ program schedules the arithmetic operations and converts them to microcode that
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is stored in an instruction ROM. Ate and optimal Ate pairings, defined on suitable 256-
bit BN curves, are computed on a Virtex-6 FPGA. Use is made of the dedicated Digital
Signal Processing (DSP) units available on these FPGAs. A total of 4,014 slices and
42 DSPs are used. 128-bit secure Ate and optimal Ate pairings are returned in 1.6 ms
and 1.17 ms, respectively. This is a dramatic improvement on their previous 183,000 gate
ASIC implementation, which exhibited computation times of 4.22 ms in the former case
and 2.91 ms in the latter case. As is the case with the previous paper, the small number
of curves that are suitable for these methods may prove restrictive.
In 2012, Yao et al. [169] discussed optimal Ate pairing computation using Residue Number
Systems (RNSs). This is a continuation and extension of the work described by Cheung
et al. [174] in the previous year. In an RNS, a set of smaller integers are used to represent
a large integer. An RNS base contains n coprime integer constants, each of which is called
an RNS modulus. Large integer arithmetic can be performed by operating on each of the
moduli in parallel: there are no interdependencies. This facilitates wide scale parallelism.
Modular reduction by the prime p on which the finite field is defined is not performed
in the RNS setting. Instead, Yao et al. employ Montgomery reduction. The number
of required reductions is minimised using the lazy reduction technique [140]. A hardware
processor is presented that can perform optimal Ate pairings on finite field sizes of 260 bits
or less. It contains a micro-coded sequencer and an ALU containing four parallel rowers.
Each rower performs an operation on a particular modulus and contains four 69× 18-bit
signed multipliers and some addition units for reduction and recombination of the results.
Extra addition and accumulation units are also included so that Fp2 operations can be
performed efficiently using the rowers. The processor is implemented on a Xilinx Virtex-6
FPGA containing dedicated DSPs. The 25×18 multipliers within the DSPs are employed.
A total of 64 DSPs are consumed. A processor computing a 126-bit secure optimal Ate
pairing returns a result in 358 µs and occupies 5,237 slices. This is an extremely fast pairing
computation at this security level. This level of acceleration is, in the main, due to the
custom architectures that are designed to efficiently employ the RNS and lazy reduction
techniques. The availability of dedicated DSPs on modern FPGAs also means that the
area requirements of pairing processors can be significantly reduced as the units required
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for multiplication are usually the most expensive in terms of area.
In 2013, Ghosh et al. [170] discussed pairing implementation on a Virtex-6 FPGA. The
vulnerability of the implementation to side channel attacks is considered and some coun-
termeasures discussed. Fp multiplication is performed using a binary double-and-add
algorithm. The result at the end of each iteration of the algorithm is maintained below
the number of bits in p so that a final division can be avoided. The logic blocks of Virtex-6
FPGAs are organised into individual rows of 16 slices (or 32 LUTs) that are connected
by a Fast Carry Chain (FCC). This means that two 32-bit operands can be added ex-
tremely quickly. An addition module that performs fast 256-bit addition using these carry
chains is described. A unified arithmetic unit for addition, multiplication and subtraction
is presented. The unit contains three of the 256-bit addition modules and a module for
Fp doubling (performed with some simple rewiring). Several smaller units are included to
control data flow and storage. The Montgomery ladder technique [175] is used to compute
the double-and-add Blakley algorithm for modular multiplication [176]. A result is re-
turned by the arithmetic unit in 256 clock cycles. A custom Configurable Arithmetic Unit
(CAU) architecture is discussed. Each CAU contains three unified arithmetic units. A
CAU has two modes: it can be used to perform three parallel, independent, Fp arithmetic
operations or a single multiplication on Fp2 . Two CAUs, operating in parallel, are utilised.
A dedicated unit handles the complex data access requirements introduced by the parallel
use of the CAUs. A processor computing 128-bit Tate (using the BKLS algorithm), Ate
and optimal Ate pairings is implemented and occupies 23,000 slices on a Virtex-6 FPGA.
Results are returned in 11.93 ms, 8.32 ms and 5.66 ms, respectively. DPA attacks on the
implementation are also considered. The attack model involves an adversary collecting a
set of random public points and analysing power traces in order to retrieve details about
the Hamming weight of the intermediate data. Very small power variations can be used
to retrieve the values of particular bits during iteration. Ghosh et al. successfully mount
this attack on the FPGA. To counter this attack, they suggest that operations that are
performed on both public and private information at the same time should be removed.
Such operations are performed during computation of the line functions of Miller’s algo-
rithm but can be modified to counter the attack. This does, however, result in a significant
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increase in computation time. Using the countermeasure, pairings are returned in 182 ms,
108 ms and 32 ms for the Tate, Ate and optimal Ate pairings, respectively. Results are
not returned as quickly as the processors described by Fan et al. in [168] and [79]. This
implementation is, however, not restricted to a subset of BN curves. The architecture of
[169] utilises the DSPs that are available on Virtex-6 FPGAs and returns a pairing in a
much faster 358 µs. It would be interesting to investigate whether the use of DSPs could
improve the results returned by Ghosh et al.
In 2014, Chang et al. [171] discussed the energy-efficient hardware implementation of prime
characteristic pairings on BN curves. The top level architecture of their system is similar
to that of a general purpose sequential processor. It contains a data cache, an instruction
cache, an ALU for prime field computation, a control system and a decoder. While
some other publications discussed in this chapter use scheduling techniques to accelerate
pairing computation, Chang et al. concentrate on maximising resource utilisation. The
ALU contains Arithmetic Units (AUs) that can perform only addition and subtraction,
These are called AAUs. It also contains full AUs, or FAUs, that can perform addition,
subtraction and Montgomery multiplication. The AUs are connected using a register
file. During each computation cycle, an idle AU searches for an instruction for which
the input operands are available. If there is enough space in working memory, the AU
will perform this operation. A more stringent limit is placed on the memory available to
the AAUs in comparison to the FAUs so that multiplicative operations will have higher
priority when they can be performed. A scheduler and compiler are used to generate an
optimised schedule for each of the AUs and to ensure that memory units are efficiently
employed. Through simulation, Chang et al. find that the use of one FAU and two
AAUs delivers the most desirable performance. The pairing processor is hand-coded in
the Verilog language and synthesised on a TSMC 90nm technology. A version that is not
hand-coded is implemented at 130nm. A 200 MHz, 128-bit BN curve optimal Ate pairing
is returned by the 90nm implementation in 3.04 ms. A total of 116,000 gates are required.
Chang et al. define their energy metric in terms of an Area×Time×Cycle (ATC) product.
A value of 353.6 is reported. The 130nm implementation returns a result in 5.88 ms, has a
footprint of 166,000 gates and has an ATC product of 976.2. The only direct comparison
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that can be made is to that of the 130nm results published by Kammler et al. in 2009
[167]. They return an optimal Ate pairing in 15.8 ms on a 338 MHz implementation that
has a footprint of 164,000 gates. This results in an ATC product of 2591.2.
7.5 Modern Applications of Pairings
In the last number of years, several interesting cryptographic schemes and applications
that rely on bilinear pairings have been proposed. Some of these applications and the
computation of pairings on devices that are suitable for their implementation are discussed
in this section.
7.5.1 Attribute-Based Encryption
The use of bilinear pairings in Attribute-Based Encryption (ABE) has garnered much
interest in recent times. In ABE, a user of a system must possess one or more attributes to
be a member of a network and to gain access to particular information within that network.
Cryptography based on ABE is a natural fit for securing confidential information in the
medical field [177], [178]. A patient’s medical information can, for example, be encrypted
so that it can only be accessed by health care professionals that have certain attributes.
The access policy is specified using a Boolean formula. For example, the policy for access
to Patient A’s medical records while staying in Hospital H for a surgical operation may
be defined by:
((employed by H) AND (surgeon OR anaesthesiologist)) OR (Patient A’s general practitioner)
In 2015, Zavattoni et al. [179] published a detailed description of ABE and its associated
computational costs. The techniques used to perform point scalar multiplication, expo-
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nentiation and pairing computation are first discussed. When the point to be multiplied,
P , is not known in advance, the Non-Adjacent Form (NAF) windowing method of [23]
is used in conjunction with the methods that Gallant et al. [180] describe to accelerate
scalar multiplication on BN curves. Consider the scalar multiplication [n]P , where n is
some random integer. Let A be the cost of a point addition and D be the cost of a point
doubling. Then unknown point scalar multiplication is performed at a cost of l2D+
l
w+1A,
where w is the NAF window size and l is of size that is at most one bit larger than the
bit size of n.
In ABE, an input argument for a scalar multiplication or a pairing is often known in
advance. This is the case when, for example, a particular point is defined at system set up
and rarely changes throughout the operating life of the system. If the point P is known in
advance, a scalar multiplication by a random integer n can be performed using the comb
method [23], which relies heavily on precomputation. This has a relatively large storage
requirement of 2w points but the cost of known point scalar multiplication is d(A + D),
where d = l/w. This is a much lower cost in comparison to the unknown point scalar
multiplication operation.
When pairing computation must be performed and the input arguments are not known in
advance, the optimal Ate pairing computation methods described by Aranha et al. [140]
are used. A Miller loop is computed at a cost of 6785mE + 3022rE , where mE is the cost
of an integer multiplication of two 256-bit integers and rE is the cost of the Montgomery
reduction from the 512-bit result to a 256-bit integer. The final exponentiation costs
3526mE + 1932rE . When one of the inputs to the pairing is known in advance, then
computation time can be reduced by precomputing the line functions and storing their
values prior to pairing computation [181]. Clearly, this is expensive in terms of storage.
When a product of pairings is required, the number of pairing computations can be reduced
at the expense of more scalar multiplications by grouping pairing input arguments. The
techniques of [182] and [130] can also be used to share the accumulating function and
the final exponentiation step. Encryption and decryption require a combination of these
operations.
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Zavattoni et al. implement ABE on an Intel Core i7. For a six attribute implementation,
encryption requires 2.38 MCycles, key generation requires 652 Kcycles, while decryption
requires 4.61 MCycles. Interestingly, the number of cycles required by the pairing opera-
tions is only 57.3% of the overall cost due to the techniques used to reduce the complexity
of pairing computation. This publication provides an excellent overview of ABE and its
associated operations.
7.5.2 Mobile Devices
Until relatively recently, the use of pairing-based cryptography on mobile devices has not
received much attention in the literature as limited processing power rendered implemen-
tation impractical. In 2011, however, De Caro and Iovino [183] presented a compact Java
library, which they call jPBC, computing the operations required by PBC. The library
is a port of the PBC library, written in C, presented by Lynn [64] and publically avail-
able at [184]. Since Java is widely used in the mobile community, jPBC can be installed
on smartphones that use the Android operating system with minimal effort. The jPBC
library supports the six curves available in Lynn’s PBC library. The properties of these
curves, called types A to G, are discussed by Galbraith et al. in [185]. The jPBC library
has a hierarchy of access interfaces, at the top of which is a pairing interface that selects
the pairing to be performed according to the curve that has been selected. In a similar
fashion to PBC and the C++ Miracl library [77], jPBC also has interfaces for various fields
and associated arithmetic on their members. Preprocessing of exponentiation and pairing
operations is performed in jPBC to compensate for the reduction in speed brought about
by the use of Java instead C. This is sometimes possible when operations are performed
on a particular point that does not change after system setup. De Caro and Iovino report
results for a pairing computed on a type A supersingular curve of form y2 = x3 + ax,
where a ∈ Fq. This curve has an embedding degree of 2. A field size of 512 bits is
used. The library is implemented on a Samsung 19000 Galaxy S and on a HTC Desire
HD A9191 smartphone. Both implementations return similar results. On the Samsung
Galaxy, a pairing is returned in 516.6 ms without preprocessing. The preprocessing tech-
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niques provide significant speed up, with a pairing result returned in 253.9 ms. De Caro
and Iovino also show how the library can be used to perform the BLS signature scheme
[186], although no timing results are provided. The creation of a version of the library
that accesses assembly to perform the required operations may, perhaps, provide further
acceleration of the required operations. The jPBC library is publically available at [187].
In 2015, Malina et al. [188] investigated the use of pairing-based cryptography on mobile
phones running the Android operating system. Several optimisations for the implemen-
tation of PBC schemes are discussed. The pairing-based and modular arithmetic opera-
tions are performed using jPBC and the Java Math.BigInteger library. The BBS04 short
signature scheme [189] is implemented. Malina et al. discuss how this scheme can be
performed efficiently in this setting. Pairing precomputation is employed when a pair-
ing must be performed on inputs that do not change after system setup. Bilinearity is
used to reduce the number of pairing computations required when pairings are multiplied.
The product (e(P,Q)T ).(e(P, S)W ) is, for example, computed according to e(P,QT .SW ).
The signature stage requires three pairing computations as precomputation and use of
the bilinearity property are not applicable. The number of pairing computations required
during the verification stage is, however, reduced from five to one. Batch verification [190]
can also be used to reduce the number of required pairing computations. It is possible to
combine a set of verification equations, to perform point exponentiation instead of pairing
exponentiation and to group pairings that must be performed on the same point(s) when
batch verification is utilised. Pairing computation is performed on a type D curve with
an order of 175-bits and an embedding degree of 6. The Java library is implemented on
the Samsung Nexus i9250 and the LG Nexus 5 mobile devices. Without the optimisation
techniques, a BBS04 signature is performed in 10.23 ms on the Nexus 5. The use of the
techniques reduces the time to 2 ms. Essentially, this means that the use of BBS04 for
signing is a practical proposition. However, even if 10 signatures are batch verified, the
average time per verification is 14.275 ms. Malina et al. state that verification should,
therefore, only be implemented in applications where time is not a critical issue.
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7.5.3 Wireless Sensor Networks
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) have a large range of applications. Their use in bat-
tlefield, agricultural and industrial settings is continuously attracting interest. A WSN
is an ad hoc network containing (many) devices, called sensor nodes, that monitor and
periodically send information about the area in which they are embedded to other devices
or to one or more base stations within their range in a territory of interest. This sys-
tem can provide a much more comprehensive record of the territory than the use of one,
usually more expensive and complicated, sensor could. Since a large quantity of nodes is
often required, their cost is of primary concern. For this reason, microprocessors are an
ideal candidate for use in WSN nodes. The nodes may also be embedded in inhospitable
environments: once entrenched, a sensor may be very difficult to retrieve. For this reason,
minimisation of the energy dissipated by the nodes is also of concern as it may not be
possible to change a power source after deployment. The literature results for pairing
implementation in the context of WSNs are listed in Table 7.4.
Table 7.4: Notable modern contributions to the implementation of pairings in the context
of wireless sensor networks.
Ref. Year Sec. Curve Alg. Device F. Cycles Time
(Bits) (MHz) (×106) (ms)
[191] 2011 72 E(F2271) ηT Atmel ATMega128 7.4 14.06 1900
TI MSP430 8 10.4 1270
Intel XScale 13 1.81 140
[192] 2011 72 E(F2283) ηT ASIC - 0.574mm2 200 0.14 0.70
[193] 2012 128 BN-254 aopt TI MSP430 8 79.44 9930
TI MSP430X 67.68 8460
TI PSP430X+GTY 47.76 5970
[194] 2014 128 BN-256 aopt Cort-M0+ 48 47664 993
+ MAC 17952 374
+ h/w 7776 162
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In 2011, Oliveira et al. [191] discussed the use of pairings in wireless sensor networks. In
WSNs, authentication and secure key distribution is particularly difficult as the nodes do
not have the ability to store a large number of keys. An Identity-Based Non-Interactive
Key Distribution Scheme (ID-NIKDS), described by Sakai et al. in [27], can provide a
solution to this problem. In such a scheme, a secret key can be established between two
nodes using their public identities alone: they do not need to communicate with each
other. A secure information exchange can then proceed using a traditional symmetric key
scheme such as AES. As with most other ID-based schemes, each node is provided with
a unique secret key before deployment. The unique keys are generated from one master
key by a trusted authority. Pairing computation is by far the most costly operation in
ID-NIKDS schemes. Oliveira et al. discuss the implementation of pairings on 8-, 16-
and 32-bit RISC processors that are commonly used in sensor networks. The exploration
of finite field implementation using small instruction sets, low memory availability and
a limited number of lookup tables is very interesting. A characteristic 2 ηT pairing is
performed on E(F2271), which provides a 72-bit security level. Results are returned in
1.9 s, 1.27 s and 0.14 s on the 8-, 16- and 32-bit processors, respectively.
In the same year, McCusker and O’Connor [192] presented an IBE system for secure key
distribution and access control in a WSN. A technique is also proposed that reduces the
vulnerability of the system to node capturing. The system employs (ID-NIKDS) [27] and
the Identity-Based Signature (IBS) scheme described by Barreto et al. in [195]. Prior to
deployment, the necessary system parameters and private keys are stored on the sensor
nodes by the Key Generation Centre (KGC). Immediately after deployment, pairs of
neighbouring nodes establish a key. Each device then transmits a small signed message to
all nodes within radio range. A device that can generate a valid signature is allowed to
join the network. Each node then keeps a record of authenticated devices within its own
radio range. If a node is to be added, the KGC broadcasts the identity of the new device
along with a time-stamped signature. The nodes await a small signed message from the
new node and add it to the network if correct. Node removal is performed in a similar
manner. McCusker and O’Connor describe their system in terms of an environmental
monitoring application in which the nodes are static but information is extracted by a
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mobile entity such as a trusted employee carrying a laptop or tablet device. When a reading
is required, a request is relayed between the nodes until the desired device is reached.
Information is then sent back from node to node using AES. Focus is placed on device
area utilisation and energy usage. A Tate pairing using the Duursma and Lee method,
performed on the supersingular elliptic curve E(F2283), is used to explore the viability of the
scheme. An implementation, performed on a 32-bit RISC ARM920T processor, computes
a pairing in 177.1 ms. Symmetric key generation and signature verification require two
Tate pairing computations, an exponentiation and a scalar multiplication. A total of
35.4 mJ and 444.5 ms are required to implement the scheme at 140 MHz. These values
are too high for practical use. McCusker and O’Connor discuss the augmentation of the
system with a hardware unit. Pairing computation is outsourced to this unit. The top level
architecture contains an FSM, an ALU and some registers. An F2m bit-serial multiplier, a
squaring module and a square rooting module are used to perform all necessary operations.
The ALU also contains registers, multiplexers and combinatorial logic that control the
datapaths through which extension field multiplication and inversion are performed. The
hardware unit is interfaced to the ARM device using the Advanced Peripheral Bus (APB)
scheme. A synchroniser is used to manage the two clock domains. The hardware processor
is synthesised on a 65 nm CMOS technology. The ASIC computes a pairing in 698.11 µs,
uses 29.6 µJ per computation and has a footprint of 0.574mm2. However, even with the
significant reduction in pairing computation time, McCusker and O’Connor state that the
scheme is not suited to use in WSNs as a total of 7.26 mJ and 91.7 ms are required to
operate the scheme. They hypothesise that significant improvements could be attained if
elliptic curve scalar multiplication and exponentiation were also accelerated in hardware. A
resultant energy consumption of 80 µJ and a scheme operation time of 1.75 ms is predicted.
If this were the case, it is claimed that this system would be appropriate for WSN use.
In 2012, Gouveˆa et al [193] discussed the computation of several curve and pairing-based
cryptographic protocols on platforms that are suited to WSN applications. Implemen-
tation is performed on three 16-bit TI microcontrollers from the MSP430 family. The
first microcontroller, simply called the MSP430, has 12 general-purpose registers and an
instruction set for addition, subtraction and 1-bit shifts. Integer multiplication is per-
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formed using a peripheral hardware multiplier that can be used on all microcontrollers
in the family. The next device is the MSP430X that, in addition to the features of the
MSP430, has an instruction set that enables multiple register read and writes and 4-bit
shifts using a single instruction each. It also has an address space that is extended to 20
bits, has more memory and has faster data-memory transfer. The third implementation is
performed on an MSP430X device that features a dedicated 32 × 32 bit hardware multi-
plier (called an MPY). A 256-bit BN curve optimal Ate pairing computation is performed
on each of the devices. A result is returned in 9.93 s, 8.46 s and 5.97 s on the MSP430, the
MSP430X and the MSP430X+MPY32 devices, respectively. The ID-KDNS [27] scheme
is implemented on each of the microcontrollers. It should be noted that the use of the
IBS scheme for node authentication as suggested by McCusker and O’Connor [192] is not
employed and so only one pairing computation must be performed by each node. On
the MSP430X+MPY32 implementation, a key agreement can be reached in a runtime of
6.13 s on one node and 7.12 s on the other. Note that the slight increase in computation
time in comparison to the pairing is due to relatively inexpensive hashing functions and
other similar operations. Keeping in mind that this is a 128-bit implementation, this is
an excellent result that demonstrates that pairings returning high security levels can be
implemented in a reasonable time on very small devices.
In 2014, Unterluggauer and Wenger [194] discussed the computation of pairings on an
ARM microprocessor augmented with hardware peripherals. Three implementations,
small enough for use in embedded systems, are presented. Arithmetic is performed using
the techniques of Beuchat et al. [116] while pairings are computed using the explicit for-
mulae of Costello et al. [150]. The inversion trick discussed by Aranha et al. [140], the
Fp2 lazy reduction technique described by Beuchet et al. [116] and a variant of the fast
exponentiation technique discussed by Fuentes-Castan˜eda et al. [196] are also employed.
To counter side channel attacks, all implementations have data-independent runtime, use
randomised projective coordinates, and perform intermediate point verifications. The
first implementation is performed on a processor that is functionally equivalent to the
32-bit Cortex-M0+ microprocessor. This ARM processor has a very low area footprint (a
minimum of 12KGates) and was designed with energy efficiency in mind. This makes it
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extremely suitable for embedded applications. The Cortex-M0+ contains a 32× 32→ 32
multiplier. Since the operands are small relative to the applicable field sizes, multiplication
and reduction would take a relatively large amount of time if this multiplier were used
alone. The second implementation utilises the same processor with an extra multiply-and-
accumulate (MAC) extension module. The use of this module means that the result of
a 32 × 32 → 64 bit multiplication can be stored in three accumulation registers in one
cycle. The third implementation consists of the original microprocessor architecture and a
hardware unit for accelerated field addition, subtraction and Montgomery multiplication.
The hardware unit is synthesised on a low-leakage 130 nm UMC technology. Optimal
Ate pairings are computed at the 128-bit security level. Power and timing information
is collected from the three implementations at a clock frequency of 48 MHz in each case.
The basic microprocessor implementation requires 53,700 gates, consumes 5.8 mW and
computes a pairing in 993 ms. The MAC extension increases the total area to 58,800 gates
and the power to 7.33 mW but reduces the runtime to 374 ms. The implementation that
includes the hardware accelerator requires 57,700 gates and consumes 9.96 mW. It does,
however, decrease the runtime to 162 ms. Energy consumption is a major consideration for
embedded systems. The implementations require 5.76 mJ, 2.74 mJ and 1.61 mJ per pairing
computation, respectively. These are the lowest energy values that have been published
to date. It should also be noted that the area count of each of the implementations is very
low in comparison to most other implementations that have been discussed.
7.6 Future Directions
As seen in this chapter, the software and hardware implementation of pairings attracts
much attention in the modern literature. This is the case due to the continuous suggestion
of new, efficient, techniques for pairing computation and due to improvements in the
processing power and architectural features of hardware and software platforms. It is
highly probable that further optimisations will become available, at least into the near
future, as PBC is a highly vibrant area in which novel applications are continuously
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proposed. This will provide the software and hardware designer with much challenging
work in the years to come.
Many applications of pairings require computation in environments in which it may be
difficult to access or retrieve a device once deployed. As a result, power consumption may
be of primary concern. The careful design of a dedicated hardware processor that targets
the implementation of cryptographic schemes that are suitable for such environments may
prove beneficial. It may be useful to create a software system similar to that of Chap-
ter 6 (in which area/time trade-offs are explored) to examine trade-offs between power
consumption and computation time on various devices and architectures. As seen in the
previous section, the use of PBC in WSNs is attractive due to the power savings that are
provided by identity-based schemes. In 2015, Chen et al. [197] used PBC as a basis to
propose a dynamic key management and authentication system for WSNs. The dynamic
key management capabilities are used to update session keys when required. Pairings are
used to enable the mutual authentication of nodes. Interestingly, the Global Position-
ing System (GPS) is used to define the most efficient route for information transmission
through the network and can be used to intelligently group sensor nodes into clusters that
can be arranged hierarchically. This is an excellent example of a very interesting and
powerful use of pairings and an investigation into the efficient implementation of such a
system may prove worthwhile.
Attribute-based encryption is a continuously evolving area. Many applications of ABE
have yet to be explored. The use of ABE in a WSN setting may be an interesting area
of research. It may be possible to utilise ABE in order to facilitate access control in
different geographical areas or territories. Access to sensing data can also be controlled
if, for example, a particular node is used to sense more than one parameter. This may be
of particular interest as nodes are often placed in insecure locations. Access can also be
readily modified if the location of a node, or nodes, must be changed.
As seen in the previous section, Zavattoni et al. [179] show that the cost of pairing
computation in their ABE implementation is only 57.3% of the overall total. It would
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be interesting to investigate whether a dedicated hardware architecture could be designed
that computes known and unknown point scalar multiplication, known and unknown pair-
ing computation and the products of pairings in an efficient manner. These computations
can be performed by similar arithmetic units in many cases. By combining and schedul-
ing the operations in an intelligent fashion and exploring various design strategies, an
ABE processor with a very high resource utilisation could be created. It may, therefore,
be possible to design a very area-efficient ABE processor that performs encryption and
decryption relatively quickly.
The practical implementation of PBC on highly constrained devices such as smart and SIM
cards may open a very large area for research as pairing-based schemes that were, in most
cases, originally only suitable for implementation on larger processors, could be employed
in an end-to-end fashion. In 2014, Chung et al. [198] discussed the implementation
of pairings on USB tokens. They demonstrated that PBC can be used in a practical
fashion at the 128-bit security level. Much work is, however, required on the efficient
implementation of pairings on highly-constrained devices before the widespread adoption
of PBC will become attractive. This is an area in which much further work is required.
There have been relatively few investigations into the implementation of pairings on mod-
ern smartphones and tablets. Many of these devices have relatively powerful one core, or
multi core, processors that are supplemented with fast memory access, efficient compu-
tation pipelines, wide data bandwidth and other appealing attributes. Such devices may
be exceptional candidates for pairing computation due to the multitude of such features.
Multi core implementation may, for example, mean that arithmetic on sub fields and their
extensions can be performed in parallel. If two pairing computations are required, opera-
tions can also be shared across cores. An instruction-level simulation on an architecture
that is very similar to modern smartphones may be useful as a proof of concept.
An investigation into the development of a pairing-based system on devices produced by
Apple, Inc. may prove very beneficial. The open source Swift programming language [199],
released in 2014, can be used for application development. This language is constructed
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on top of C and Objective-C code and provides support for the operations performed by
these languages. Importantly, object-oriented functionality is also available. The open
source LLVM compiler [200] can be used to convert Swift code into optimised native
instructions on Apple devices that are built on the OS X and iOS operating systems. The
open source nature of the language means that it can be ported to the web successfully.
A good example of this is the IBM, Inc. Kitura web-based framework [201]. This is also
open source and reduces the effort required to develop end-to-end solutions in modern
mobile and internet environments. The development of a mobile phone application using
Swift, in conjunction with a web framework, for secure communication using pairing-based
cryptography could be very valuable.
In 2015, Jacobsen et al. [202] discussed the use of identity-based cryptography in home
area networks. The rapid growth of the Internet of Things means that there is a constant
need for new ways to secure devices that are connected wirelessly. These devices often
have a very low energy capacity. This is an area of interest for pairing-based cryptography
as non-interactive key distribution could provide significant savings in power consumption.
The outsourcing of computation to cloud servers is a rapidly expanding research area. In
2015, Chen et al. [203] proposed an algorithm for the secure outsourcing of point mul-
tiplication, exponentiation and pairing computation to an untrusted cloud server. They
demonstrate that secure identity-based encryption and signature schemes can be imple-
mented using their algorithm. It would be interesting to investigate whether some out-
sourcing could be used to make schemes that rely on pairings feasible on devices that have
a very small area or stringent energy requirements.
7.7 Conclusions
The current state of the art of pairing-based cryptography has been presented in this
chapter. Modern pairing computation techniques have been discussed. Computational
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and side channel attacks on cryptographic systems have also been outlined. Notable soft-
ware and hardware implementations of the Tate, ηT , Ate and optimal Ate pairings have
been described. Although the processors presented in this thesis perform small character-
istic pairings, this does not diminish the contributions of this work. A significant influence
can be seen in much of the literature since 2008. Tower fields are carefully defined with
an efficient hardware implementation in mind. A variety of systems have been designed
in such a fashion that arithmetic operations required on different iterations of the loop
can be performed in parallel. Algorithms for pairing computation on BN curves are struc-
turally similar to those of the ηT pairing: they mainly comprise an expensive Miller loop
that performs many finite field operations. This means that many of the design strategies
discussed in this thesis can still be used. In much of the literature, the sparse nature of
extension field variables has been exploited to reduce the number of subfield operations
that are required to perform arithmetic. At the time of publication, the flexible proces-
sor of Chapter 6 was among the first implementations to demonstrate that pairing-based
cryptography is viable in environments in which area is very restricted. Several subse-
quent implementations have used similar architectures for pairing computation. Software
systems that reduce the effort required for the prototyping of pairing processors have been
used in conjunction with those systems in a similar fashion. These systems often utilise
automatic VHDL conversion and rapid instruction sequence generation techniques.
As a suggested modern application for the work discussed in this thesis, consider an ap-
plication in which a set of sensing units must be embedded in a very large habitat that
consists of several inhospitable territories in which bandwidth is very limited. Once de-
ployed, it may be difficult to retrieve the sensors. Before deployment, the sensing units are
grouped by territory. Each group is associated with one base station device that commu-
nicates with and receives information from its designated nodes. A central server retrieves
the collected data from each of the base stations at intervals. Before deployment, the
sensors and base stations are allocated the keys and system parameters that are required
for secure field communication. In this example, the sensor nodes should be inexpensive
and compute a low-energy pairing due to retrieval difficulties. An architecture similar to
the processor of Chapter 6, configured with a small number of low-digit multipliers and
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implemented on a low cost FPGA, would be ideal in this case. Computation speed is
more of a consideration on the base station device as it must communicate with each of
its designated sensors and send data to the central server. The base station must also be
provided with more power. A suitable, most likely larger, configuration can be chosen and
implemented on an FPGA (cost may be less of a consideration as only one base station
is required in each territory). The software design system can be used to explore suitable
implementations for the sensors and stations before deployment. The server itself may
comprise an even larger flexible processor. If more speed is required, then a high through-
put architecture similar to those presented in Chapters 4 and 5 can be used to quickly
and securely collect data from the base stations within every territory of the habitat.
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Chapter 8
Conclusions
The thesis is summarised in this section. The contributions of the research are also dis-
cussed.
In Chapter 2, the cryptographic use of elliptic and genus 2 hyperelliptic curves is discussed.
The theory of groups, rings and finite fields is outlined. The mathematics necessary for an
understanding of elliptic and genus 2 hyperelliptic curve cryptography is then explained.
Curve and divisor theory is discussed. The operations necessary to perform scalar mul-
tiplication on these curves are also described. Attacks on the DLP, the ECDLP and the
HCDLP are discussed, along with the measures that should be used to prevent them.
Finally, the benefits of hyperelliptic curve cryptography are outlined.
In Chapter 3, the Tate and ηT pairings are introduced. The optimisations available in the
literature, leading to the definition of the ηT pairing, are discussed. The Tate pairing can
be performed efficiently by computing an ηT pairing, followed by a well-defined exponen-
tiation. Security considerations for the use of pairings in cryptography are also presented.
The Boneh-Franklin IBE scheme is outlined.
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The motivation for the methodology used in this thesis is also discussed in Chapter 3. The
relatively low cost and reconfigurability of FPGAs means that they are an ideal platform
on which to implement the processors discussed in this thesis. Three processors have been
created during this work. Each must be defined using detailed low level RTL VHDL. The
tools used to synthesise, place and route the processors are resource intensive. Verifica-
tion and benchmarking are also time-consuming due to the complexity of the operations
involved. A software system has been designed to address these issues. The software is
written using object-oriented C++. Classes for software pairing computation, RTL VHDL
generation, efficiency analysis, automatic implementation, rapid benchmarking and robust
verification have been created. A program for the automatic generation of instruction sets
according to user-defined algorithms has also been written. This program can be used
in conjunction with the flexible processor of Chapter 6 to implement any algorithm that
relies on finite field operations.
In Chapter 4, a hardware processor for Tate pairing computation on a characteristic 2
elliptic curve is presented. The algorithms and operations required for pairing computation
on such a curve are provided. The computation and implementation of arithmetic on F2m
and F24m is discussed. A generic algorithm for F24m inversion requires many F2m operations
and some conditional statements that can complicate a hardware control system. In
this work, the sparse nature of the irreducible polynomial defining F24m is exploited to
dramatically reduce the number of required operations. Inversion can be performed by
grouping computations into three fixed steps. A total of 33 F2m multiplications, four
squarings, 16 additions and one inversion are necessary. The multiplications are efficiently
scheduled through three multipliers. An F24m inversion result is returned in 13(m/D)
clock cycles if 3(m/D) > 2m or in 10(m/D) + 2m cycles otherwise. A hardware unit
implementing this inversion technique was presented at the 3rd International Conference
on Reconfigurable Computing and FPGAs in 2006 [7]. The inverter was then incorporated
into a characteristic 2 Tate pairing processor architecture implementing the Tate pairing
using the BKLS algorithm. This work was published in a special issue of the Computers
& Engineering Journal in 2007 [8].
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Dedicated hardware units for the fast computation of the main stages of the iterative
loop of the characteristic 2 ηT pairing (Algorithm 5) are also presented in Chapter 4. A
precomputation unit calculates and stores all squares and roots in 2m clock cycles. Units
for the computation of u0 and u1, their sparse multiplication, and F24m multiplication
have also been created. The last three units were designed so that operations required
on different iterations of the loop can be performed in parallel with ease, significantly
reducing the number of cycles required for loop completion. A unit that performs the
final exponentiation is also described. The processor that uses these units to compute a
Tate pairing is then presented. It is implemented on a Virtex-II Pro FPGA. Results show
that it can perform a full Tate pairing in a very low number of clock cycles. The custom
processor was presented at the 2006 IEEE Conference on Field Programmable Technology
[6].
In Chapter 5, the hardware implementation of the genus 2 hyperelliptic curve Tate pairing
is discussed. Genus 2 curves offer an embedding degree of 12, which means that a smaller
subfield can be used than in the elliptic cases. This benefit is, however, offset by a more
complicated pairing construction and the challenges of computation on extensions of high
degree. Algorithms for the Tate pairing, calculated using the ηT method, are provided
in Chapter 5. Tower field constructions that enable fast extension field arithmetic are
also discussed. Hardware units for the accelerated computation of the genus 2 iterative
loop (Algorithm 10) are presented. A precomputation unit is carefully designed to supply
squares and roots when necessary. Two sparse members of F212m must be multiplied. The
F212m result is then multiplied by the accumulating Miller variable on each iteration. A
custom dual mode multiplication unit performs both of these operations quickly while
minimising resource utilisation. The genus 2 processor is implemented on a Virtex-II Pro
FPGA. Results show that a pairing can be computed in the same order of clock cycles as
in the characteristic 2 elliptic case. Furthermore, the genus 2 implementations are more
efficient, returning the lowest AC products. The genus 2 implementation also scales better
with increases in security level due to the high embedding degree. Prior to this work, there
had been no published hardware implementation of a pairing using any type of algorithm
on genus 2 curves. An early, more general purpose, version of the genus 2 processor was
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presented at the 2006 IEEE Conference on Information Technology: New Generations
[9]. The architectures of the custom hardware units and the final genus 2 processor were
published in The Journal of Systems Architecture in 2007 [10].
In Chapter 6, a flexible processor for characteristic 2 and 3 elliptic curve Tate pairing
computation is presented. During the initial stages of the work, analysis showed that
hardware implementation of parallelised characteristic 3 extension field arithmetic would
lead to an unjustifiable area utilisation. This analysis provided the motivation for the
creation of a processor that employs subfield modules alone. The top level architecture
contains RAM for storage, an ALU, tristate buffers and a control system. The ALU can
be programmed to contain either characteristic 2 or 3 arithmetic modules. The quantity
of multiplication modules and their digit sizes can be varied using the flexible software
design system. The control system contains an FSM, a counter and a ROM. The FSM
handles the counter, which accesses an instruction set contained in the ROM. A C++
class has been written to reduce the instruction set generation effort. An algorithm that
is to be implemented can be defined in terms of subfield and extension field operations
using all of the functionality of C++. The instruction set is then generated automatically
and flashed to ROM. Characteristic 2 and 3 versions of the processor are implemented
on a Xilinx Virtex-II Pro FPGA for various versions of the ALU. Results show that
maximal efficiency is provided when area utilisation is low: implementations with small
footprints can return pairings in relatively low numbers of clock cycles. The primary
focus of the processors of Chapters 4 and 5 and, indeed, those discussed in much of the
literature is fast pairing computation. Those hardware architectures are more fixed in
nature and it can be difficult to maintain performance and efficiency when they must be
scaled down in area. The flexible processor described here is an excellent computation
platform for environments with small area profiles. The features of the software system
and the ease of architectural modification enables the rapid and detailed exploration of
solutions for various applications. The processor is also suited to embedded environments
in which bandwidth is limited. If the algorithm to be implemented must be modified, the
associated instruction set can be generated in a central system (such as a server). This can
be sent to the embedded system in a very small file, along with a control signal indicating
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that the ROM should be updated. This means that a large architectural reprogramming
file does not need to be sent to modify the operations performed by a remote device. A
characteristic 3 version of the flexible processor, performing the reduced ηT pairing without
conversion to the Tate pairing, was presented at the 2007 IEEE conference on Information
Technology: New Generations [11]. An implementation computing the Tate pairing was
published in the International Journal of High Performance Systems Architecture in 2007
[12]. Subsequent to this, the processor was further discussed and characteristic 2 and
3 pairing results published in a chapter of a 2009 IOS Press book titled Identity-Based
Cryptography [13].
In chapter 7, the state of the art of pairing-based cryptography has been presented. Mod-
ern pairing computation techniques, security issues, and developments in software and
hardware implementations have been described. The ideas, design strategies and architec-
tures of this thesis have had an influence on many of these implementations. Many novel
pairing-based applications have been proposed in the literature. The implementations and
suggested use of pairings on such a wide breadth of devices as large, dedicated ASICs, ex-
pensive to low cost FPGAs, general purpose serial processors, microprocessors and even
on USB tokens is a large cause for optimism that PBC will remain a rapid growth area.
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